Veilig het jaar 2000 in?...FWD: [2/2] CND: The Millennium Bug and Nuclear Weapons

[Ak Malten]

Beste Mensen,

ter informatie. Deze E-mail is speciaal bedoeld om de discussie 
over de millennium bug weer aan te zwengelen.

Deze E-mail bestaat uit 2 delen...

Met vriendelijke groeten,

Peace,
or saved by
the pigeon,

Ak Malten,

Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance

---origineel bericht in het Engels (sorry!) volgt---


http://www.cnduk.org/briefing/year2K.htm

CND Special Report [1/2]

The Millennium Bug and Nuclear Weapons


Britain and Trident

If you take the word of the British Defence secretary and the head of US
Defense Department efforts to solve the millennium bug as it affects
nuclear weapons have been a resounding success.

"The nuclear deterrent has been thoroughly checked and there is no
safety risk to the deterrent as a result of the millennium bug." - The
British Ministry of Defence (MoD)

"I would like to take this opportunity to state unequivocally that our
nuclear command and control system has been thoroughly tested and has
performed superbly. We will continue to further test and evaluate our
systems involved in this most important function as our highest
priorityŠ" - US Department of Defense

However, the small amount of data being made available to support such
bold assertions does not instil the same level of confidence in
independent analysts.

One has to first of all remember that the British Trident system is
almost a mirror of the US Trident system with some 70% of the British
system being made up of US components. Furthermore, the British are also
heavily reliant on the US nuclear weapons command and control
infrastructure.

Therefore, any problems with the US Trident system will have an impact
on the British system. If the US programme fails, the British programme
will fail.

In Britain the MoD Y2K remediation programme is having problems of its
own:

*The programme has already slipped from an original target date of
January 1999 to December 1999.

*There are problems with recruiting enough trained staff,

*there were problems with defining pieces of equipment that were
critical to the continued, uninterrupted operations of the MoD, and;

*There have been problems with Trident getting the necessary checks done
by the US Government and its contractors.

The MoD has been working on solving the year 2000 problem since 1996 and
it is currently estimated that it will cost at least £200 million to
fix.

"The Ministry of Defence has had a Year 2000 programme in place since
early 1996. The programme is complex, with over 20,000 computer based
systems to be evaluated. Priority is being given to finding solutions to
those systems that pose a high risk to defence capability, and to
obtaining assurances of millennium compliance from our suppliers." [14]

The MoD set two target dates in October 1996 to ensure full Y2K
compliance.

"October 1997 - Substantial progress should have been made in completing
year 2000 compliance work. A progress review will be undertaken to
ensure that all systems have been checked and that deadlines will be
met.

December 1998 - Mission critical systems should now be year 2000
compliant to allow time for bedding in and to allow resources to be
devoted to other systems." [15]

A 'Deterrent Millennium Task Group' was established to ensure the
British Trident system is Y2K compliant but the MoD are not able to say
how many people are working on the issue or how much it will cost
because there "is no separately identifiable central record". [16]

Trident is a modern, heavily computer reliant weapons system.

The job of the Deterrent Task Group is to check the missile, the
warhead, fire control, navigation, targeting, firing chain, reactor and
propulsion control, sonar, command and control and all associated shore
based facilities.

The MoD will not reveal how the 'Deterrent Millennium Task Group' are
getting on because they believe that "to disclose the details of our
audits and investigationsŠ would reveal information which could
compromise the effectiveness of the UK's strategic deterrent". [17]

Despite the shroud of secrecy the facts that are available show all is
not well within the Ministry of Defence Y2K programme.

The September 1998 review of MoD progress stated that there was
confusion in identifying the number of mission critical systems within
the MoD i.e. those that are the highest priority to fix. As a result "in
June 1998 the MoD was forced to issue a common baselineŠ in the hope of
producing a more realistic figure" [18] and that it was hoped that the
December review will provide more realistic figures on which to measure
progress.

