Rapport: Iraq, The assessment of the British Government
Dr. Marc-Alexander Fluks
fluks at SCIENCE.UVA.NL
Wed Sep 25 12:02:02 CEST 2002
REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl
IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
----------------------------------
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
Foreword by the Prime Minister
Executive Summary
Part 1: Chapter 1: The role of intelligence
Chapter 2: Iraq's programmes 1971-2002
Chapter 3: The current position 1998-2002
Part 2: History of UN Weapons inspections
Part 3: Iraq under Saddam
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE TONY BLAIR MP
The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the
British intelligence machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and
made up of the heads of the UK's three Intelligence and Security
Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from
key government departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided
regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues
on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues.
Its work, like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is
unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of document. But in
light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I
wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this
issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest.
In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from
inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his
capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council Resolutions
expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is
continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real
damage upon the region, and the stability of the world.
Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam's is one of the
most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world. So I believe people
will understand why the Agencies cannot be specific about the sources,
which have formed the judgements in this document, and why we cannot
publish everything we know. We cannot, of course, publish the detailed
raw intelligence. I and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on
the intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority. I also want to
pay tribute to our Intelligence and Security Services for the often
extraordinary work that they do.
What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is
that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons,
that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he
has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I
also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his
utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors.
The picture presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become more
not less worrying. It is clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of
containment has not worked sufficiently well to prevent Saddam from
developing these weapons. I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and
current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped.
Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but
against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the
building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would
use these weapons, as vital to his strategic interests, and in particular
his goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his
military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45
minutes of an order to use them.
I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has
already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them up.
In today's inter-dependent world, a major regional conflict does not stay
confined to the region in question. Faced with someone who has shown
himself capable of using WMD, I believe the international community has
to stand up for itself and ensure its authority is upheld.
The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the
hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam's, is real. Unless we
face up to the threat, not only do we risk undermining the authority of
the UN, whose resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the
longer term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people.
The case I make is that the UN Resolutions demanding he stops his WMD
programme are being flouted; that since the inspectors left four years
ago he has continued with this programme; that the inspectors must be
allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if
he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he has done in the
past, the international community will have to act.
I believe that faced with the information available to me, the UK
Government has been right to support the demands that this issue be
confronted and dealt with. We must ensure that he does not get to use the
weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons,
acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these
weapons, and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has
used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people.
Following the Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the
ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of
mass destruction.
2. Much information about Iraq's mass destruction weaponry is already in
the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points
clearly to Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and
biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows
that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production
of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates that Iraq remains
able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery
rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them.
3. An independent and well researched overview of this public evidence
was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
on 9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble
nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign
sources.
4. As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional
information is available to the government from secret intelligence
sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence
cannot tell us about everything. However, it provides a fuller picture of
Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches
great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he
regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does
not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them,
including against his own population, and is determined to retain them,
in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal
evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from
renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the
policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his
illicit weapons programmes.
6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:
* continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
* military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons,
including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are
deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them.
* command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and
biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam
Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this
authority to his son Qusai);
* developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier
reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
* pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of
potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons
programmes;
-------------------------------
* tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be
used in the production of nuclear weapons;
* sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having
no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it;
* recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;
--------------------------------
* illegally retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles, with a range of
650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
* started deploying its Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has
used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range
to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the
United Nations;
* started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making
efforts to extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the
limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
* constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles
capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO
members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours
and Israel;
* pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its
illegal development of long range missiles;
------------------------------------
* learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already
begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of
the return of inspectors.
7. These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC). More details on the judgements, and on the development of the
JIC's assessments since 1998, are set out in Part 1 of this paper.
8. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international
law. Under a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Iraq
is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under the supervision
of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out the key UN Security
Council Resolutions. It also summarises the history of the UN inspection
regime and Iraq's history of deception, intimidation and concealment in
its dealings with the UN inspectors.
9. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we
have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive
nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. His record of internal repression and
external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he
poses. The paper briefly outlines in Part 3 Saddam's rise to power, the
nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Saddam's
human rights abuses are also catalogued, including his record of torture,
mass arrests and summary executions.
10. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons
programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control,
Iraq generated illegal income of some $3 billion in 2001.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PART 1 IRAQ'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
PROGRAMMES
CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
1. Since UN Inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998, there has been
little overt information on Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and
ballistic missile programmes. Much of the publicly available information
about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is dated. But we also have
available a range of secret intelligence about these programmes and
Saddam Hussein's intentions. This comes principally from the United
Kingdom's intelligence and analysis agencies - the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the
Security Service, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have
access to intelligence from close allies.
2. Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are
designed to remain concealed. The nature of Saddam's regime makes Iraq a
difficult target for the intelligence services. Intelligence, however,
has provided important insights into Iraqi programmes, and Iraqi military
thinking. Taken together with what is already known from other sources,
this intelligence builds our understanding of Iraq's capabilities, and
adds significantly to the analysis already in the public domain. But
intelligence sources need to be protected, and this limits the detail
that can be made available.
