Senaatsfractie PvdA: Geen Iraq-enquete

[Henk op xp]

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

Mark Giebels schreef:
>  REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl
>
>  Uiteraard ging het om De Hoop Scheffer, dat wist toch iedereen? Ik
>  heb er ooit nog eens een grapje over gepost hier:

>  George: 'But aren't you guys from that ultra-liberal country in Old
>  Europe?" JP:"We are trying to reform it" George:"Oh great, just what
>  I try to do up here. But I have to deal with this damn constitution
>  that ties my hands. How do you guys get away with that. Don't you
>  have liberal activist lawyers". JP: "Constitution? Lawyers? What are
>  you talking about. In Holland, we politicians have the power to do
>  whatever we want". George:"Really, and how do you get elected with
>  such an anti-liberal agenda. We have all those so-called civil rights
>  groups that throw tons of bucks in ads against me, particularly if I
>  say what I really want". JP: "We don't, and we don't get elected
>  either". George:"Wow, that sounds like heaven. It's much tougher up
>  here. I'm trying, for instance, to fund our conservative faith-based
>  schools with tax money, but those damn liberals are able to stop me
>  at every attempt. I've tried everything already." JP:"Our religious
>  school get funded by the government just as much as our public
>  schools. In fact, that's written in our constitution." George: "Wow,
>  how amazing, let's keep in contact, maybe we can exchange some
>  ideas.." JP: "Well, now you mention this, I was thinking, how about
>  you appoint my dearest friend DHS as secretary general of NATO or
>  something..." DHS:"Ehh, hi Mr Bush, that's me, DHS.." George:" OK,
>  see you guys, you're doing a great job over there in Scandinavia..."
>  JP: "Thanks, bye, just wanted to let you know that we support you
>  whatever your plans are reagrding Iraq". George: "Sure, you guys
>  share my faith, I can count on you, see you".
>
>  DHS: "Is het gelukt JP" JP:"Ik denk het wel Jaap"

OK, SO TIME TO LEARN HOWTO: ´DUCK AND COVER´ !!
http://stream.state.gov/streamvol/journa 
<http://stream.state.gov/streamvol/journals/fullversion.mov>ls/fullversion.mov 
<http://stream.state.gov/streamvol/journals/fullversion.mov>


Ok, op naar een wat realistischer scenario
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0305/ijpe/lutes.htm


      New Players on the Scene:
      A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market

/Colonel Charles D. Lutes
/

    /Current nonproliferation regimes "may be inadequate to deal with
    the emerging threat of non-state proliferation" that Pakistani
    nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan represents, according to U.S. Air Force
    Colonel Charles D. Lutes. He says that's because these regimes are
    based on international norms, which in turn are based on the
    assumption that only governments are able to develop nuclear weapons. /

    /A Senior Military Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic
    Studies at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Lutes
    says the Bush administration, recognizing this flawed assumption,
    has begun employing a two-tracked approach, attacking both supply of
    and demand for nuclear materials. /

In October 2003, Italian coast guard cutters pulled alongside a 
German-flagged cargo vessel bound for Libya called the /BBC China/. Upon 
inspection, authorities found precision machine tools, aluminum tubes, 
molecular pumps, and other components for building approximately 10,000 
"P-2" gas centrifuges designed for enriching uranium to specifications 
required for a nuclear weapon.

These components were traced back to a publicly traded Malaysian 
engineering company called Scomi Precision Engineering. Scomi had 
manufactured the parts at the behest of a Sri Lankan, Buhary Sayed Abu 
Tahir. Via his front company in Dubai, SMB Computers, Tahir arranged to 
deliver the parts to Libya for its hidden nuclear weapons program.

The Italian authorities ensured that the cargo never arrived at its 
destination. The seizure of the /BBC China's/ cargo was a key part in a 
chain of events that led Libyan President Muammar Qadhafi to "come out 
of the cold" and renounce his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs 
in December 2003.