The September 1998 review went on to state that :

"Šthe MoD might need to delay or stop activities/projects while
attention and resources are focussed on Y2K. He also said that some
systems might need to be abandoned in the short term pending resolution
of the problem." [19]

"Shortage of skilled in-house staff is being identified as a potential
risk to the programme in some areasŠ" [20]

The MoD Year 2000 newsletter of the same period stated that as of
September 1998 57% of MoD's critical system will not be fixed by the
December deadline.

Of this 57% there was no known date for the compliance of 29% and all
that can be said of the other 28% is that they will be compliant after
December 1998. [21]

Taskforce 2000 described the Ministry of Defence as being one of nine
'high risk' departments. The MoD have admitted that the findings of the
report are correct - "Taskforce 2000 have correctly recognised the scale
of the problem facing the Ministry of Defence and the capability of our
programme managers." [22]

The UK MoD progress report for June of this year provides some worrisome
about the level of UK MoD Y2K preparedness.

In order to be assured that all of your systems are fully Y2K compliant
you first have to find them, repair them, independently verify that the
fixes put in place are correct then test them in every possible
scenario.

For the first time the UK MoD have released failure rate figures for
these independent audits.

According to the latest quarterly report MoD are only independently
auditing on a random sample basis a small percentage of their systems,
seven to ten per cent (around 100 - 150), not one hundred per cent.

Therefore, it can be viewed as representative of all MoD systems.

The independent audit by Logica and Smith Systems is described by MoD as
"bringing particular value through technical expertise and commercial
experience."

Audits of just under half of the planned systems has found one-fifth
having 'minor deficiencies' i.e. where the auditors felt that whilst the
work to demonstrate compliance was 'generally adequate', aspects of the
particular project being audited 'required further attention'.

A further fifteen per cent were found to have 'major deficiencies' i.e.
further work was needed before the system could be declared compliant.

For a third of all systems audited the common findings of the auditors
were:

*Scope of rectification project not adequately defined;

*Inadequate testing of interfaces with other systems;

*Lack of attention to project risk management

*Missing documentary evidence of project plans and/or test results, and;

*Inadequate procedures to ensure that systems remain compliant once
rectified.

This audit programme will continue through till October 1999.

Going by this failure rate of a random sample we are looking at major
deficiencies being found in 300 MoD systems with a further 200 having
minor deficiencies - some one-third of all MoD critical systems.

As worrying is the testing programme which MoD are conducting.

Some 36 exercises are planned throughout this year which will include
Y2K technical validation and demonstration of contingency plans.

What if, deficiencies are found here as well.

With over a third of MoD critical systems thought to be compliant being
found to be deficient the rosy picture being painted now doesn't look so
good.

Another problem is contractors. One may recall the admittance by MoD
that they were reliant upon US contractors to tell them about Y2K
compliance of systems on Trident boats.

According to MoD as of June this year just over half of their suppliers
have provided them with 'satisfactory replies', a further one third had
not even replied to the original questionnaire sent out almost a year
ago and a further one-fifth had replied but were being asked for further
information.

The US Situation

According to the Ministry of Defence because the "Trident Strategic
Weapons System was procured 'off the shelf' from the US Government" they
are reliant upon the US who have "a programme of work to provide
certification of year 2000 compliance for all items associated with the
system procured by the UK." [23]

In the US where information is more easily available there is greater
concern about how Y2K compliant nuclear weapons and their associated
infrastructure actually are. The US Department of Defence (DOD) is
spending $3,700 million on fixing the problem.

For example:

*One mission critical system for the Trident nuclear weapons system will
not be Y2K compliant at the end of this year;

*It was estimated that 81% of DoD critical systems were fixed as of
December 1998 and this would increase to 93% by the Government set March
31, 1999 deadline - by March the number dropped to eighty-eight per
cent;

*Reports from the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the unit that oversees
the US nuclear stockpile, on US nuclear weapons systems Y2K compliance
were found to have been inaccurate after an investigation by the DoD's
own internal auditor, and;

*It appears that the every part of the US Navy's nuclear submarine
command and communication systems cannot be renovated in time. [24]

Innumerable Congressional investigations of the US Navy Y2K programme
and of the US Department of Defense overall show that things are not
going terribly well.

