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<div id="bookCover">
<div class="cover">(De grondwet is hier niet toereikend. Er mag
niet gediscrimeerd worden maar discriminatie op basis van kennis
en wetenschap is wel toegestaan. Inderdaad een ongerijmdheid.
Maar ja... wetenschappers, psychiaters en hun handlangers denken
alles te kunnen kennen, uitzonderingen daargelaten.)</div>
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<div class="cover"><img alt="Epistemic Injustice – Power and the
Ethics of Knowing - Oxford Scholarship Online"
src="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/covers/9780198237907.jpg"
width="164">
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<span id="title">
<h1 id="pagetitle">Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of
Knowing</h1>
</span>
<h2>Miranda Fricker</h2>
<div class="abstract">
<h3>Abstract</h3>
<p style="" id="contentAbstract_full">Justice is one of the oldest
and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do
well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very
idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our
epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as
epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the
philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space
that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a
distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is
wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged
therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book
identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial
injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts
the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices:
gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social
experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a
range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an
analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes;
a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a
revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical
explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of
objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue
epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic
injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of
discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and
constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic
justice which aim to forestall it.</p>
</div>
<p class="keywords"><em>Keywords: </em> <a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=social
power">social power</a>, <a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=credibility">credibility</a>,
<a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=prejudice">prejudice</a>,
<a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=stereotype">stereotype</a>,
<a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=epistemology
of testimony">epistemology of testimony</a>, <a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=virtue
epistemology">virtue epistemology</a>, <a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=genealogy">genealogy</a>,
<a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=objectification">objectification</a>,
<a
href="https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/search?f_0=keywords&q_0=silencing">silencing</a>
</p>
<h3>Bibliographic Information</h3>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Print publication date: 2007</td>
<td>Print ISBN-13: 9780198237907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007</td>
<td>DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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