Veilig het jaar 2000 in? ...FWD: [1/2] CND: The Millennium Bug and Nuclear Weapons

[Ak Malten]

Beste Mensen,

ter informatie. Deze E-mail is speciaal bedoeld om de discussie 
over de millennium bug weer aan te zwengelen.

Deze E-mail bestaat uit 2 delen...

Met vriendelijke groeten,

Peace,
or saved by
the pigeon,

Ak Malten,

Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance

---origineel bericht in het Engels (sorry!) volgt---

http://www.cnduk.org/briefing/year2K.htm

[With additional Executive Summary, Action Alert sample letter, and
References]


BRIEFING

CND Special Report [1/2]

The Millennium Bug and Nuclear Weapons

Written by Louise Edge and William Peden

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
162 Holloway Road
London N7 8DQ.

tel: +44 (0)171-700 2393
fax: +44 (0)171 700 2357

email: cnd at gn.apc.org

website: http://www.cnduk.org


This report is indebted to the work of the British American Security
Information Council and their report on U.S. nuclear weapons and Y2K:
"The Bug in the Bomb" http://www.basicint.org/y2krept.htm (in 5 parts).


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Computer technology is central to nuclear weapons and their associated
command, control and communications systems.

The ability of, particularly, the U.S. and Russia to monitor each others
activities is based on a highly interdependent conglomeration of radar
arrays, satellites, commununications networks and data processing stations
all of which rely heavily on computers. Computer crashes or false data
being generated could have disastrous consequences.

Examples of microchips used in the nuclear weapons systems include command
and control systems, radar, and safety systems in submarine nuclear
reactors, warhead storage bunkers and missile silos.

Analysts in the US are particularly concerned about small problems arising
from Y2K and going undetected. If an entire system crashes that is obvious.
However, if the glitch triggers some unobtrusive transformation of data,
those relying on the information might not know the data was invalid and
make a bad decision as a result.

One example would be detection of a missile launch which had not taken
place or a communications failure from a missile silo to its command
centre, both of which could lead operators to believe they were under
nuclear attack.

Is the military ready?

Of the 36,000 nuclear weapons remaining in the world, approximately five
thousand sit in silos and on submarines on high alert status. Every one of
these missiles can be fired within 15 minutes and reach their target cities
in under 30 minutes.

Reports of poor communications, unpaid staff and low morale within the
Russian nuclear control structure and the ongoing economic and political
problems within the former Soviet Union only increase concerns about safety
over the millennium roll over period.

Britain

In Britain the MoD Y2K remediation programme is having problems. The MoD
has been working on solving the year 2000 problem since 1996 and it is
currently estimated that it will cost at least £200 million to fix. The
programme has slipped from its original target date for completion of
January 1999 to December 1999.

According to the latest quarterly report MoD are only independently
auditing on a random sample basis a small
percentage of their systems, seven to ten per cent (around 100 - 150), not
one hundred per cent.

Audits of just under half of the planned systems has found one-fifth having
"minor deficiencies" i.e. where the auditors felt that whilst the work to
demonstrate compliance was "generally adequate", aspects of the particular
project being audited "required further attention".

A further fifteen per cent were found to have "major deficiencies" i.e.
further work was needed before the system could be declared compliant.

Going by this failure rate of a random sample we are looking at major
deficiencies being found in 300 MoD systems with a further 200 having minor
deficiencies - some one-third of all MoD critical systems.

The United States

In the US, where information is more easily available, there is greater
concern about how Y2K compliant nuclear weapons and their associated
infrastructure actually are. The US Department of Defence (DOD) is spending
$3,700 million on fixing the problem.

An audit of "Strategic Systems Programs" i.e. the office which operates the
US Trident submarine system and parts of the British system by the US Navy
Inspector General concluded that "...the Strategic Systems Program will not
meet the DoD and Navy target completion dates for their mission-support and
infrastructure." [1]

The unpublished DOD data from which the US Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) compiles its quarterly Y2K progress reports gave more detail as to
the seriousness of DOD's problem. One of the eight subsystems for Trident
would not be ready for installation until 15 December this year, leaving
sixteen days to test it and fix it if it doesn't quite work.

