Artikel: Why Poor Countries Are Poor

[dirkie]

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

Martijn,
Je slaat je kop precies op de spijker. Het geldt
inderdaad, in mindere mate, voor Nederland en andere
westerse democratien...
Hoe verder ik las hoe meer paralellen te vooschijn
komen op een weliswaar andere manier en met minder
directe dramatische gevolgen dan in Camaroon maar de
vierde macht, en een gebrekkig functionerende
parlementaire democratie hebben dezelfde neiging.
Het geloof komt daar nog bij...
dirkie

--- Martijn Meijering <mmeijeri at xs4all.nl> wrote:

> REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl
>
> Mooi artikel Bart, dank. In minder ernstige vorm
> geldt dit vrees is ook
> voor westerse democratieen...
>
> > REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl
> >
> >
> http://www.reason.com/news/show/33258.html?id=05dr3
> >
> > Wel aardige leeskost vond ik, hoe krijgen we toch
> eens voor elkaar dat
> > er in die arm blijvende landen eens behoorlijk
> bestuur komt.
> >
> > Welke krachten kan de internationale gemeenschap
> uitoefenen, behoudens
> > dom geweld? Zorgen dat verkiezingen eerlijk
> verlopen, maar dan ook echt?
> >
> > Dus inclusief vrije pers, vrije informatie, het
> uitsluiten van fraude en
> > dwang, en zorgen dat iedereen kan stemmen?
> >
> > Ik zet de tekst hier toch maar even onder:
> >
> > Why Poor Countries Are Poor
> >
> > The clues lie on a bumpy road leading to the
> world's worst library.
> >
> > Tim Harford | March 2006 Print Edition
> >
> > They call Douala the "armpit of Africa." Lodged
> beneath the bulging
> > shoulder of West Africa, this malaria-infested
> city in southwestern
> > Cameroon is humid, unattractive, and smelly. On a
> torrid evening in late
> > 2001, I was guided out of the chaotic Douala
> International Airport by my
> > friend Andrew and his driver, Sam, who would have
> whisked us immediately
> > to the cooler hillside town of Buea if Douala were
> at all conducive to
> > being whisked anywhere. It isn't. Douala, a city
> of 2 million people,
> > has no real roads.
> >
> > A typical Douala street is 50 yards wide from
> shack to shack. It's
> > packed with street vendors, slouched beside a tray
> of peanuts or an
> > impromptu plantain barbecue, and with little
> clusters of people,
> > standing around a motorbike, drinking beer or palm
> wine, or cooking on a
> > small fire. Piles of rubble and vast holes mark
> unfinished construction
> > or demolition work. Along the middle is a strip of
> potholes that 20
> > years ago was a road.
> >
> > Down that strip drive four streams of traffic,
> mostly taxis. The streams
> > on the outside are usually made up of cabs picking
> up fares, while the
> > taxis on the inside weave in and out of the
> potholes and other cars with
> > all the predictability of ping pong balls in a
> lottery machine. Douala
> > used to have buses, but they can no longer cope
> with the decaying roads.
> > So the taxis are all that's left: beaten-up old
> Toyotas, carrying four
> > in the back and three in the front, sprayed New
> York yellow, each with a
> > unique slogan: "God Is Great, " "In God We Trust,"
> "Powered by God, "
> > "Toss Man."
> >
> > Nobody who sees a Douala street scene can conclude
> that Cameroon is poor
> > because of a lack of entrepreneurial spirit. But
> poor it is. The average
> > Cameroonian is eight times poorer than the average
> citizen of the world
> > and almost 50 times poorer than the typical
> American. And Cameroon is
> > getting poorer. Can anything be done to reverse
> the decline and help
> > Cameroon grow richer instead?
> >
> > That's no small question. As the Nobel laureate
> economist Robert Lucas
> > put it, "The consequences for human welfare
> involved in questions like
> > these are simply staggering: Once one starts to
> think about them, it is
> > hard to think about anything else."
> >
> >
> > The Missing Jigsaw Piece
> >
> > Economists used to think wealth came from a
> combination of man-made
> > resources (roads, factories, telephone systems),
> human resources (hard
> > work and education), and technological resources
> (technical know-how, or
> > simply high-tech machinery). Obviously, poor
> countries grew into rich
> > countries by investing money in physical resources
> and by improving
> > human and technological resources with education
> and technology transfer
> > programs.