3. Iraq's capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has provided advice to the Prime
Minister and his senior colleagues on the developing assessment, drawing
on all available sources. Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most
significant views reached by the JIC between 1999 and 2002.
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
The JIC is a Cabinet Committee with a history dating back to 1936. The
JIC brings together the Heads of the three Intelligence and Security
Agencies (Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications
Headquarters and the Security Service), the Chief of Defence
Intelligence, senior policy makers from the Foreign Office, the Ministry
of Defence, the Home Office, the Treasury and the Department for Trade
and Industry and representatives from other Government Departments as
appropriate. The JIC provides regular intelligence assessments to the
Prime Minister, other Ministers and senior officials on a wide range of
foreign policy and international security issues. It meets each week in
the Cabinet Office.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 2: IRAQ'S PROGRAMMES: 1971-1998
1. Iraq has been involved in chemical and biological warfare research for
over 30 years. Its chemical warfare research started in 1971 at a small,
well guarded site at Rashad to the Northeast of Baghdad. Research was
conducted there on a number of chemical agents including mustard gas, CS
and tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated organisation called Al-Hassan Ibn
Al-Haitham was established. In the late 1970s plans were made to build a
large research and commercial-scale production facility in the desert
some
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effects of Chemical Weapons
Mustard is a liquid agent, which gives off a hazardous vapour, causing
burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the
respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea. It
attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and
blood-forming organs.
Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic.
They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and
paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause rapid
death.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
70km Northwest of Baghdad under the Project cover of No 922. This was to
become Muthanna State Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and
operated under the front name of Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide
Production. It became operational in 1982-83. It had five research and
development sections each tasked to pursue different programmes. In
addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent production
facility, and it also took the lead in weaponising chemical and
biological agents including all aspects of weapon development and
testing, in association with the military. According to information,
subsequently supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in
1991 was 4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it could have
been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage and
precursor production facilities known as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near
Habbaniyah, north-west of Baghdad, parts of which were not completed
before they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War.
2. Iraq started biological warfare research in the mid-1970s. After
small-scale research, a purpose-built research and development facility
was authorised at al-Salman, also known as Salman Pak. This is surrounded
on three sides by the Tigris river and situated some 35km South of
Baghdad. Although some progress was made in biological weapons research
at this early stage, Iraq decided to concentrate on developing chemical
agents and their delivery systems at al-Muthanna. With the outbreak of
the Iran-Iraq War, in the early 1980s, the biological weapons programme
was revived. The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small
biological weapons research team at al-Muthanna, helped to develop the
programme.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The effects of biological agents
Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis.
Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be
expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary, but can include
fever and internal bleeding. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7
days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.
Botulinum toxin is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The
first symptoms of poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure
or as long as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between
12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.
Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Most symptoms
take a long time to show. Food products contaminated by aflatoxin can
cause liver inflammation and cancer. It can also affect pregnant women,
leading to stillborn babies and children born with mutations.
Ricin is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ
failure leading to death within one or two days of inhalation.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
At about the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak site
into a secure biological warfare research facility. Dr Taha continued to
work with her team at al-Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak,
which was under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence.
Significant resources were provided for the programme, including the
construction of a dedicated production facility, (Project 324) at
al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and weaponisation testing and
later filling of munitions was conducted in association with the staff at
Muthanna State Establishment. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities
were taken over and some adapted for use in the production and research
and development of biological agents. These included:
* al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute which produced botulinum
toxin and conducted virus research. There is some intelligence to
suggest that work was also conducted on anthrax;
* al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water Research centre where Iraq
admitted it undertook aflatoxin production and genetic engineering;
* Amariyah Sera and Vaccine institute which was used for the storage of
biological agent seed stocks, and was involved in genetic
engineering;
3. By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was producing very large quantities
of chemical and biological agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations to
the UN during the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had produced at least;
* 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax, 2,200
litres of aflatoxin, and were working on a number of other agents;
* 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin
and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes of VX.
4. Iraq's nuclear programme was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation agreement signed
with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear research centre, equipped with a
research reactor, was built at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research
centre. The research reactor worked up to 1991. The surge in Iraqi oil
revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research
programme. This was bolstered in the mid-1970s by the acquisition of two
research reactors powered by highly enriched uranium fuel, and equipment
for fuel fabrication and handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was
self-sufficient in uranium ore. One of the reactors was destroyed in an
Israeli air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become
operational, the other was never completed.
5. By the mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq's position in the war with
Iran prompted renewed interest in the military use of nuclear technology,
and additional resources were put into developing technologies to enrich
uranium as fissile material (material that makes up the core of a nuclear
weapon) for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was preferred
because it could be more easily produced covertly than the alternative,
plutonium. Iraq followed parallel programmes to produce highly enriched
uranium (HEU): electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas
centrifuge enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing
completion and another was under construction. However, Iraq never
succeeded in its EMIS technology, and the programme had been dropped by
1991. Iraq decided to concentrate on gas centrifuges as the means for
producing the necessary fissile material. Centrifuge facilities were also
under construction, but the centrifuge design was still being developed.