The latest OMB report of June of this year displayed that the US DoD still
had 264 systems to fix - 249 of which are being repaired, eight are being
replaced and seven are being retired. [2]

Furthermore, two of the main systems used to communicate with US Trident
submarines will, according to the US Navy, require replacing if they are to
be compliant, something that is unlikely to occur within the next one
hundred days or so. [3]

By not replacing these two systems, command and control of US and UK
Trident submarines will be severely weakened.

Russia

The Russians have been late in acknowledging the problem of the millennium
bug across their society. Until February 1999 Russia's civilian military
leaders denied that Russia's nuclear forces could have Y2K difficulties.
They have now identified particular Y2K difficulties and are looking at
ways of repairing and/or patching the problems.

Since then they have acknowledged that they face problems and requested
$2-3 billion from the IMF and technical assistance from the U.S. to fix the
problem.

The U.S prepared a group of computer and military experts to go to Russia
and started to develop plans for a jointly operated early warning centre
known as the 'Center for Y2K Strategic Stability'.

The centre was to be built at Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado where
Russian and US officers would set side-
by-side monitoring data fed directly from the NORAD operational command
centre nearby. These officers would be in direct touch with those with
their finger on the button in their own countries.

However before work could begin the war in the Balkans began, diplomatic
relations cooled and according to Russian news agency Interfax co-operation
was broken off.

Construction of the facility is almost complete but as of now Russia has
not agreed to participate.

In an interview with CNN the US Government Y2K czar John Koskinen said "If
it goes blind in effect, then the level of anxiety could increase, so we're
trying to make sure that doesn't happen... we think they're going to have
more difficulties than China." [4]

A meeting is to occur between the US and Russian Defence Secretaries on
September 13 in Moscow to discuss this issue. This is supposed to be "the
decision day" according to a NORAD spokesperson.

NATO

As of January this year only ten out of one hundred and twenty-five NATO
Mission Critical Systems identified were thought to be Y2K compliant. Of
the rest, 29 were not compliant, 4 were under investigation and of the
remaining 82 nothing was known. [5]

These primarily consist of planning and logistics systems; command, control
and consultation systems; air defence systems; airborne warning aircraft;
and intelligence gathering systems.

As of June NATO were admitting that the crisis in the Balkans had slowed
them down somewhat but they were getting on with it according to the NATO
Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support. How far they have got "on
with it" remains unknown.

Conclusion

It is obvious that none of the eight nations who possess nuclear weapons
can guarantee that their nuclear- related computer systems are Y2K
compliant. Therefore, the only responsible solution is for everyone to
stand down nuclear operations. This would involve taking the approximately
five thousand nuclear weapons onboard submarines and in land-based silos
off alert status and de-coupling the nuclear warheads from their respective
delivery vehicles.

The immediate stakes are so high, and the potential for global catastrophe
so clear, that mutually verified de-alerting to reduce the dangers
presented by the Y2K computer problem must take precedence over all other
political, defence and foreign policy considerations.

____________________________________________________________


What is the millennium bug?

The phrases 'Millennium bug', 'century date change' and 'Y2K' all refer
to the same problem - a defect that exists in millions of computers
world-wide that will cause erroneous handling of date (day, month, year)
information unless corrected.

The origin of the millennium bug dates back to the 1960's and 1970's
when computers were bulky in size but small in memory, which was
expensive to buy at that time. To conserve memory programmers began
designating the year by using two digits rather than four, with the
first two digits assumed to be 19. The year 1967, for example, appears
as 67.

Unless corrected, i.e. expanded to accept four digits, these date
sensitive computer systems and microchips, embedded in countless
mechanical devices, may misinterpret the two zeros in '2000' as '1900'.

How could the millennium bug affect equipment?

The Y2K problem affects two general classes of equipment. The first
comprises business or mainframe computer systems. These perform a
variety of data intensive calculations - balancing accounts, making
automatic payments, ordering goods etc.

The second class of equipment affected is embedded chips, alternatively
known as embedded processors or microchips. These are found across our
modern society and are primarily used to control or augment operations.

