Britain ’s Chilcot inquiry: A whitewash of war crimes and Iraq war

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Britain’s Chilcot inquiry: A whitewash of war crimes and Iraq war
16 March 2010

The inquiry into the war in Iraq, headed by Chairman Sir John Chilcot,
has halted its proceedings until after the expected May 6 British
general election.

Its hearings, however, have confirmed that the fundamental purpose for
which it was convened was to ensure that those responsible for waging
an illegal war of aggression are not held to account. Instead, the
inquiry has been utilised legitimise the invasion of Iraq and affirm
the basis on which it was carried out—the US doctrine of pre-emptive war.

The Chilcot inquiry is wholly a creature of the government and has no
real independence. It was announced last June by Labour Party Prime
Minister Gordon Brown, with the limited remit of establishing the
“lessons that can be learned” regarding British involvement in the
US-led war.

It was stressed that there would be no assigning of responsibility to
any politician, civil servant, diplomat or military figure for their
role in the events leading to the war, the military slaughter itself,
or its aftermath. Those testifying were also assured that no
prosecutions or legal proceedings would arise from their appearances.

Witnesses are not required to speak under oath and none are properly
cross-examined. On more than one occasion, including when former Prime
Minister Tony Blair appeared, Chilcot reminded everyone, “This is not
a trial.”

Along with Blair, all the major British figures involved in the
planning and conduct of the war have already appeared, including
then-Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, then-Defence Minister Geoff Hoon,
Blair’s director of communications, Alastair Campbell, former UK
Ambassador to the United Nations Jeremy Greenstock, and
then-Chancellor Gordon Brown. Not a single probing or critical
question has been asked of any of them.

All of the inquiry’s personnel were chosen by Brown from members of
the Privy Council, a body appointed by the Queen on the advice of the
prime minister.

Chilcot himself sat on the 2004 Butler inquiry into the intelligence
used to justify the Iraq war, which refused to hold Blair or anyone
else accountable for the “dodgy dossier” culled from old Internet
reports and false claims, such as the assertion that Iraq had weapons
that it could deploy against Britain within 45 minutes. Inquiry member
Sir Lawrence Freedman was a foreign policy adviser to Blair and a
staunch advocate of the Iraq war. The historian Sir Martin Gilbert
supported the war. Sir Roderic Lyne was British ambassador to the
Russian Federation and is an adviser to JP Morgan Chase, which
operates the Trade Bank of Iraq. He was also a special adviser to the
oil conglomerate BP.

Under the inquiry’s terms, the government has the final say on which
documents can be made public and even which documents can be handed
over to it. The final decision on the publication of any disputed
documents will be made by the cabinet secretary and head of the Home
Civil Service, Sir Gus O’Donnell. O’Donnell’s close relationship to
Brown goes back to 2002, when he was made permanent secretary at the
Treasury. The terms further stipulate that if the Cabinet Office and
the inquiry team fail to reach an agreement, “the Inquiry shall not
release that information into the public domain”.

An example of what is being concealed was provided when the
Independent published a Foreign Office internal paper from 2000 that
proved that the British government was discussing the invasion of Iraq
more than two years earlier than previously stated. The Independent
was able to obtain the document only after a Freedom of Information
request was initially rejected, and the newspaper demanded an internal
review. The released document was heavily redacted by the Foreign Office.

Even the publication of Chilcot’s final report will be approved by the
government beforehand. Brown stated in announcing the inquiry that it
cannot disclose matters “essential to our national security.”

Nor can it publish material deemed “likely” to “cause harm” to
“defence interests or international relations.” In October, Brown’s
Cabinet Office issued a further nine protocols imposing restrictions
on what is allowed to be disclosed, up to and including the final
report, including the barring of material that would impact
“commercial and economic interests.” The restrictions also allow any
government agency or department to veto and remove any sections from
the final report that they wish.

These restrictions have enabled many of those called to testify to
make a defence of the Iraq war and the policy of pre-emptive war
elaborated by the Bush administration in the United States.

Blair’s communications director, Alastair Campbell, for example,
declared baldly, “I think that Britain as a country should feel
incredibly proud” of its part in the Iraq war.

Brown stated that the invasion of Iraq was “the right decision for the
right reasons,” and that “everything that Mr. Blair did during this
period, he did properly.” Turning reality on its head, he went on to
call Iraq a “serial violator” of international law and an “aggressor
state” that had refused “to obey the laws of the international community.”

Commenting on the questioning of Brown, Guardian columnist Simon
Jenkins pointed out: “Nobody asked the obvious rejoinder, that the
Iraq invasion was made in defiance of the international community. It
ignored UN principles on regime-change and pre-empted the weapons
inspecting regime. It was not sanctioned by the UN and was opposed by
most of Europe. Small wonder Brown began smiling, a lot.”

Blair’s own testimony was the most politically revealing. He alluded
to his belief that regime-change was required in Iraq, whether or not
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. If there was a “danger” or
a “possibility” of Saddam Hussein “reconstituting” a weapons
programme, then war was legitimate—a clear endorsement of the doctrine
of pre-emptive war. “There is,” he said, “a danger of making a binary
distinction between regime-change and WMD.”

More significant still, Blair repeatedly drew a comparison between
Iraq and the danger supposedly posed by Iran, stating that there were
“very similar issues.” Because of the precedent set and the action
taken against Iraq, Britain was in a “far better place” to deal with
Iran now, he claimed.

The utilisation of Chilcot to defend the Iraq war is a warning. For
the British ruling elite, far more is involved that mere historical
revision or even an attempt by those involved to cover for their crimes.

At the outset of the inquiry, Chilcot stated that it would “help
ensure that, if we face similar situations in future, the government
of the day is best equipped to respond to those situations in the most
effective manner in the best interests of the country.”

Such “similar situations” are either underway or in an advanced state
of preparation. Events since 2003 have made clear that Iraq was only a
bloody episode in a period of escalating militarism that continues
today in Afghanistan.

To accept in any way that the Iraq war was wrong, let alone illegal,
would be to call into question the essential strategic interests of
British imperialism and a foreign policy based upon riding
Washington’s military coat-tails in Afghanistan, Iran and wherever
else aggressive wars will be waged to secure domination of strategic
resources such as oil and gas.

Robert Stevens

http://wsws.org/articles/2010/mar2010/pers-m16.shtml

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