> >
> > Nothing is wrong with this picture as far as it
> goes. Education,
> > factories, infrastructure, and technical know-how
> are indeed abundant in
> > rich countries and lacking in poor ones. But the
> picture is incomplete,
> > a puzzle with the most important piece missing.
> >
> > The first clue that something is amiss with the
> traditional story is its
> > implication that poor countries should have been
> catching up with rich
> > ones for the last century or so--and that the
> farther behind they are,
> > the faster the catch-up should be. In a country
> that has very little in
> > the way of infrastructure or education, new
> investments have the biggest
> > rewards.
> >
> > This expectation seems to be confirmed by the
> experience of China,
> > Taiwan, and South Korea--not to mention Botswana,
> Chile, India,
> > Mauritius, and Singapore. Fifty years ago they
> were mired in poverty,
> > lacking man-made, human, technical, and sometimes
> natural resources. Now
> > these dynamic countries, not Japan, the United
> States, or Switzerland,
> > have become the fastest-growing economies on the
> planet.
> >
> > Since technology is widely available and
> increasingly cheap, this is
> > what economists should expect of every developing
> country. In a world of
> > diminishing returns, the poorest countries gain
> the most from new
> > technology, infrastructure, and education. South
> Korea, for example,
> > acquired technology by encouraging foreign
> companies to invest or by
> > paying licensing fees. In addition to the fees,
> the investing companies
> > sent profits back home. But the gains to Korean
> workers and investors,
> > in the form of economic growth, were 50 times
> greater than the fees and
> > profits that left the country.
> >
> > As for education and infrastructure, since the
> returns seem to be so
> > high, there should be no shortage of investors
> willing to fund
> > infrastructure projects or lend money to students
> (or to governments
> > that provide education). Banks, domestic and
> foreign, should be lining
> > up to lend people the money to get through school
> or to build a new road
> > or a new power plant. In turn, poor people, or
> poor countries, should be
> > very happy to take out such loans, confident that
> investment returns are
> > so high that the repayments will not be difficult.
> Even if, for some
> > reason, that didn't happen, the World Bank,
> established after World War
> > II with the express aim of providing loans to
> countries for
> > reconstruction and development, lends billions of
> dollars a year to
> > developing countries. Investment money is clearly
> not the issue; either
> > the investments are not being made, or they are
> not delivering the
> > returns the traditional model predicts.
> >
> >
> > A Theory of Government Banditry
> >
> > As our car slowly bumped and lurched through the
> crowds, I tried to make
> > sense of it all by asking Sam, the driver, about
> the country.
> >
> > "Sam, how long was it since the roads were last
> fixed?"
> >
> > "The roads, they have not been fixed for 19
> years."
> >
> > President Paul Biya came to power in November 1982
> and had been in
> > office for 19 years by the time I visited
> Cameroon. Four years later, he
> > is still in power. He recently described his
> opponents as "political
> > amateurs"; they are certainly out of practice.
> >
> > "Don't people complain about the roads?"
> >
> > "They complain, but nothing is done. The
> government tells us there is no
> > money. But there is plenty of money coming from
> the World Bank and from
> > France and Britain and America--but they put it in
> their pockets. They
> > do not spend it on the roads. "
> >
> > "Are there elections in Cameroon?"
> >
> > "Yes! There are elections. President Biya is
> always re-elected with a 90
> > percent majority. "
> >
> > "Do 90 percent of people vote for President Biya?"
> >
> > "No, they do not. He is very unpopular. But still
> there is a 90 percent
> > majority. "
> >
> > You do not have to spend a long time in Cameroon
> to realize how much
> > people resent the government. Much of government
> activity appears to be
> > designed expressly to steal money from the people
> of Cameroon. According
> > to the global watchdog Transparency International,
> Cameroon is one of
> > the most corrupt countries in the world. I was
> warned so starkly about
> > government corruption, and the likelihood that
> officials at the airport
> > would attempt to relieve me of my wad of West
> African francs, that I was
> > more nervous about that than the risk of malaria
> or a gunpoint mugging
> > in the back streets of Douala.
> >
> > Many people have an optimistic view of politicians
> and civil
> > servants--that they are all serving the people and
> doing their best to
> > look after the interests of the country. Other
> people are more cynical,
> > suggesting that many politicians are incompetent
> and often trade off the
> > public interest against their own chances of
> re-election. The economist
> > Mancur Olson proposed a working assumption that
> government's motivations
> > are darker still, and from it theorized that
> stable dictatorships should
> > be worse for economic growth than democracies, but
> better than sheer
> > instability.