Worldwide, it is estimated that there are 15 billion microchips - most
of which contain some form of date related function - are embedded in
appliances and machines ranging from clock radios to ATMs. For example,
a new car today rolls onto the highway with at least 100 microchips in
it. Microchips are embedded in thermostats, leak detectors, underground
storage tank monitors, boilers, lighting systems, generators, elevators,
alarms, smoke detectors, sprinklers, sewage systems and all common
office equipment.

The effect of the Y2K flaw on computer systems, whether generated by
failure to fix the mainframe or an embedded chip, is not easily
predictable. It may bring a computer to a crashing halt. It may cause it
to generate obviously incorrect outputs. Alternatively, it could allow
the computer to produce invalid data that will not be detected until
much later.

Y2K related failures in business computer systems could mean that
payments to staff or creditors may be wrong or not occur, tracking
inventory orders and responding to emergencies may be affected.

Y2K problems in any one of these microchips embedded in any one system
can cause problems - for instance the failure of a chip that controls
security in a military establishment could result in an automatic lock
in of staff.

The failure of a chip that monitors water flow or temperature in an
industrial plant could cause erroneous alerts or fail to spark an alert
when a genuine emergency exists.

Furthermore, the failure of one chip can set off a chain of events.
Failing chips can cripple subsystems, which in turn can cause partial or
total failure of entire systems. Those impaired systems may cause any or
all of the other systems which they are connected with to fail as well.

How could the bug affect nuclear weapons?

Computer technology is central to nuclear weapons and their associated
command, control and communications systems.

The ability of, particularly, the U.S. and Russia to monitor each others
activities is based on a highly interdependent conglomeration of radar
arrays, satellites, communications networks and data processing stations
all of which rely heavily on computers. Computer crashes or false data
being generated could have disastrous consequences.

The problem facing technicians working to sort out the millennium bug as
it affects nuclear weapons and their communications systems is made more
difficult because the systems in question utilise millions of "embedded
systems" in the form of microchips and microprocessors.

These embedded chips are a particular problem for the military. In order
to keep costs down the military have traditionally used '
commercial-off-the-shelf' chips (COTS) that are generic and may have
time and/or date functions imbedded within them rather than uniquely
one-off designs. Embedded chips are so widespread that their individual
identification within a particular system or subsystem takes a lot of t
ime. In addition there is no general method for assessing the Y2K
compliance of software, chips or microprocessors therefore every system
must be checked line by line and chip by chip in order to ensure
compliance - a gargantuan task.

Examples of microchips used in the nuclear weapons systems include
command and control systems, radar, and safety systems in submarine
nuclear reactors, warhead storage bunkers and missile silos.

Analysts in the US are particularly concerned about small problems
arising and going undetected. If an entire system crashes that is
obvious. However, if the glitch triggers some unobtrusive transformation
of data, those relying on the information might not know the data was
invalid and make a bad decision as a result.

The problem of interlinked systems

Another problem the military face is that even if a particular system is
free of Y2K errors, any interfaces or connections to other systems that
are not fully Y2K compliant could introduce bad data, causing the fixed
systems to produce erroneous information or even shut down completely.
This creates severe problems for military alliances such as NATO.

As of January this year only ten out of one hundred and twenty-five NATO
Mission Critical Systems were thought to be Y2K compliant. Of the rest,
29 were not compliant, 4 were under investigation and of the remaining
82 nothing was known.

These primarily consist of planning and logistics systems; command,
control and consultation systems; air defence systems; airborne warning
aircraft; and intelligence gathering systems.

As of June NATO were admitting that the crisis in the Balkans had slowed
them down somewhat but they were getting on with it according to the
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support. How far they have
got "on with it" remains unknown.

"Our involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo made us slower to focus on Y2K
issues than what might otherwise have beenŠThat having been said, now we
are focussed and have a clear idea of what our most important systems
are to correctŠ While the organisation does not have the thousands of
information systems a single country has the job of getting ready for
Y2K is by no means trivial."

Furthermore, nuclear weapons systems can rely on non-nuclear,
non-national and non-military systems. For example, the US military
relies on an array of commercial computer systems and in some areas is
also dependent upon civilian water and power systems. Another example is
that the US communications from STRATCOM (Strategic Command) to its
nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean travel partly over the Italian
telephone system.