A report by the US General Accounting Office concluded that:

"While the Navy has taken a number of actions to address this issue,
many critical tasks remain to be done in a relatively short period. At
this point, the Navy does not know whether it has identified all systems
and interfaces; it lacks reliable data on the status or cost of
remediation efforts; and it does not know if it has the capacity to
handle the demanding task of testing systems, networks, operating
platforms and databases. Despite the fact that these weaknesses have
greatly increased the chances that it will not correct its
mission-critical systems in time, the Navy is not adequately prepared to
respond to unforeseen problems and delays." [25]

The US DoD Inspector Generals Office found that of the 430 systems they
investigated that were reported as compliant in November 1997 the
majority did not undergo actual testing to validate Y2K compliance. They
projected that only 36.8% were actually tested for Y2K compliance. A
further 16.1% were determined to be Y2K compliant through an inspection
of the system without testing. 8% were determined to be compliant
through statements made by another organisation and 34.5% were reported
as compliant without testing, inspection without testing or a statement
from another organisation. [26]

The report concluded that:

"Sufficient time to fix the DoD Y2K problem is quickly running out. The
year 2000 will arrive exactly on schedule. Senior DoD management cannot
afford to make Y2K program decisions based on highly inaccurate
information. If DoD does not take the action that it needs to obtain
accurate information as to the status of its Y2K effort, we believe that
serious Y2K failures may occur in DoD mission-critical information
technology systems." [27]

In August of last year the US Secretary of Defence was forced to issue a
memo to all military commands that admitted that the DoD "is making
insufficient progress in its efforts to solve its Y2K problem and went
on to list a series of things he wanted to see occurring."

The following month the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in
their quarterly review, placed the US DoD in Tier One of its Y2K
categories. Tier One "comprises agencies where there is insufficient
evidence of adequate progress." [28]

OMB founded that the number of US DoD mission critical systems that were
behind schedule had increased by nine to 51 since their last report. 69
mission critical systems will miss the March 1999 deadline, double the
amount reported in the previous review. [29]

A report released in November 1998 by the US House Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information and Technology gave the US DoD a D
minus for its Y2K activities. The Chairman of the Committee said he was
'deeply concerned' about the DoD's minus grade. [30]

This grading means that as far as the sub-committee is concerned US DoD
will not be fully Y2K compliant until sometime in 2001.

Their latest 'report card' gave the US DoD a slightly better grade, a C
minus.

In the next OMB Y2K compliance review, of November 1998, the US Dept of
Defence was reported to have only fixed 53% of their 2,581 mission
critical computer systems and the number of systems falling at least two
months behind schedule has increased from 51 to 65. "This slow progress
leaves the agencies far behind OMB's Sept. 30 deadline for having
systems fixed and likely to miss the Jan 31, 1999, deadline for testing
the systems." [31] In the same article US DoD said that the "leading
obstacles" included "the massive co-ordination" effort required as well
as "interfaces across agency or governmental boundaries."

The unpublished DOD data from which this report is compiled gave more
detail as to the seriousness of DOD's problem. One of the eight
subsystems for Trident would not be ready for installation until 15
December this year, leaving sixteen days to test it and fix it if it
goes wrong.

The latest OMB report of June of this year displayed that the US DoD
still had 264 systems to fix - 249 of which are being repaired, eight
are being replaced and seven are being retired. [32]

An audit of 'Strategic Systems Programs' i.e. the US Trident submarine
system by the Navy Inspector General published in January of this year
painted a worrying picture of Tridents Y2K compliance:

"Šthe Strategic Systems Program will not meet the DoD and Navy target
completion dates for their mission support and infrastructure." [33]

Two of the main systems used to communicate with US Trident submarines
will, according to the US Navy, require replacing if they are to be
compliant, something that is unlikely to occur within the next one
hundred days or so. [34]

By not replacing these two systems command and control of US and UK
Trident submarines will be severely weakened.

Even if, with a last gasp Herculean effort Britain and the US manage to
make all of their systems totally compliant they still have to talk to
other systems. If those systems are not compliant then everything could
crash.

Defense Department officials remain adamant however that they will make
the deadline.