> >
> > Olson supposed that governments are simply
> bandits, people with the
> > biggest guns who will turn up and take everything.
> That's the starting
> > point of his analysis--a starting point you will
> have no trouble
> > accepting if you spend five minutes looking around
> you in Cameroon. As
> > Sam said, "There is plenty of money...but they put
> it in their pockets."
> >
> > Imagine a dictator with a tenure of one week--in
> effect, a bandit with a
> > roving army who sweeps in, takes whatever he
> wishes, and leaves.
> > Assuming he's neither malevolent nor kindhearted,
> but purely
> > self-interested, he has no incentive to leave
> anything, unless he plans
> > on coming back next year. But imagine that the
> roaming bandit likes the
> > climate of a certain spot and decides to settle
> down, building a palace
> > and encouraging his army to avail themselves of
> the locals. Desperately
> > unfair though it is, the locals are probably
> better off now that the
> > dictator has decided to stay. A purely
> self-interested dictator will
> > realize he cannot destroy the economy and starve
> the people if he plans
> > on sticking around, because then he would exhaust
> all the resources and
> > have nothing to steal the following year. So a
> dictator who lays claim
> > to a land is a preferable to one who moves around
> constantly in search
> > of new victims to plunder.
> >
> > I cannot confirm that President Biya fits Olson's
> description of a
> > self-interested dictator. But if he did, it
> wouldn't be in his interest
> > to take too much from the Cameroonian people,
> because then there would
> > be nothing to take next year. As long as he feels
> secure in his tenure,
> > he will not wish to kill the golden goose. Like
> the virus whose very
> > existence relies on the bodies it afflicts, Biya
> would have to keep the
> > Cameroonian economy functioning in order to keep
> stealing from it. This
> > suggests that a leader who confidently expects to
> be in power for 20
> > years will do more to cultivate his economy than
> one who expects to flee
> > the country after 20 weeks. Twenty years of an
> "elected dictator" is
> > probably better than 20 years of one coup after
> another.
> >
> > Staying with the simplifying assumption that Biya
> has absolute power
> > over the distribution of Cameroon's income, he
> might decide to steal,
> > say, half of it every year in the form of "taxes"
> that go into his
> > personal bank account. That would be bad news for
> his victims, of
> > course, but also bad news for Cameroon's long-term
> growth. Think of a
> > small business owner considering an investment of
> $1,000 in a new power
> > generator for his workshop. The investment is
> expected to generate
> > income of $100 a year. That's 10 percent, a pretty
> good return. But
> > since Biya might take half of it, the return falls
> to a much less
> > attractive 5 percent. The businessman decides not
> to make the investment
> > after all, so he misses out and so does Biya.
> >
> > Olson does not predict that stable dictatorships
> will do good things for
> > their countries, just that they'll damage the
> economy less than unstable
> > ones. Of course, Biya might make his own
> investments--for instance,
> > providing roads or bridges to encourage commerce.
> While they would be
> > expensive in the short term, they would help the
> economy to prosper,
> > leaving Biya with more opportunities to steal
> later. But the flip side
> > of the businessman's problem applies: Biya would
> be stealing only half
> > of the benefits, not nearly enough to encourage
> him to provide the
> > infrastructure that Cameroon needs.
> >
> > When Biya came to power in 1982, he inherited
> colonial-era roads that
> > had yet to fall apart completely. If he had
> inherited a country without
> > any infrastructure, it would have been in his
> interest to build it up to
> > some extent. Because the infrastructure was
> already in place, Biya
> > needed to calculate whether it was worth
> maintaining, or whether he
> > could simply live off the legacy of Cameroon's
> colonial rulers. In 1982
> > he probably thought the roads would last into the
> 1990s, which was as
> > long as he could reasonably have expected to hold
> onto the reins of
> > power. So he decided to live off the capital of
> the past and never
> > bothered to invest in any type of infrastructure
> for his people. As long
> > as there was enough to get him through his rule,
> why bother spending
> > money that could otherwise go right into his
> personal retirement fund?
> >
> >
> > Bandits, Bandits Everywhere
> >
> > But perhaps Biya is not in control as much as it
> first appears. A little
> > traveling in Cameroon reveals that whether or not
> Biya is the
> > bandit-in-chief, there are many petty bandits to
> satisfy.
> >
> > If you want to drive from the town of Buea to
> Bamenda, farther north,
> > the most popular way to make the trip is by bus;
> minibuses ply all
> > long-distance routes in Cameroon. Designed to seat
> 10 people in comfort,
> > they will depart as soon as 13 paying passengers
> have boarded. The
> > relatively capacious seat beside the driver is
> worth fighting for. The
> > vehicles are old bone-shakers, but the system
> works pretty well. It
> > would work a lot better if not for all the
> roadblocks.