Any glitch in any one of these non-military systems could cause trouble
in areas where the military were confident they were Y2K compliant.

Because of these subtle insidious side effects U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defence John Hamre admitted, "Everything is so interconnected , its hard
to know with any precision whether we have got it fixed".

Accident scenarios

Accidental automatic launch

It is extremely unlikely that a computer failure on 1st Jan 2000 would
lead to an accidental automatic launch of a nuclear missile. This is
because most missiles have safety and security systems inside, such as
Permissive Action Links (PALs) and Environmental Sensing Devices (ESDs),
designed specifically to prevent an accidental launch. The most likely
way in which Y2K could affect missiles is by causing the them to shut
down and disable itself.

A more likely accident scenario is faulty data causing someone to
wrongly order a missile launch.

Faulty data causing human error

"The potential seriousness of Y2K-related glitches in this vast 'system
of systems' was demonstrated by a 1993 simulated test by NORAD [6]
personnel. Out of curiosity, the technicians rolled the dates up to Jan
1, 2000. The result, total system blackout (Kaplan, 1993). Officials
have become increasingly aware of the Y2K glitch since that incident;
this is especially true for the nuclear weapons and C3I (Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence) community."

"Šthere might be a combination of nuclear nightmares: C3I networks may
leave the nation blind to incoming attack or inform leaders that an
attack is in progress when none actually exists, or foreign systems
(such as those in Russia or China) may fail while the US continues to
field a viable arsenal, possibly causing increased fears and instability
as leaders with Y2K problems become suspicious of US military
activitiesŠ"

As a result of Y2K induced problems communications systems which control
nuclear weapons systems may become faulty or blocked, erroneous early
warning information of a nuclear missile launch may be received,
computer screens may black out and nuclear weapons support systems may
fail.

The danger during the Y2K rollover lies primarily in the possibility
that spurious data coming through early warning systems may induce
commanders, even at the highest levels, to mistakenly authorise the
launches of nuclear weapons because they believe they are under attack.

One other point to bear in mind is that all commanders in charge of
nuclear systems have instructions and the ability to launch if
communications with their command centre fail. This is for the obvious
reason that if a nuclear attack did occur there may not be time to issue
the launch command through the proper command chain because it has been
destroyed. Therefore, if communications were to fail, there is the
possibility that a commander could take that as meaning a nuclear attack
had occurred, the higher echelons were all dead, and he should launch.

High Alert Status

The risk of such a launch is increased because of the continuation by
Russia and the US of a policy of 'launch on warning'. This calls for
instant retaliation as soon as it is detected that another country has
launched a nuclear attack. Of the 36,000 nuclear weapons remaining in
the world approximately five thousand sit in silos and on submarines on
high alert status. Every one of these missiles can be fired within 15
minutes and reach their target cities in under 30 minutes.

Russia is a particular concern because of the huge economic and
political problems currently dominating its attention, combined with a
recognised low awareness of the Y2K issue. Reports of poor
communications, unpaid staff and low morale within the Russian nuclear
control structure can only increase concerns.

It is very dangerous to assume that the widely dispersed Russian
military personnel will be prepared to deal cautiously with any launch
reports received on 1st January 2000?

Even without the millennium bug adding its element of chaos, US and
Russian early warning systems have experienced close calls based on
receiving false or wrongly interpreted early warning data which cast
serious doubt on their ability to cope if a Y2K glitch occurs.

For example:

*In the US in 1980, warning displays at U.S. nuclear command centres
began showing the launch of enemy missiles. Preparations for retaliation
against an apparent Soviet attack were quickly instituted. Minuteman
missiles were readied for launch. In the end the number of missile shown
in the displays didn't make sense and the alert was cancelled.
Technicians traced the fault to the random failure of a 46-cent computer
chip.

*In 1983 in Russia, satellites mistook glare off the tops of clouds for
a US missile launch, (and disaster was averted by the refusal of the
local commander to believe the warnings were real);

*In 1995, a Norwegian research rocket prompted a full-scale Russian
alert. If Y2K breakdowns produce inaccurate early warning data, or if
communications and command channels are compromised, the combination of
hair-trigger force postures and Y2K failures could be disastrous. There
should therefore be a 'safety first ' approach to Y2K and nuclear
arsenals.