"ŠI'm confident that our nation's strategic nuclear forces will be as
safe, secure and reliable after January 1st as they are todayŠ" [35]

One prime example is NATO, which Britain and the US are key members of.
Things are not going well there either.

As of January this year only ten out of a total of one hundred and
twenty-five NATO Mission Critical Systems were thought to be Y2K
compliant. Of the rest, 29 were not compliant, 4 were under
investigation and of the remaining 82 nothing was known. [36]

With so much uncertainty in whether or not the two nations that are
spending so much time, money and effort on solving the Y2K problem will
have their nuclear weapons Y2K compliant on time there should be even
more doubt cast on the capability of other nations where we have less
information who also have nuclear weapons - India, Pakistan, Israel,
France and China.

Russia

"Ša recent report by the Russian "State Communications Committee" and
Russian Foreign Ministry stated that possible disruption could happen in
computer systems for Russian defense forces, and that about 51,000 of
the 96,000 computers in Russia will be susceptible to disruptions at the
turn of the centuryŠ Specifically, the report estimated that half of the
50 operating systems and 100 software programs used by Russian
government structures are facing serious problems due to the millennium
bug." [37]

The Russians have been late in acknowledging the problem of the
millennium bug across their society. Until February 1999 Russia's
civilian military leaders denied that Russia's nuclear forces could have
Y2K difficulties. They have now identified particular Y2K difficulties
and are looking at ways of repairing and/or patching the problems.

Since then they have acknowledged that they face problems and requested
$2-3 billion from the IMF and technical assistance from the U.S. to fix
the problem.

The Russian Northern Fleet based around Murmansk with its forty nuclear
powered submarines and three nuclear powered surface cruisers appears to
have not even got off the ground on beginning Y2K remediation work. It
was estimated that it would cost around $500,000 and between five to 6
months just to repair the fleets local computer network. The fleet was
proposing to sell its old computers to raise the funds but they have not
yet received permission to do so from their Moscow headquarters. [38]

The U.S prepared a group of computer and military experts to go to
Russia and started to develop plans for a jointly operated early warning
centre known as the 'Center for Y2K Strategic Stability'.

The centre was to be built Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado were
Russian and US officers would set side-by-side monitoring data fed
directly from the NORAD operational command centre nearby. These
officers would be in direct touch with those with their finger on the
button in their own countries.

However before work could begin the war in the Balkans began, diplomatic
relations cooled and according to Russian news agency Interfax
co-operation was broken off.

Construction of the facility is almost complete but as of now Russia has
not agreed to participate.

In an interview with CNN the US Government Y2K czar John Koskinen said:

 "If it goes blind in effect, then the level of anxiety could increase, so
we're trying to make sure that doesn't happenŠ we think they're going to
have more difficulties than China." [39]

A meeting is to occur between the US and Russian Defence Secretaries on
September 13 in Moscow to discuss this issue. This is supposed to be
'the decision day' according to a NORAD spokesperson.

Another worrying element is Russia's nuclear control system called
'Perimeter'. According to Jane's Intelligence Review, if Moscow looked
like it was under attack or even of command links to key Russian leaders
were interrupted , Perimeter would automatically launch a communications
missile that would in turn transmit the codes to launch thousands of
nuclear weapons.

China

A recent survey of the countries most crucial enterprises by the Beijing
Morning Post showed that more than half did not even know how to detect
the glitch in their systems.

China's problems are exacerbated by the fact that, by some estimates,
over 90% of the software used in China is pirated, including most of the
software used in government offices and state owned enterprises, making
it difficult to approach software vendors for technical advice to sort
out any problems.

Testimony to a US Congressional Committee by the US intelligence
community expressed concern about the lack of awareness of Y2K in China.