> >
> > Bullying gendarmes, often drunk, stop every
> minibus and try their best
> > to extract bribes from the passengers. They
> usually fail, but from time
> > to time they become determined. My friend Andrew
> was once hauled off a
> > bus and harassed for several hours. The eventual
> pretext for the bribe
> > was his lack of a yellow-fever certificate, which
> you need when you
> > enter the country but not when riding a bus. The
> gendarme explained
> > patiently that Cameroon had to be protected from
> disease. The price of
> > two beers convinced him that an epidemic had been
> prevented, and Andrew
> > caught the next bus, three hours later.
> >
> > This is even less efficient than Mancur Olson's
> model predicts. Olson
> > himself would have admitted that his theory in its
> starkest form
> > underestimates the damage that bad governments
> inflict on their people.
> > Biya needs to keep hundreds of thousands of armed
> police and army
> > officers happy, as well as many civil servants and
> other supporters. In
> > a "perfect" dictatorship, he would simply impose
> the least damaging
> > taxes possible in whatever quantity was necessary
> and distribute the
> > proceeds to his supporters. This approach turns
> out to be impracticable,
> > because it requires far more information about and
> control over the
> > economy than a poor government can possibly
> muster. The substitute is
> > government-tolerated corruption on a massive
> scale.
> >
> > The corruption is not only unfair; it is also
> hugely wasteful. Gendarmes
> > spend their time harassing travelers in return for
> modest returns. The
> > costs are enormous. An entire police force is too
> busy extracting bribes
> > to catch criminals. A four-hour trip takes five
> hours. Travelers take
> > costly steps to protect themselves: carrying less
> money, traveling less
> > often or at busier times of the day, bringing
> extra paperwork to help
> > fend off attempts to extract bribes.
> >
> > The blockades and crooked police officers comprise
> a particularly
> > visible form of corruption, but there are
> metaphorical roadblocks
> > throughout the Cameroonian economy. To set up a
> small business, an
> > entrepreneur must spend on official fees nearly as
> much as the average
> > Cameroonian makes in two years. To buy or sell
> property costs nearly a
> > fifth of the property's value. To get the courts
> to enforce an unpaid
> > invoice takes nearly two years, costs more than a
> third of the invoice's
> > value, and requires 58 separate procedures. These
> ridiculous regulations
> > are good news for the bureaucrats who enforce
> them. Every procedure is
> > an opportunity to extract a bribe. The slower the
> standard processes,
> > the greater the temptation to pay "speed money."
> >
> > Inflexible labor regulations help ensure that only
> experienced
> > professional men are given formal contracts; women
> and young people have
> > to fend for themselves in the gray market. Red
> tape discourages new
> > businesses. Slow courts mean that entrepreneurs
> are forced to turn down
> > attractive opportunities with new customers,
> because they know they
> > cannot protect themselves if they are cheated.
> Poor countries have the
> > worst examples of such regulations, and that is
> one of the major reasons
> > they are poor. Officials in rich countries perform
> these basic
> > bureaucratic tasks relatively quickly and cheaply,
> whereas officials in
> > poor countries draw out the process in hopes of
> pocketing some extra
> > cash themselves.
> >
> >
> > Institutions Matter
> >
> > Government banditry, widespread waste, and
> oppressive regulations are
> > all elements in that missing piece of the puzzle.
> During the last 10
> > years or so, economists working on development
> issues have converged on
> > the mantra that "institutions matter." Of course,
> it is hard to describe
> > what an "institution" really is. It is even harder
> to convert a bad
> > institution into a good one.
> >
> > But progress is being made. We've just seen one
> kind of institution:
> > business regulations. Sometimes, it can be
> improved with simple
> > publicity. After the World Bank revealed that
> entrepreneurs in Ethiopia
> > couldn't legally start a business without paying
> four years' salary to
> > publish an official notice in government
> newspapers, the Ethiopian
> > government scrapped the rule. New business
> registrations jumped by
> > almost 50 percent immediately.
> >
> > Unfortunately, it is not always so easy to get
> corrupt governments to
> > change their ways. Although it is becoming clearer
> and clearer that
> > dysfunctional institutions are a key explanation
> of poverty in
> > developing countries, most institutions cannot be
> described with an
> > elegant model like Mancur Olson's, or even with
> careful data-gathering
> > by the World Bank. Most unhappy institutions are
> unhappy in their own way.
