[D66] 'Epistemic injustice'

[RO]

(De grondwet is hier niet toereikend. Er mag niet gediscrimeerd worden 
maar discriminatie op basis van kennis en wetenschap is wel toegestaan. 
Inderdaad een ongerijmdheid. Maar ja... wetenschappers, psychiaters en 
hun handlangers denken alles te kunnen kennen, uitzonderingen daargelaten.)



Epistemic Injustice – Power and the Ethics of Knowing - Oxford 
Scholarship Online

  * Find in Worldcat <https://worldcat.org/isbn/9780198237907>


  Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing


    Miranda Fricker


      Abstract

Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but 
sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In 
epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical 
dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a 
thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the 
philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is 
epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively 
epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically 
in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential 
to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: 
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it 
charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: 
gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social 
experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of 
philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social 
power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two 
hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of 
Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a 
discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a 
virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic 
injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, 
analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid 
ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.

/Keywords: / social power 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=social 
power>, credibility 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=credibility>, 
prejudice 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=prejudice>, 
stereotype 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=stereotype>, 
epistemology of testimony 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=epistemology 
of testimony>, virtue epistemology 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=virtue 
epistemology>, genealogy 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=genealogy>, 
objectification 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=objectification>, 
silencing 
<https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=silencing> 



      Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2007 	Print ISBN-13: 9780198237907
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007 
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001
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