"The Asian economic crisis has hampered the Y2K remediation efforts of
all of the Asia-Pacific countries except Australia. While the lines of
authority for China's Y2K effort have been established, its late start
in addressing Y2K issues suggests Beijing will fail will fail to solve
many of its Y2K problems in the limited time remaining, and will
probably experiences failures in key sectors such as telecommunications,
electric power and banking." [40]

Solutions

"Taking nuclear forces off alert could be verified by national technical
means and nuclear weapon state inspection arrangements. in the first
instance, reduction in alert status could be adopted by the nuclear
weapon states unilaterally" [41]

It is obvious that none of the eight nations who possess nuclear weapons
can guarantee that their nuclear- related computer systems are Y2K
compliant. Therefore the only responsible solution is for everyone to
stand down nuclear operations. This would involve taking the
approximately five thousand nuclear weapons onboard submarines and in
land-based silos off alert status and de-coupling the nuclear warheads
from their respective delivery vehicles.

These moves would mirror the recommendations made by the Australian
Government established commission of experts known as the Canberra
Commission in August 1996, which believed that by terminating the
practice of maintaining nuclear forces on a high states of you would: --

*Reduce dramatically the chances of accidental or unauthorised nuclear
missile launch.

*Help set the stage for intensified co-operation on a more far- reaching
disarmament agenda

*Have a very positive influence on the political climate between nuclear
weapon states.

If both sides are verifiably de-alerted, it will not be possible for
either to launch a disarming first strike.

"Šwe have to understand that stability based on mutually assured
destruction is as unsafe as it was in 1962 when Mr McNamara arrived to
the notion of nuclear deterrence. And maybe the year 2000 problem
provides us with even greater impetus to analyze the entirely unhealthy
dependence of Russia and the United States on launch and warning and
going to the next century with a completely different management of the
inter-relationship between our two nuclear forces." [42]

The immediate stakes are so high, and the potential for global
catastrophe so clear, that mutually verified de-alerting to reduce the
dangers presented by the Y2K computer problem must take precedence over
all other political, defence and foreign policy considerations.

____________________________________________________________


ACTION ALERT - LETTER WRITERS NEEDED.


THE Y2K DANGER SHOULD BE A WAKE-UP CALL FOR THE WORLD AND
THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE ERA OF NUCLEAR TERROR.


Please send letters to the governments of all the nuclear powers (with the
exception of China, the only one with a 'no first use' policy). The
following sample text may help: postal addresses and fax numbers (where
known) are listed at the end.

DEAR....

'I am writing to convey my extreme concern over the possibility that Year
2000 (Y2K)-related computer failures in nuclear-weapons systems may lead
to an unacceptable risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

'Because none of the nuclear-weapons states can guarantee that their
nuclear-related computer systems are Y2K compliant, the only responsible
solution is for them all to stand down nuclear operations. This should
include taking nuclear weapons off alert status and decoupling nuclear
warheads from delivery vehicles.

'I strongly urge that you remove all strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
from 'hair trigger' alert and place them in a status in which at least
hours and preferably days would be required to launch them.

'The immediate stakes are so high, and the potential for global catastrophe
so clear, that mutually verified de-alerting in the face of the Y2K
computer problem must take precedence over all other considerations of
politics and national security.'


Send letters to:

Britain: Prime Minister Tony Blair, 10 Downing St, London SWLA 2AA.  FAX:
0171 930 1419

France: President Jacques Chirac, Palais de I'Elysee, 55 rue de Faubourg St
Honork, 75008 - Paris.

India: Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, South Block, New Delhi 110011.

Israel: Prime Minister Ehud Barak, PO Box 187, Kiryat Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem
91919.

Pakistan: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister's Secretariat,
Islamabad.

Russia: President Boris Yeltsin, Krasnopresenskaya-2, Moscow. FAX
+7-095-205-4330.

United States: President Bill Clinton, White House, Washington DC. FAX
+1-202-456-2461.



'The Titanic sank in an ocean that was 99-per-cent free of icebergs.'

- Y2K microchip systems expert Mark Frautschi.

____________________________________________________________


REFERENCES


[1] Summary of DoD Year 2000 Audit and Inspection Reports II. Office of the
Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. 99-115, March 29, 1999.

[2] "Progress on Year 2000 Conversion", 9th Quarterly Report, US Office of
Management Budget, June 15 1999.

[3] "The Y2K Problem and Nuclear Weapons", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
March/April 1999.