In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash programme to develop a single
nuclear weapon within a year. This programme envisaged the rapid
development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce
weapons-grade HEU using fuel from the Soviet research reactor, which was
already substantially enriched, and unused fuel from the reactor bombed
by the Israelis. By the time of the Gulf War, the crash programme had
made little progress.
6. Iraq's declared aim was to produce a missile warhead with a 20-kiloton
yield and weapons designs were produced for the simplest implosion
weapons. These were similar to the device used at Nagasaki in 1945. Iraq
was also working on more advanced concepts.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effect of a 20-kiloton nuclear detonation
A detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city might flatten an
area of approximately 3 square miles. Within 1.6 miles of detonation,
blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of
which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation,
there would still be 10% casualties.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 1991 the programme was supported by a large body of Iraqi nuclear
expertise, programme documentation and databases and manufacturing
infrastructure. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported
that Iraq had:
* experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock waves;
* invested significant effort to understand the various options for
neutron initiators;
* made significant progress in developing capabilities for the
production, casting and machining of uranium metal.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCUD missiles
The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet
Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German V-2 developed
in World War II.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical
missile forces, and it was also widely exported. Recipients of
Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya,
although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.
7. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed ballistic missile
industry. Many of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi
modified version of the SCUD missile, the Al Hussein, with an extended
range of 650km. Iraq had about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior to
the Gulf War plus an unknown number of indigenously produced engines and
components. Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as
the Al Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to
reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles;
recent intelligence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time.
In particular Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range
of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage
satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid.
Also during this period, Iraq was developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km
range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the
1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt).
There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on
systems.
The use of chemical and biological weapons
8. Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the
Iran-Iraq War. (Many of the casualties are still in Iranian hospitals
suffering from the long-term effects of numerous types of cancer and lung
diseases.) In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against
Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in northern Iraq (see box). Estimates vary, but
according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed.
9. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin during
the war with Iran resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. A month
after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tonnes of sarin
nerve agent against Iranian troops on the Al Fao peninsula. Over the
next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve agents on
Iranian troops causing extensive casualties.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Attack on Halabja
On Friday, 17th March 1988, the village of Halabja was bombarded by Iraqi
warplanes. The raid was over in minutes. Saddam Hussein used chemical
weapons against his own people. A Kurd described the effects of a
chemical attack on another village:
"My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from their noses and
their mouths. Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning. I
couldn't do much, just clean up the blood and vomit from their mouths and
try in every way to make them breathe again. I did artificial respiration
on them and then I gave them two injections each. I also rubbed creams on
my wife and two brothers."
(From "Crimes Against Humanity," Iraqi National Congress.)
Among the corpses at Halabja, children were found dead where they had
been playing outside their homes. In places, streets were piled with
corpses.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that
by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical and
biological agents including over 16,000 free fall bombs and over 110,000
artillery rockets and shells. Iraq also admitted to the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads
available for its ballistic missiles.
The use of ballistic missiles
11. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq
War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles
during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Israel and at Coalition
forces stationed in the Gulf region.
12. At the end of the Gulf War the international community was
determined that Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and
ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method chosen to achieve
this aim was the establishment of UNSCOM to carry out intrusive
inspections within Iraq and to eliminate its chemical and biological
weapons and ballistic missiles with a range over 150km. The IAEA was
charged with the abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Between
1991 and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very large
quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as well as
associated production facilities. The IAEA also destroyed the
infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and removed key
nuclear materials. This was achieved despite a continuous and
sophisticated programme of harassment, obstruction and deception and
denial (see Part 2). Because of this by 1998 UNSCOM concluded that they
were unable to fulfil their mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in
December 1998.
13. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January
1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that when the UN inspectors
left Iraq they were unable to account for:
* up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes
of VX nerve agent;
* up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately
300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the
production of VX;
* growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to
produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq
admits to having manufactured);
* over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological
agents.
14. The departure of UNSCOM meant that the International Community was
unable to establish the truth behind these large discrepancies and
greatly diminished its ability to monitor and assess Iraq's continuing
attempts to reconstitute its programmes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 3: THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998-2002
1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam's chemical, biological,
nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available
evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and
other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest
intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and
capabilities since 1998. The main conclusions are that:
* Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in
breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical
and biological agents;
* Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, which he regards
as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. He is determined to
retain these capabilities;
* Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive
range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic
missiles;
* Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of
its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in breach of
UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil
nuclear application in Iraq;
* Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile
in breach of UNSCR 687, which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern
Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer range
ballistic missiles;
* Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of
chemical and biological weapons;
* Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological
weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.
The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within forty five
minutes of a decision to do so;
* Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is
already taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and
documentation in advance of the return of inspectors;
* Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles
programmes are well-funded.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999-2002
2. Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has monitored evidence,
including from secret intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive
chemical and biological warfare capabilities. In the first half of 2000
the JIC noted intelligence on Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use
chemicals; and on the reconstruction of civil chemical production at
sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme. Iraq had
also been trying to procure dual-use materials and equipment which could
be used for a biological warfare programme. Personnel known to have been
connected to the biological warfare programme up to the Gulf War had been
conducting research into pathogens. There was intelligence that Iraq was
starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production
facilities. Planning for the project had begun in 1995 under Dr Rihab
Taha, known to have been a central player in the pre-Gulf War programme.