Just as significantly, this interdiction operation was the strand that 
unraveled the shadowy proliferation network of Tahir's boss and mentor, 
Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. [Note: The details on the /BBC 
China/ seizure and the Khan network were derived from published sources. 
Specifically, see Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, "The Man Who Sold the 
Bomb," /Time/, February 14, 2005, pp. 22-30. Also see Barton Gellman and 
Dafna Lizner, "Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls: President Faces a 
Multi-Front Battle Against Threats Known, Unknown," /The Washington 
Post/, October 26, 2004, p. A1.]

*A Nuclear Marketplace*

The godfather of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan is a 
legendary and celebrated figure in his country for his years of 
secretive work in developing the first "Islamic bomb" to counter the 
threat from long-time rival India.

As a scientist working for the Dutch Urenco firm in the 1970s, Khan had 
access to blueprints for uranium enrichment technology, which he stole 
and brought back to Pakistan when he returned home.

Khan was appointed by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Ali Bhutto to run 
Pakistan's nuclear-research program, with the goal of countering India's 
nuclear aspirations with a weapon of its own. Running counter to the 
nonproliferation norms of the international community, Khan was forced 
to pursue this goal with the utmost secrecy. However, Pakistan's 
indigenous scientific and engineering infrastructure was underdeveloped 
for the task. So Khan did what any good entrepreneur would do: he 
outsourced.

He cultivated a network of suppliers and manufacturers, many of whom did 
not realize the ultimate objective of the science project undertaken at 
the Khan Research Laboratories. By 1998, however, there was no doubt. To 
the surprise of the international community, Pakistan completed five 
underground nuclear tests and joined an elite club of nuclear weapon states.

For A.Q. Khan, the patriotic fervor surrounding this achievement was 
only the beginning. A shrewd businessman, he saw potential for financial 
gain between his network of suppliers and a burgeoning market for 
nuclear arms. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were foremost on 
a list of those at least window-shopping for such capability.

An ongoing investigation reveals that the Khan network played a 
significant role, beginning in the early 1990s, in the development of 
Iranian and North Korean enrichment technology. In exchange, North Korea 
appears to have shared its ballistic missile technology with Pakistan.

The investigation of the Libyan program continues to reap an 
intelligence bonanza uncovering the extent of Khan's cooperation with 
rogue regimes worldwide. While there is considerable debate over the 
role of the Pakistani government with regard to Khan's activities, it is 
unlikely that officials in Islamabad had full knowledge of the scope and 
scale of the Khan network.

As it continues to be exposed, the web of alleged Khan sponsors and 
suppliers is breathtaking. Starting with the stolen centrifuge designs 
from the Netherlands, and augmented by weapons designs from China, the 
syndicate also included engineering assistance from Britain; vacuum 
pumps from Germany; specialized lathes from Spain; furnaces from Italy; 
centrifuge motors and frequency converters from Turkey; enrichment parts 
from South Africa and Switzerland; aluminum from Singapore; and 
centrifuge parts from Malaysia, all orchestrated from an administrative 
hub in Dubai.

Despite mounting evidence, however, it is unlikely that the full extent 
of the network that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director 
General Mohamed ElBaradei dubbed "the nuclear Wal-Mart" will ever be 
fully known.

*Supply Always Meets Demand*

Now that A.Q. Khan is under house arrest in Pakistan, but unavailable to 
Western authorities for interrogation, vexing questions remain. It is 
clear that Khan met with, and possibly sold components to, officials in 
a number of nuclear-aspiring states. Ongoing investigation has linked 
Khan to nuclear programs in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. 
Additionally, published reports have identified Khan meetings with 
potential customers in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Kuwait, Myanmar, and Abu Dhabi. The wider the spread of this 
dangerous knowledge and expertise, the greater the opportunity exists 
for terrorists or criminals to become armed with a nuclear bomb.

Clearly, al-Qaida and its affiliates are in the market for nuclear 
weapons. On the one hand, Khan's far-flung conglomeration of shady 
manufacturers, unsavory middlemen, and illicit traffickers seems the 
ideal supplier to meet the terrorist demand for nuclear arms. Its 
loosely coupled network mirrors the cellular structure favored by 
al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. This structure facilitates surreptitious 
and relatively untraceable transactions among those who wish to wreak 
catastrophic violence.