> >
> > Such a uniquely backfiring setup was responsible
> for the world's worst
> > library. A few days after I arrived in Cameroon, I
> visited one of the
> > country's most prestigious private
> schools--Cameroon's equivalent of
> > Eton. The school boasted two separate library
> buildings, but the
> > librarian was very unhappy. I soon understood why.
> >
> > At first glance the new library was impressive.
> With the exception of
> > the principal's palatial house, it was the only
> two-story structure on
> > campus. Its design was adventurous: a poor man's
> Sydney Opera House. The
> > sloped roof, rather than running down from a
> ridge, soared up in a V
> > from a central valley like the pages of an open
> book on a stand.
> >
> > When you're standing in the blazing sunlight of
> the Cameroonian dry
> > season, it's hard to see at first what the problem
> is with a roof that
> > looks like a giant open book. But that's only if
> you forget, as the
> > architect apparently did, that Cameroon also has a
> rainy season. When it
> > rains in Cameroon, it rains for five solid months.
> It rains so hard that
> > even the most massive storm ditches quickly
> overflow. When that kind of
> > rain meets a roof that is, essentially, a gutter
> that drains onto a
> > flat-roofed entrance hall, you know it's time to
> laminate the books. The
> > only reason the school's books still existed was
> that they'd never been
> > near the new building; the librarian had refused
> repeated requests from
> > the principal to transfer them from the old
> library.
> >
> > I was tempted to conclude that the principal was
> in an advanced stage of
> > denial when I stepped inside the new library to
> see the devastation. It
> > was in ruins. The floor contained the stains of
> countless puddles. The
> > air carried the kind of musty smell associated
> with a damp cave. The
> > plaster was peeling off the walls. Yet the library
> is only four years old.
> >
> > This is a shocking waste. Instead of building the
> library, the school
> > could have bought 40,000 good books, or acquired
> computers with Internet
> > connections, or funded scholarships for poor
> children. Any of these
> > alternatives would have been incomparably better
> than an unusable new
> > library. The school never even needed a new
> library in the first
> > place--the old library works perfectly well, could
> easily hold three
> > times as many books as the school owns, and is
> waterproof.
> >
> > If the library was such a pointless endeavor, why
> was it built at all?
> > It's all too tempting for the visitor in Cameroon
> to shrug his shoulders
> > and explain the country's poverty by presuming
> that Cameroonians are
> > idiots. Cameroonians are no smarter or dumber than
> the rest of us.
> > Seemingly stupid mistakes are so ubiquitous in
> Cameroon that
> > incompetence cannot be the whole explanation.
> There is something more
> > systematic at work. We need to consider the
> incentives of the decision
> > makers.
> >
> > First, most of the senior education officials in
> northwest Cameroon come
> > from the small town of Bafut. Known as the Bafut
> Mafia, these officials
> > control considerable funds for the education
> system, which they hand out
> > based on personal connections rather than
> necessity. Not surprisingly,
> > the principal of this prestigious private school
> was a senior member of
> > the Bafut Mafia. Wanting to convert her school
> into a university, the
> > principal needed to build a library of university
> size and quality. It
> > was irrelevant to the principal that the current
> library was more than
> > sufficient, and that the taxpayers' money could
> have been better spent
> > in other ways or by other schools.
> >
> > Second, nobody was monitoring the principal or her
> spending. Staff
> > members are paid or promoted not on merit but at
> the principal's
> > command. This is a prestigious school with good
> conditions for teachers,
> > so staff members would be particularly eager to
> keep their jobs, which
> > meant keeping in good favor with the principal. In
> fact, the only person
> > able to defy the principal was the librarian, who
> was accountable only
> > to the Voluntary Service Overseas office in
> London. She turned up after
> > the library was built but was at least in time to
> prevent the book
> > collection from being transferred and destroyed.
> >
> > Either the principal was so stupid that she did
> not realize water ruins
> > books, or she did not care very much about the
> books and simply wanted
> > to demonstrate that the library had some books in
> it. The second
> > explanation seems more likely. With the money at
> her fingertips and
> > nobody to object to the wastefulness of building a
> second library, the
> > principal had full control over the project. She
> appointed a former
> > pupil of the school to design the library,
> probably to demonstrate the
> > quality of education provided by the school; she
> did prove a point,
> > although perhaps not the one she intended. But no
> matter how incompetent
> > the architect, the flaws in the design would have
> been spotted if
> > anybody concerned had a strong interest in making
> sure the library
> > functioned as a library. But that was never the
> prime concern of anybody
> > with authority. The people in power simply cared
> about putting up
> > something that could qualify the school as a
> university.