The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and
material to produce biological warfare agents within weeks using its
legitimate biotechnology facilities.
3. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare
agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf
War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of
mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months. The JIC
concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological
warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production
pointed to a continuing research and development programme. These
chemical and biological capabilities represented the most immediate
threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi
development of mass destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence
of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which was
providing hard currency.
4. In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on
Iraqi chemical and biological warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq
has the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons.
Recent Intelligence
5. Subsequently, intelligence has become available from reliable sources
which complements and adds to previous intelligence and confirms the JIC
assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The
intelligence also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a
number of issues related to these weapons. This intelligence covers:
* Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important
role in Iraqi military thinking: intelligence shows that Saddam
attaches great importance to the possession of chemical and
biological weapons, which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi
regional power. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on its
possession of these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering
them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain
this capability and recognises that Iraqi political weight would be
diminished if Iraq's military power rested solely on its conventional
military forces.
* Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems: Iraq is
already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding
evidence of its chemical and biological weapons programme.
Intelligence indicates that Saddam has learnt lessons from previous
weapons inspections, has identified possible weak points in the
inspections process and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive
equipment and papers can easily be concealed, and in some cases this
is already happening. The possession of mobile biological agent
production facilities will also aid concealment efforts. Saddam is
determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to
develop further in the four years since inspectors left.
* Saddam's willingness to use chemical and biological weapons:
intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq's military planning,
Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including
against an internal uprising by the Shia population. Intelligence
indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or
biological weapons within forty five minutes of an order to do so.
Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks
6. When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks, Iraq has
claimed, repeatedly, that if it had retained any chemical agents from
before the Gulf War they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render
them harmless. But Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM having the knowledge and
capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent and other chemical warfare
agents which would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also
examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to
1991 and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of
deterioration.
7. Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been
destroyed. No convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support
this claim. In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies
between the amount of growth media (nutrients required for the
specialised growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of
agent it admits to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to
produce more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly
manufactured.
Chemical agent: production capabilities
8. Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent.
During the Gulf War a number of facilities which intelligence reporting
indicated were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq's chemical
weapons effort were attacked and damaged. Following the ceasefire UNSCOM
destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq's
chemical weapons programme. Other equipment was released for civilian use
either in industry or academic institutes, where it was tagged and
regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera
monitoring, to ensure that it was not being misused. This monitoring
ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities
remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at
al-Muthanna was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been rebuilt,
other plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme have
been rebuilt. This includes the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2
near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol
are used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the production of
chemical agents.
9. Other dual use facilities, which are capable of being used to support
the production of chemical agent and precursors, have been rebuilt and
re-equipped. New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal
foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for
production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah, which is a
chemical research centre. It undertakes research, development and
production of chemicals previously imported but not now available and
which are needed for Iraq's civil industry. The Director General of the
research centre is Hickmat Na'im al-Jalu who, prior to the Gulf War
worked in Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and after the war was
responsible for preserving Iraq's chemical expertise.
FIGURE 1: THE IBN SINA COMPANY AT TARMIYAH
10. Parts of the al-Qa'Qa' chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have
also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are
elements of the phosgene production plant at Al Qa'Qa'. These were
severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM
supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have
industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a
precursor for nerve agent.
11. Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent
production and weaponisation. Most of the personnel previously involved
in the programme remain in country. While UNSCOM found a number of
technical manuals (so called "cook books") for the production of chemical
agents and critical precursors, Iraq's claim to have unilaterally
destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost
certainly untrue. Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still
discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure
that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Problem of Dual Use Facilities
Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile programmes are dual-use. For example, any major
petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health
organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment
required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN
weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the
true nature of many of Iraq's facilities.
For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji,
in the desert in north west Iraq at Ash Sharqat. This site is a former
uranium enrichment facility, which was damaged during the Gulf War, and
rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has
been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production
complex. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is
surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards.
Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid, which can
be used in explosives, missile fuel, and in the purification of uranium.
FIGURE 2: ASH SHARQAT CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FACILITY
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biological agent: production capabilities
12. We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce
biological warfare agents. As with some chemical equipment, UNSCOM only
destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to biological weapons
production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and
construct biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer
dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the
technology required to produce biological weapons. The experienced
personnel who were active in the programme have largely remained in the
country. Some dual-use equipment has also been purchased, but without
monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their
biological weapons programme. This newly purchased equipment and others
previously subject to monitoring could be used in a resurgent BW
programme. Facilities of concern include:
* the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah: this was damaged in
UK/US air attacks in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox) but has been
rebuilt. The residue from the castor bean pulp can be used in the
production of the biological agent ricin;
* the Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute, which was
involved in biological agent production and research before the Gulf
War;
* The Amariyah Sera and Vaccine plant at Abu Ghraib. UNSCOM established
that this facility was used to store biological agents, seed stocks
and conduct biological warfare associated genetic research prior to
the Gulf War. It has now expanded its storage capacity.
13. UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological
agent production facilities. In the past two years evidence from
defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities. Recent
intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile
facilities. These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent
production from military attack or UN inspection.
Chemical and biological agents: delivery means
14. Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and
biological agents. These include:
* free fall bombs - Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to two
sites of free fall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990-91.
These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.
Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types of aerial bomb with
various chemical agent fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin
and cyclosarin;
* artillery shells and rockets - Iraq made extensive use of artillery
munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War.
Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq is known
to have tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological
agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for by
UNSCOM;
* helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers - Iraq carried out studies
into aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these platforms
prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these
devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol
dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over a large area;
* Al Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km) - Iraq told UNSCOM that
it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin.
Iraq also developed chemical agent warheads for Al Hussein. Iraq
admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for Al Hussein which were
intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin.
However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of
VX degradation product which indicate that some additional warheads
were made and filled with VX;
* Al Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus) - it is
unclear if chemical and biological warheads have been developed for
these systems, but given their experience on other missile systems,
we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing so;
* L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme - we know from intelligence
that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to
be used as a pilot-less aircraft (unmanned aerial vehicle - UAV),
which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological
agents over a large area.
FIGURE 3: THE L-29 JET TRAINER
Chemical and biological warfare: command and control
15. The authority to use chemical and biological weapons ultimately
resides with Saddam, but intelligence indicates that he may have also
delegated this authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organisation
(SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the
movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The
Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level
throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The
Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile
systems and some Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems.
Chemical and biological weapons: summary
16. Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological
weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and
has continued to produce chemical and biological agents. Iraq has:
* chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from
pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production;
* the capability to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun,
sarin, cyclosarin, and VX capable of producing mass casualties;
* a biological agent production capability and can produce at least
anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq has also
developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents.
* a variety of delivery means available;
* military forces, which maintain the capability to use these weapons,
with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
JIC Assessments: 1999-2001
17. Since 1999 the JIC has monitored Iraq's attempts to reconstitute its
nuclear weapons programme. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq had
continued its nuclear research after 1998. The JIC drew attention to
intelligence that Iraq had recalled its nuclear scientists to the
programme in 1998. Since 1998 Iraq had been trying to procure items that
could be for use in the construction of centrifuges for the enrichment of
uranium.
Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Expertise
18. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter 2 describe the Iraqi nuclear weapons
programme prior to the Gulf War. It is clear from IAEA inspections and
Iraq's own declarations that by 1991 considerable progress had been made
in both developing methods to produce fissile material and in weapons
design. The IAEA dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi
nuclear weapons
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elements of a nuclear weapons programme: nuclear fission weapon
A typical nuclear fission weapon consists of:
* fissile material for the core, which gives out huge amounts of
explosive energy from nuclear reactions when made "super critical",
through extreme compression. Fissile material is usually either
highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons-grade plutonium.
* HEU can be made in gas centrifuges (see separate box).
* plutonium is made by reprocessing fuel from a nuclear reactor.
* explosives are needed to compress the nuclear core.
They also require:
* a complex arrangement of detonators, explosive charges to produce an
even and rapid compression of the core.
* sophisticated electronics to fire the explosives.
* a neutron initiator to provide initial burst of neutrons to start the
nuclear reactions.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weaponisation
Weaponisation is the conversion of these concepts into a reliable weapon.
It includes:
* developing a weapon design through sophisticated science and complex
calculations;
* engineering design to integrate with the delivery system;
* specialised equipment to cast and machine safely the nuclear core.
* dedicated facilities to assemble the warheads.
* facilities to rigorously test all individual components and designs.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The complexity is much greater for a weapon that can fit into a missile
warhead than for a larger Nagasaki-type bomb.
programme, including the dedicated facilities and equipment for uranium
separation and enrichment, and for weapon development and production, and
removed the remaining highly enriched uranium. But Iraq retained, and
retains, many of its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians, who
are specialised in the production of fissile material and weapons design.
Intelligence indicates that Iraq also retains the accompanying programme
documentation and data.
19. Intelligence shows that the present Iraqi programme is almost
certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level
needed for a nuclear weapon. It indicates that the approach is based on
gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, one of the routes Iraq was following
for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. But Iraq needs
certain key equipment, including gas centrifuge components, and
components for the production of fissile material before a nuclear bomb
could be developed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gas centrifuge uranium enrichment
Uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride is separated into its
different isotopes in rapidly spinning rotor tubes of special
centrifuges. Many hundreds or thousands of centrifuges are connected in
cascades to enrich uranium. If the lighter U235 isotope is enriched to
more than 90% it can be used in the core of a nuclear weapon.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Following the departure of weapons inspectors in 1998 there has been
an accumulation of intelligence indicating that Iraq is making concerted
covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and materials with nuclear
applications. Iraq's known holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA
supervision. But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of
significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Iraq has no active civil
nuclear power programme or nuclear power plants, and therefore has no
legitimate reason to acquire uranium.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq's civil nuclear programme
* Iraq's long-standing civil nuclear power programme is limited to
small scale research. Activities that could be used for military
purposes are prohibited by UNSCR 687 and 715.