In an attempt to alleviate this problem of false alerts the Presidents
of Russia and the United States agreed in September of last year to
share missile early warning data.

Plans were shelved following diplomatic cooling caused by the Balkans
War. Talks have been resumed and details of this are still being worked
out and it is now certain that it will not happen until sometime next
year at the earliest.

Submarine safety

"The failure of an embedded microchip in a discrete, localised computer
or machine, such as a wristwatch, or the air conditioning system in a
building can be merely inconvenient. However the failure of a microchip
in a critical, large or dangerous piece of machinery - loss of air
pressure in an F15 or a submerged submarine - can be devastating and
even life threatening". [7]

Another accident scenario is the breakdowns in the cooling systems of
nuclear reactors onboard submarines or any of the other many reactor
safety systems such as radiation detection devices.

In one instance a British Trident submarine commander switched the
nuclear power plant off to test the reaction of his crew and the
submarine's back up diesel propulsion system. Sadly for him and his crew
the submarine's backup propulsion system was insufficiently powerful to
maintain the submarine safely at depth and the submarine started to
plummet to the ocean floor. There was then a problem restarting the
nuclear reactor before the submarine imploded from the pressure of being
beyond its maximum design depth. Luckily, the reactor system was
restarted just in time and the submarine safely surfaced. If Y2K
problems were to cause such a glitch there may be no way to reinstate
reactor power.

The consequences of such a scenario would be the certain death of the
crew and the scattering of large amounts of nuclear material into the
ocean environment.

Submarine communications

It also appears that the US navy's nuclear submarine command and
communications systems cannot be renovated.

Several of the navy's key components for communicating with its nuclear
submarines are far behind schedule for ensuring Y2K compliance.

Two of the main systems used to communicate with US Trident submarines
will, according to the US Navy, require replacing if they are to be
compliant, something that is unlikely to occur within the next one
hundred days or so. [8]

By not replacing these two systems command and control of US and UK
Trident submarines will be severely weakened.

One should remember that submarine commanders need to maintain
continuous communications with base. If this fails they are trained to
assume that there country has been attacked and launch their missiles.

We can only hope that if this does occur then the submarine commanders
would surface and attempt to establish whether an attack had occurred
by, for example, trying to pick up CNN before launching.

Force readiness

This can be affected by systems causing automatic shutdown. This may
occur for instance if permissive action links (PALs) that protect a
warhead form accidental or unauthorised detonation were to interpret an
anomalous date as an attempt to illegally unlock it. PALs would respond
by disabling the warhead. Similarly, some chips, concluding that 00
means that no maintenance has taken place since 1900 could shut down
systems for maintenance.

How likely are these scenarios?

"The Titanic sank in an ocean that was 99% free of icebergs". [9]

The short answer to the question how likely is the millennium bug to
cause a disaster or emergency involving nuclear weapons is no-one knows.

Computer scientists and industry pundits estimate that between two and
five per cent of all chips in existence will experience problems. This
figure may seem low but who knows which chips will fail and what the
affect will be.

The consequences might be minor in both depth and breadth and not that
noticeable. The problem could be pervasive with fairly minor affects in
most cases. More of a nuisance than anything else.

Or you have the 'doomsday scenario' where almost all systems fail
outright, and the nature of the glitches leaves systems impervious to
timely intervention by technicians.

The US Department of Defense believes that:

"evidence clearly shows that Y2K-induced failures are likely to be
pervasive, complex, difficult to repair, and potentially damaging. Given
the highly interconnected nature of all systems under the purview of US
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), it is impossible to say with any degree of
certainty that current "fixes" have succeeded. Given the pervasiveness
of imbedded subsystems, in the form of microchips and microprocessors;
it is also impossible to say with any authority that all problem areas
have been properly identified, much less repaired. The only method for
attaining this type of knowledge is through comprehensive, integrated
'mission-level' testing and verification programs, done well in advance
of the Year 2000 in case "evidence clearly shows that Y2K-induced
failures are likely to be perdifficulties occur that need further
renovation."

