[D66] Censuur: Amerikaanse/Britse Regering haalde rapport van Internet over Ukrainse Maffia

[Dr. Marc-Alexander Fluks]

[Een van de leuke dingen van Internet is dat er een Internet Archief 
bestaat. Hier kan men files vinden die thans onder de censuur vallen. Zo 
ook het onderstaande rapport van de Britse Regering over de Maffia in 
Ukraine dat op een website van de Amerikaanse Regering heeft gestaan...]


Bron:  U.S. Department of Justice /
        Home Office, Britse Regering
Datum: Mei 2016
URL:   Gewist:
        
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/11/17/cig_ukraine_organised_crime_05-2016.pdf
        In het Internet Archief (8 maart 2021):
        
https://web.archive.org/web/20210308105044/https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/11/17/cig_ukraine_organised_crime_05-2016.pdf


Country Information and Guidance Ukraine: Fear of organised criminal 
gangs
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4.3 Link with politics

4.3.1 According to the April 2015 Organized Crime Observatory's report:

'On the surface, today's Ukraine has moved past the rule of organized 
crime groups and the highly publicized contract killings of the lawless 
1990s. But the small group of individuals who own much of Ukraine's 
wealth today almost all got their start in this lawless era, and most of 
them amassed their early fortunes through illicit activities, alliances 
with organized crime groups, and theft of state assets... Over time, the 
tools of economic capture have become more sophisticated: instead of 
armed gangs, we see lawyers and notaries creating fraudulent ownership 
claims and falsified proxy battles, using multiple layers of shell 
companies served by off-shore banks. Still, the threat of violence 
underlies much of the corporate raiding that continues today, even if it 
has receded into the background. And self-enrichment remains the primary 
goal for many who serve in Ukraine's Parliament and at the highest 
levels of government, for whom conflicts of interest represent business 
opportunities, rather than moral dilemmas.

'The alliance between the oligarchs and the state has become entrenched 
at the highest levels of government, while at the local level, judges, 
police, local government officials and politicians have organized 
themselves into a corrupt network of mutual enrichment at the public 
expense. Where does organized crime end and organized corruption begin? 
Ukraine offers evidence that it is not really possible to draw a 
distinction.

'While most post-Soviet states have developed an oligarchic class that 
owns a high proportion of the country's wealth, the situation in Ukraine 
appears to be one of the more extreme examples. According to our best 
estimates the 50 richest Russians own assets valued at 16% of Russia's 
GDP. In Ukraine the same group holds assets valued at 45% of the 
country's GDP. This fact has a huge impact on the country's politics, 
economy, and future development, not to mention the wellbeing of its 
citizens.'10


4.3.2 According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised 
Crime:

'The Russian annexation of the Crimea is clearly proving a troublesome 
geopolitical issue, but it also has serious potential implications for 
the criminal environment in the region and conceivably even globally.

'Crimea has long had a reputation as a relatively criminalized 
peninsula, not least as its local authorities resented their 
subordination to Kiev and worked often poorly or at odds with national 
law enforcement. The presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet—and 
consequently regular military traffic to and from the Russian mainland 
exempted by treaty and law from Ukrainian and Russian customs checks 
alike—contributed to a thriving smuggling economy. Military supply and 
personnel convoys were associated with the traffic in drugs, stolen 
goods and in a few cases illegal migrants into Ukraine, largely with 
impunity, under the protection of higher military authorities.

'First of all, there are serious questions about the commitment of the 
local authorities to a serious campaign against well-entrenched ethnic 
Russian gangs. New Crimean premier Sergei Aksenov has been widely 
identified as a former gangster from the 'Salem' organized crime group, 
who went by the nickname 'Goblin' in the 1990s (the only time he tried 
to deny the claim in court, his suit was dismissed). Regardless of the 
truth of the specific allegations made against Aksenov (and other senior 
Crimean politicians, who have been connected with organized crime), 
powerful gangs of the 1990s such as 'Salem' and their main 
Simferopol-based rival, the 'Bashmaki' have evolved into powerful 
circles connecting business, political and criminal interests.

'According to Viktor Shemchuk, its chief prosecutor, 'Every government 
level of Crimea was criminalized.' To a large extent they managed this 
by maintaining close links with local law enforcement agencies—an 
Interior Ministry official in Kiev once disgustedly told me that 'in 
Crimea, the police are the krysha' ('roof', a criminal protector) - and 
by leveraging links with Russia, especially its powerful crime networks. 
The infamous Moscow-based Solntsevo group has run smuggling operations 
through Sevastopol, for example, as have many others.'11


4.3.3 An article published by the Council on Foreign Relations in March 
2015 stated:

'Eastern Ukraine has long been ruled by a nexus of political power, 
business interests, and criminal groups. An important power figure 
before the war was Ukrainian businessman Rinat Akhmetov, who enjoyed 
greater authority than many local governors or law enforcement 
officials. After the conflict erupted, corrupt local institutions 
collapsed as prewar officials and business leaders fled west or threw in 
their lot with separatists, leaving the separatist-held territories to 
devolve into lawlessness.'12


Noten

10 Organized Crime Observatory. 'Ukraine and the EU: Overcoming criminal 
exploitation toward a modern democracy?' dated April 2015. History of 
organised crime in Ukraine.
http://www.o-c-o.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Ukraine-and-the-EU-Overcoming-criminal-exploitation-toward-a-modern-democracy.pdf 
Date accessed: 21 August 2015
11 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime. 'Analyzing 
Organized Crime,' dated April 2014.
http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Analyzing%20Organized%20Crime%20-%20%20April%202014.pdf 
Date accessed: 21 August 2015
12 Foreignaffairs.com. Paul Stronski, 'Broken Ukraine; The Mess Isn't 
All Russia's Fault,' dated 17 March 2015
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/2015-03-17/broken-ukraine 
Date accessed: 31 May 2016

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8. Corruption

8.1.1 According to Transparency International's 2015 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Ukraine scored 27 out of 100 possible, which is 1 
point higher than it was in the 2014 CPI. Ukraine is ranked 130 out of 
168 positions. In 2014 it was 142 out of 175 positions. Such a result 
was achieved due to public judgment of corrupt officials, establishment 
of anti-corruption bodies and emergence of the whistleblowers' movement. 
The delay with real punishment of bribe takers, and establishing corrupt 
relations between business and the Government prevent Ukraine from 
taking a decisive step forward, according to the CPI.29


Noot

29 Transparency International Ukraine. 'Ukraine Has Climbed Up For Only 
1 Point in the World Ranking of Corruption Perception,' dated 27 January 
2016. http://ti.ukraine.org/en/news/oficial/5741.html Date accessed: 6 
April 2016

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