On the other hand, in considering the terrorist link it is important to 
look at the wares that Khan and his cronies offered for sale. Primarily, 
Khan purveyed the necessary materiel for a state nuclear program: 
centrifuge components and designs, weapons blueprints, and technical 
expertise. There are no published reports of Khan dealing in nuclear 
fissile material itself, the final product of the enrichment process 
that fuels a nuclear weapon.

Presumably terrorists would prefer to purchase a finished weapon or, at 
a minimum, the fissile material, as they likely have little ability or 
patience to develop a program infrastructure. To a terrorist, then, 
dealing with Khan would be tantamount to asking for AK-47s and bullets, 
and instead receiving steel, metal casts and molds, and a fabrication 
instruction manual.

As much damage as the black market may have done in bringing North Korea 
and Iran closer to membership in the nuclear club, the present danger 
lies in how the supplier network adapts now that Khan is no longer at 
the helm.

Although President Bush has stated that Khan's network has been shut 
down, it remains possible that parts of it may have just burrowed more 
deeply underground. While it is unlikely that Khan Research Laboratories 
will engage in any further black market activity, it remains to be seen 
what will become of its associates.

Just as terrorist networks re-form and adapt, so too can the supplier 
network. The predominant commodity will be the knowledge base and 
expertise resident in the remaining supplier nodes. Cut off from Khan's 
access to the rogue state market, a new network of nuclear scientists 
and engineers may coalesce around the terrorist market.

To the extent that these profiteers may have any access to fissile 
material or even a finished weapon, the risk of proliferation to 
terrorists increases exponentially. Unfortunately in the case of 
terrorist actors, unlike state actors, possessing a nuclear weapon 
probably has only one purpose: for detonation into a visible mushroom cloud.

*From Cooperative Agreements to Cooperative Action
*

Existing nonproliferation regimes may be inadequate to deal with the 
emerging threat of non-state proliferation as exemplified by the Khan 
nuclear smuggling network. International norms—the basis of these 
regimes—are predicated on an assumption that only states have the 
requisite resources to develop nuclear weapons.

The Khan experience, viewed through a new set of assumptions in a 
post-9/11 world, indicates that this basic premise is flawed. For this 
reason, the Bush administration has begun prodding the international 
community to move from a position of cooperative agreements to one of 
cooperative action.

Accordingly, the United States and its partners have developed a more 
proactive approach to attack both ends of the problem. To curb demand, 
the war on terrorism seeks to defeat terrorist groups in the short term, 
while undermining terrorist ideology and support over the long term. 
Against rogue states, international diplomatic pressure backed by threat 
of force is aimed at isolating outlaw regimes. The experience in Iraq 
shows the challenges of this policy when conducted with limited 
international consensus.

On the supply front, two approaches are currently in play. The first is 
to round up the relatively limited supply of fissile material. Threat 
reduction techniques applied to the former Soviet states have been 
extended on an international scale through the G-8 Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative. A recent agreement between the U.S. and Russia to 
enhance cooperation in the fight against nuclear terrorism is another 
example.

The second approach is embodied by the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI), under which participating governments collaborate to interdict 
shipments of components and material needed to construct weapons of mass 
destruction. The slogan that PSI is "an activity, not an organization" 
reflects the paradigm shift toward cooperative action. It was 
cooperation under the PSI principles that led to the interception of the 
/BBC China/ and the unraveling of the Khan network.

However, the black-market activities of A.Q. Khan may only be the tip of 
the iceberg. As long as there is significant demand for nuclear 
capability, suppliers will try to find ways to meet it. The 
international community must be flexible in its approach in order to 
confront the ever-changing nature of the nuclear supplier network. The 
shift from cooperative agreements to cooperative action to curb both 
demand and supply is a necessary ingredient for success.

Today's Nuclear Equation

/The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the U.S. 
Air Force, or the United States government.
/

/"
/

Hierover ging dus die documentaire die ik laatst noemde.
http://www.cbc.ca/nuclearjihad/video.html


En er ligt wel degelijk een relatie tussen het geblunder van Lubbers en 
de activiteiten van A.Q. Khan.
Waarschijnlijk ook de bron die Balkenende niet wil noemen vindt 
waarschijnlijk hierin de oorsprong.

Henk Elegeert

/Zie ook:
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0305/ijpe/ijpe0305.pdf
/

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