Fixing the millennium bug problem

The year 2000 problem is far more complex to solve than simply date
changing the date in a computer programme.

A report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) "
The Bug In The Bomb" concluded that:

"In short: to be considered invulnerable, the DoD (US Department of
Defense) has to test nearly every chip and every line of computer code
for systems that are dependent on dates for operations. For those
military items considered "critical to core mission requirements" every
chip may have to undergo examination just to be certain of force
readiness, even when the larger system in question does not overtly
utilize dates."

Problems faced by those trying to solve Y2K problems include:

*Much of the software currently in use is based upon virtually extinct
programming languages for which there exists a shortage of people who
understand them;

*The code from which a program has been devised may be lost, making
amendment difficult if not impossible as the programmers technical
remarks may be missing;

*The subsystems which help support the larger operating system are so
numerous and varied that they may be difficult to locate and impossible
to repair;

*These subsystems may use chips that have their programme imbedded into
the chip itself and this programme may be date dependent or use time
synchronisation to talk to other chips or other parts of the system and
therefore may prove difficult, if not impossible, to identify and
difficult, if not impossible, to fix;

*In order to fully ensure Y2K compliance extensive dry-runs (exercises)
have to occur to ensure each bit of the system can still function in the
way it should, with every other part of the system in every conceivable
scenario (these are time-consuming and labour intensive) and;

*Many of the companies who supplied chips in the past have gone bust, so
you cannot rely on a 'corporate guarantee' as to Y2K compliance.

Are nuclear weapons Y2K compliant?

The global picture

"Internationally, there is more activity than there was a year ago, but
it is clear that most countries are significantly behind the United
States in efforts to prepare critical systems for the new millennium,
and a number of countries have thus far done little to remediate
systemsŠ" [10]

Information about military progress on Y2K compliance for the nuclear
weapons states is limited, with no information available regarding
Israel, India, Pakistan and France.

A league table of international Y2K preparedness compiled by the Gartner
group graded countries on how likely they were to experience Y2K
failures and gives an indication of how far down the Y2K compliance path
each country is with their nuclear weapons.

The U.S., the U.K. and Israel all came out in the 1st group, with an
anticipated 15% failure rate. Of the other countries possessing nuclear
weapons France came in the second tier with 33% predicted failure rate.
India came in the third tier, with an anticipated 50% failure rate.
Worryingly China, Pakistan and Russia were all in the fourth tier with a
predicted 66% failure rate. [11]

However, a word of caution, such countrywide estimates are a very crude
indicator of how the military and their nuclear systems may be faring in
terms of achieving compliance. For example, in the US, the Defense
Department is lagging behind in achieving compliance but overall the
country is doing quite well. Without detailed breakdowns it is very
difficult to carry out this type of assessment and such breakdowns do
not exist for the majority of nations who have a nuclear weapons
capability.

In testimony to a Congressional Committee by the intelligence community,
they concluded that "the lowest level of Y2K preparedness is evident in
Eastern Europe, Russia, Latin American, the Middle East, Africa and
several Asian countries including China." [12]

A World Bank survey carried out between October and December 1998 of 139
developing countries found that only 39.5% of them had appointed a
national Y2K co-ordinator and completed an action plan to make their
systems Y2K compliant.

Testimony by the Inspector General at the US State Department in March
of this year about their investigation provided some amusing, yet
worrying anecdotes about the state of other countries Y2K programmes. [13]

In one Asian country the Inspector General was told that they got off to
such a late start they decided to move straight away into contingency
planning and in another they had a lot of technical expertise but "
lamented that they could not afford the Y2K services of software
companies in their own country".

In 'Eastern Bloc' countries the Inspector General felt that assessing
progress was difficult "because of apparent widespread use of pirated
software" and that "further confusing the situation is the lack of
information on when and where computer equipment and software were
obtained in the first place."

In summary, the Inspector General stated that "Industrialised countries
are well ahead of the developing world; however, some of those locations
are at riskŠ because they were late in establishing Y2K leadershipŠ"

(Continued...)













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