> >
> > Consider the situation: money that was provided
> because of social
> > networks rather than need; a project designed for
> prestige rather than
> > use; a lack of monitoring and accountability; and
> an architect appointed
> > for show by somebody with little interest in the
> quality of the work.
> > The outcome is hardly surprising: A project that
> should never have been
> > built was built, and built badly. The lesson of
> the story might appear
> > to be that self-interested and ambitious people in
> power are often the
> > cause of wastefulness in developing countries. But
> self-interested and
> > ambitious people are in positions of power, great
> and small, all over
> > the world. In many places, they are restrained by
> the law, the press,
> > and democratic opposition. Cameroon's tragedy is
> that there is nothing
> > to hold self-interest in check.
> >
> >
> > Does Development Have a Chance?
> >
> > Development specialists often focus on helping
> poor countries become
> > richer by improving primary education and
> infrastructure such as roads
> > and telephones. That's surely sensible.
> Unfortunately, it's only a small
> > part of the problem. Economists who have pulled
> apart the statistics, or
> > studied unusual data such as the earnings of
> Cameroonians in Cameroon
> > and the earnings of Cameroonians who immigrate to
> the United States,
> > have found that education, infrastructure, and
> factories only begin to
> > explain the gap between rich and poor. Because of
> its lousy education
> > system, Cameroon is perhaps twice as poor as it
> could be. Because of its
> > terrible infrastructure, it's roughly twice as
> poor again. So we would
> > expect Cameroon to be four times poorer than the
> United States. But it
> > is 50 times poorer.
> >
> > More important, why can't the Cameroonian people
> seem to do anything
> > about it? Couldn't Cameroonian communities improve
> their schools?
> > Wouldn't the benefits easily outweigh the costs?
> Couldn't Cameroonian
> > businessmen build factories, license technology,
> seek foreign partners,
> > and make a fortune?
> >
> > Evidently not. Mancur Olson showed that
> kleptocracy at the top stunts
> > the growth of poor countries. Having a thief for
> president doesn't
> > necessarily spell doom; the president might prefer
> to boost the economy
> > and then take a slice of a bigger pie. But in
> general, looting will be
> > widespread either because the dictator is not
> confident of his tenure or
> > because he needs to allow others to steal in order
> to keep their support.
> >
> > The rot starts with government, but it afflicts
> the entire society.
> > There's no point investing in a business because
> the government will not
> > protect you against thieves. (So you might as well
> become a thief
> > yourself.) There's no point in paying your phone
> bill because no court
> > can make you pay. (So there's no point being a
> phone company.) There's
> > no point setting up an import business because the
> customs officers will
> > be the ones to benefit. (So the customs office is
> underfunded and looks
> > even harder for bribes.) There's no point getting
> an education because
> > jobs are not handed out on merit. (And in any
> case, you can't borrow
> > money for school fees because the bank can't
> collect on the loan.)
> >
> > It is not news that corruption and perverse
> incentives matter. But
> > perhaps it is news that the problem of twisted
> rules and institutions
> > explains not just a little bit of the gap between
> Cameroon and rich
> > countries but almost all of the gap. Countries
> like Cameroon fall far
> > below their potential even considering their poor
> infrastructure, low
> > investment, and minimal education. Worse, the web
> of corruption foils
> > every effort to improve the infrastructure,
> attract investment, and
> > raise educational standards.
> >
> > We still don't have a good word to describe what
> is missing in Cameroon
> > and in poor countries across the world. But we are
> starting to
> > understand what it is. Some people call it "social
> capital," or maybe
> > "trust." Others call it "the rule of law," or
> "institutions." But these
> > are just labels. The problem is that Cameroon,
> like other poor
> > countries, is a topsy-turvy place where it's in
> most people's interest
> > to take actions that directly or indirectly damage
> everyone else. The
> > incentives to create wealth are turned on their
> heads like the roof of
> > the school library.
> >
> > **********
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> >
>
>
> --
> Martijn Meijering
> Meijering & van Sterkenburg
> Niels Bohrweg 11-13
> 2333 CA LEIDEN
> The Netherlands
> phone: +31-(0)71-5282833
> fax:   +31-(0)71-5282834
>
> VAT NL1754.15.407.B.01
> KvK Rijnland 28085728
>
> **********
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