[4] "Russia, US to discuss Y2K missile fears", Jim Wolf, Reuters, Thursday
September 2, 1:11 PM ET.

[5] "Year 2000 issues within US European Command and its Service
Components", Report No. 99-145, Office of the Inspector General, April 30,
1999.

[6] The North American Aerospace Defence Command, which receives and
analyses all information from satellites and radar to warn of any attacks
occurring against the continental United States with the particular job of
watching for a nuclear attack.

[7] Deputy Secretary of Defense John J Hamre, Statement before the Senate
Armed Service Committee Information Systems, 4 June 1998.

[8] "The Y2K Problem and Nuclear Weapons", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
March/April 1999.

[9] Mark Frautschi http://www.tmn.com.y2k

[10] Statement of John A Koskinen, Chairman President's Council on Year
2000 Conversion, before the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, and the Subcommittee on Technology of the Committee on Science,
US House of Representatives, January 20, 1999.

[11] Quoted in the Report of the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000
Technology Problem.

[12] Testimony of Lawrence K Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for
Science and Technology, National Intelligence Council, Government
Management, Information and Technology Subcommittee of the House Government
Reform and Oversight Committee, 20 January 1999.

[13] Statement by Jacquelyn L Williams-Bridgers, Inspector General of the
Department of State before the Special Committee on the Year 2000
Technology Problem, United States Senate, March 5, 1999.

[14] Official Report, 18 November 1998, col. 637.

[15] MoD CIS Policy on the Year 2000 Date Change, 30 October 1996.

[16] Letter from Secretary of State for Defense to Alan Simpson MP, 30
November 1998.

[17] ibid

[18] MoD Departmental Year 2000 plans, Quarterly Return, September 1998.

[19] ibid

[20] ibid

[21] MoD Year 2000 Newsletter, Issue 3, October 1998.

[22] Official Report, 18 November 1998, col. 637.

[23] Letter from Secretary of State for Defense to Alan Simpson MP, 30
November 1998.

[24] British American Security Information Council (BASIC), 'The Bug in the
Bomb', November 1998.

[25] "Year 2000 Computer Problems Put Navy Operations At Risk", United
States General Accounting Office report to the Secretary of the Navy, June
1998, GAO: AIMD-98-150.

[26] "Year 2000 certification of mission-critical DoD Information
Technology Systems. Report No. 98-147, June 5, 1998. Office of the
Inspector General, Department of Defense.

[27] ibid

[28] US Office of Management and Budget, 6th Quarterly Report, Progress on
Year 2000 Conversion, August 15, 1998.

[29] ibid

[30] "Rep says Feds still working 'too slowly' on Y2k", Federal Computer
Week, 23 November 1998.

[31] "Y2K - 4 agencies critical", Federal Computer Week, 23 November 1998.

[32] "Progress on Year 2000 Conversion", 9th Quarterly Report, US Office of
Management Budget, June 15 1999.

[33] Summary of DoD Year 2000 Audit and Inspection Reports II. Office of
the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. 99-115, March 29,
1999.

[34] "The Y2K Problem and Nuclear Weapons", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
March/April 1999.

[35] Admiral Miles, Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command, speaking at a
DoD News Briefing, July 2, 1999.

[36] "Year 2000 issues within US European Command and its Service
Components". Report No. 99-145. Office of the Inspector General, April 30,
1999.

[37] "The Bug in the Bomb", p.11, Michael Kraig, British American Security
Information Council Research Report, November 1998.

[38] "Y2K bugs Russian Navy", Bellona Foundation Press Release, 3 June 1999.

[39] "Russia, US to discuss Y2K missile fears", Jim Wolf, Reuters, Thursday
September 2, 1:11 PM ET.

[40] Testimony of Lawrence K Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for
Science and Technology, National Intelligence Council, Government
Management, Information and Technology Subcommittee of the House Government
Reform and Oversight Committee, 20 January 1999.

[41] Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons", p.54, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, August 1996.

[42] "Y2K: An International Perspective". Remarks by Sergey Rogov,
Director, Academy of Scinces, Russia at CSIS Y2K Risk Assessment Task Force
Public Forum, 6 October 1998.















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