* Iraq has no nuclear power plants and therefore no requirement for
uranium as fuel.
* Iraq has a number of nuclear research programmes in the fields of
agriculture, biology, chemistry, materials and pharmaceuticals. None
of these activities require more than tiny amounts of uranium which
Iraq could supply from its own resources.
* Iraq's research reactors are non-operational - one was bombed by the
Israelis, one was never completed, and the other's fuel has been
removed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. Intelligence shows that other important procurement activity since
1998 included attempts to purchase:
* vacuum pumps, which could be used to create and maintain pressures in
a gas centrifuge cascade needed to enrich uranium;
* an entire magnet production line of the correct specification for use
in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges. It appears that
Iraq is attempting to acquire a capability to produce them on its own
rather than rely on foreign procurement;
* Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) and fluorine gas. AHF is commonly
used in the petrochemical industry and Iraq frequently imports
significant amounts, but it is also used in the process of converting
uranium into uranium hexafluoride for use in gas centrifuge
cascades;
* one large filament winding machine, which could be used to
manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors;
* a large balancing machine which could be used in initial centrifuge
balancing work.
22. Iraq has also made repeated attempts covertly to acquire a very large
quantity (60,000 or more) of specialised aluminium tubes. The specialised
aluminium in question is subject to international export controls because
of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used
to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive intelligence that it
is destined for a nuclear programme.
Nuclear weapons: timelines
23. In early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were
hindering the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile
material. The JIC judged that while sanctions remain effective, Iraq
would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or
prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce
sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously. However, we know
that Iraq retains expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons.
We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other
essential components from foreign sources, the timeline for production of
a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear
weapon in between one and two years.
BALLISTIC MISSILES
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999-2002
24. In mid-2001 the JIC drew attention to what it described as a
"step-change" in progress on Iraqi missile programme over the previous
two years. It was clear from intelligence that the range of Iraqi
missiles which was permitted by the UN and supposedly limited to 150kms
was being extended and that work was under way on larger engines for
longer-range missiles.
25. In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop
missiles with a range of over 1,000kms. The JIC assessed that if
sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such
a missile before 2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors
had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development. In the
previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts for the missile
programme had been bolder. The JIC also assessed that Iraq retained up
to 20 Al Hussein missiles from before the Gulf War.
The Iraqi ballistic missile programme since 1998
FIGURE 4: ABABIL-100
26. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range
missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security
Council Resolution 687. The Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been
extensively tested and is being deployed to military units. Intelligence
indicates that at least fifty have been produced. Intelligence also
indicates that Iraq has worked on extending its range to at least 200km
in breach of UN Security Resolution 687. Production of the solid
propellant Ababil-100 is also underway, probably as an unguided rocket at
this stage. There are also plans to extend its range to at least 200km.
Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant
offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also
quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of
readiness for longer periods.
27. According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 Al Hussein
missiles, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. These
missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or
re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We
judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles
to be maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some
require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be
available for use. They could be used with conventional, chemical or
biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of
reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.
FIGURE 5: AL HUSSEIN
28. Intelligence has confirmed that Iraq wants to extend the range of
its missile systems to over 1000km, enabling it to threaten other
regional neighbours. This work began in 1998, although efforts to
regenerate the long range ballistic missile programme probably began in
1995. Iraq's missile programmes employ hundreds of people. Satellite
imagery (Figure 6) has shown a new engine test stand being constructed
(A), which is larger than the current one used for Al Samoud (B), and
that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled
under UNSCOM supervision. This new stand will be capable of testing
engines for medium range ballistic missles (MRBMs) with ranges over
1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687.
Such a facility would not be needed for systems that fall within the UN
permitted range of 150km. The Iraqis have recently taken measures to
conceal activities at this site. Iraq is also working to obtain improved
guidance technology to increase missile accuracy.
FIGURE 6: AL RAFAH/SHAHIYAT LIQUID PROPELLANT ENGINE STATIC TEST STAND
29. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new
longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions
impact particularly on the:
* availability of foreign expertise;
* conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
* acquisition of guidance and control technology.
30. Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. Even if
sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile capability of
over 1000km within 5 years.
31. Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production
infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in
1998 (see Part 2). New missile-related infrastructure is also under
construction. Some aspects of this, including rocket propellant mixing
and casting facilities at the Al Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those
linked to the prohibited BADR-2000 programme (with a planned range of
700-1000km) which were destroyed in the Gulf War or dismantled by UNSCOM.
A new plant at al-Mamoun for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate,
which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket
motors, has also been constructed. This has been provided illicitly by
NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm with
extensive links in Iraq, including to other suspect facilities such as
the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant. After an extensive investigation, the
Indian authorities have recently suspended its export licence, although
other individuals and companies are still illicitly procuring for Iraq.
32. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire
additional production technology, including machine tools and raw
materials, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051. The embargo
has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as requests to buy
magnesium powder and ammonium chloride. But we know from intelligence
that some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile
programme. More will inevitably continue to do so. Intelligence makes it
clear that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third
countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for
Iraq's ballistic missiles. This includes production level quantities of
near complete sets of solid propellant rocket motor ingredients such as
aluminium powder, ammonium perchlorate and hydroxyl terminated
polybutadiene. There have also been attempts to acquire large quantities
of liquid propellant chemicals such as unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine
(UDMH) and diethylenetriamene. We judge this is intended to support
production and deployment of the Al Samoud and development of longer
range systems.
Figure 7 [Current and planned/potential ballistic missiles]
FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME
33. The UN has sought to restrict Iraq's ability to generate funds for
its chemical, biological and other military programmes. For example, Iraq
earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programme (OFF) established
by UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil sold through the UN are used to
buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq. This money remains under UN control,
and cannot be used for military procurement. However, the Iraqi regime
continues to generate income outside UN control, either in the form of
hard currency, or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds
are freed up to be spent on other things).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
UN Sanctions
UN sanctions on Iraq prohibit all imports to and exports from Iraq. The
UN must clear any goods entering or leaving. The UN also administers the
Oil for Food (OFF) programme. Any imports entering Iraq under the OFF are
checked against the Goods Review List for potential military or weapons
of mass destruction utility.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
34. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for
building new palaces, as well as purchasing luxury goods and other
civilian goods outside OFF. Some of these funds are also used by Saddam
to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military
equipment, including for chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes. We do not know what proportion of these funds is used
in this way. But we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop
its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile programme, for
example through covert procurement of equipment from abroad has been
inhibited in any way by lack of funds. The steady increase over the last
three years in the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress
the programmes faster.
-----------------------------------------
Iraq's illicit earnings
Year Amount in $billions
1999 0.8 to 1
2000 1.5 to 2
2001 3
2002 3 (assessed)
-----------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PART 2: HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS
1. During the 1990s, beginning in April 1991 immediately after the end of
the Gulf War, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions
establishing the authority of UNSCOM and the IAEA to carry out the work
of dismantling Iraq's arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
programmes and long range ballistic missiles.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD)
UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and
required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or
rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and
biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km,
and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and
facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged
with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA
must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security
Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.
UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and
complete disclosure of all its WMD programmes and provide unconditional
and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. For over a decade Iraq has been
in breach of this resolution. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities
of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.
UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for
the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement
UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this to November 1993. OMV was
conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq.
UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of
dual-use WMD goods.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
These resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which
is the instrument that allows the UN Security Council to authorise the
use of military force to enforce its resolutions.
2. As outlined in UNSCR 687, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons programmes were also a breach of Iraq's commitments under:
* The Geneva Protocol of 1925 - which bans the use of chemical and
biological weapons;
* the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - which bans the
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of
biological weapons; and
* the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - which prohibits Iraq
from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.
3. UNSCR 687 obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its
WMD programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or
rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical,
biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a
range beyond 150km. Iraq did not make a satisfactory declaration within
the specified timeframe.
Iraq accepted the UNSCRs and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM. The
history of the UN weapons inspections was characterised by persistent
Iraqi obstruction.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for
inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist,
technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for
destruction.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraqi Non-Co-operation with the Inspectors
4. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN
Security Council in January 1999, that in 1991 a decision was taken by a
high-level Iraqi Government committee to provide inspectors with only a
portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities
and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the
following actions:
* to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for
destruction only those that were least modern;
* to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to
revive programmes when possible;
* to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme,
including the VX nerve agent project; to conceal the number and type
of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range
missiles;
* and to conceal the existence of its biological weapons programme.
5. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council
that Iraq had created a new category of sites - "Presidential" and
"sovereign" - from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would
henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such
limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM
inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites. Many of
these so-called "palaces" are in fact large compounds which are an
integral part of Iraqi counter-measures designed to hide weapons
material.
Photograph of a presidential site or what have been called "palaces".
Buckingham palace has been super-imposed to demonstrate their
comparative size.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq's policy of deception
Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM having a large, effective, system for hiding
proscribed material including documentation, components, production
equipment and, possibly, biological and chemical agents and weapons from
the UN. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an
Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility
for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM
and the IAEA. The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial
Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's WMD programmes. The Higher
Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall
command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very
highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if
not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai. The system for hiding
proscribed material relies on high mobility and good command and control.
It uses lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear
to be located close to good road links and telecommunications. The
Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to
hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and
collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intimidation
6. Once inspectors had arrived in Iraq, it quickly became apparent that
the Iraqis would resort to a range of measures (including physical
threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM
and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate.
7. In response to such incidents, the President of the Security Council
issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament
and monitoring obligations.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraqi obstruction of UN weapons inspection teams
* firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from
intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991);
* keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to
allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear
weapons programme (September 1991);
* announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful"
(October 1991);
* refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Ministry of Agriculture.
Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the
building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site
contained archives related to proscribed activities;
* In 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and
choosing its own flight plans. In January 1993 it refused to allow
UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq;
* refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring
cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993);
* repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998);
* interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the
safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997);
* demanding the end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM
staff (October 1997);
* destroying documentary evidence of WMD programmes (September 1997).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obstruction
8. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until
July 1995.
In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged that biological agents had been produced
on an industrial scale at Al-Hakam. Following the defection in August
1995 of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law and former Director of the
Military Industrialisation Commission, Iraq released over 2 million
documents relating to its WMD programmes and acknowledged that it had
pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual
weapons. Iraq admitted producing 183 biological weapons with a reserve
of agent to fill considerably more.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection of Iraq's biological weapons programme
In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991,
Iraq claimed that it had merely conducted a military biological research
programme. At the site visited, Al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment,
documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to
the Al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility
was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed
animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central
site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for
weapons. The factory had also been sanitised by Iraqi officials to
deceive inspectors. Iraq continued to develop the Al-Hakam site into the
1990s, misleading UNSCOM about its true purpose.
Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at Dawrah
which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax, was not divulged as
part of the programme. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq
acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare agent had
been produced there and at Al-Hakam.
As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent
that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete.
Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater
understanding of the programme and to obtain credible supporting
evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss it's past programme and
doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest. Monitoring teams were
at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated
with the past programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive
disclosures of their programme which were judged by UNSCOM, and specially
convened international panels, to be technically inadequate.
In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent
ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later - in
early 1997 - UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Iraq tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of
its biological
weapons programme. It created forged documents to account for bacterial
growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production
of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were
created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State
Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals
and distribution to local authorities. Iraq also censored documents and
scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all
references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of
agents.
10. Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of agent
and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq destroyed, unilaterally and
illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for
these weapons impossible. In addition Iraq cleansed a key site at
Al-Muthanna - its main research and development, production and
weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents - of all evidence of a
biological programme in the toxicology department, the animal-house and
weapons filling station.
11. Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during
inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics.
In July 1998, Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process
stating that the biological programme was more secret and more closed
than other WMD programmes. He also played down the significance of the
programme. Iraq has presented the biological weapons programme as the
personal undertaking of a few misguided scientists.
12. At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons
programme via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997
the Agency's Director General stated that the IAEA was "severely hampered
by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of
the programme's scope."
Inspection achievements
13. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both
UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in
discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons programme and
destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles
as well as the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.
14. Despite UNSCOM's efforts, following the effective ejection of UN
inspectors in December 1998, there remained a series of significant
unresolved disarmament issues. In summarising the situation in a report
to the Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler indicated
that:
* contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under
international supervision, "Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and
secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and
items";
* and Iraq "also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items,
including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention
of Council resolutions."
Overall, Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had "a
significant impact upon the Commission's disarmament work."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNSCOM and IAEA Achievements
UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate
inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors
uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile
programmes. Major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included:
* the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610
tonnes of chemical precursors and 411 tonnes of chemical warfare
agent;
* the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and
production complex at Al-Muthanna, and a range of key production
equipment;
* the destruction of 48-SCUD type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56
sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical agents, and 20 conventional
warheads;
* the destruction of the Al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a
range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for
biological weapons;
* the discovery in 1991 of samples of indigenously-produced highly
enriched uranium, forcing Iraq's acknowledgement of uranium
enrichment programmes and attempts to preserve key components of its
prohibited nuclear weapons programme;
* the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear
weapons programme, including the Al-Athir weaponisation/testing
facility.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Withdrawal of the Inspectors
15. By the end of 1998 UNSCOM was in direct confrontation with the Iraqi
Government which was refusing to co-operate. The US and the UK had made
clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action
unavoidable. Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security
Council in December 1998 and stated that, following a series of direct
confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to
co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament
mandate. As a direct result, on December 16 the weapons inspectors were
withdrawn and Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK a
few hours afterwards.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998)
Operation Desert Fox targeted industrial facilities related to Iraq's
ballistic missile programme and a suspect biological warfare facility as
well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq's security
organisations which are involved in its weapons of mass destruction
programmes. Key facilities associated with Saddam's ballistic missile
programme were significantly degraded.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Situation Since 1998
16. There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since
1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and
monitoring obligations, the Security Council passed resolution 1284 in
December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor
organisation to UNSCOM and called on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors
"immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas,
facilities, equipment, records and means of transport". It also set out
the steps Iraq needed to take in return for the eventual suspension and
lifting of sanctions. A key measure of Iraqi compliance would be full
co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and
unrestricted access to any and all sites, personnel and documents.
17. For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an
annual inspection of a stockpile of nuclear material (depleted natural
and low-enriched uranium). This has led some countries and western
commentators to conclude - erroneously - that Iraq is meeting its nuclear
disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in
recent weeks, this annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for
the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the
UN Security Council."
18. Dr. Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr. Mohammed
El-Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the
absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with
its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations. In April 1999, an
independent UN panel of experts noted that "the longer inspection and
monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the
comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes,
increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons
programmes."
19. The departure of the Inspectors greatly diminished our ability to
monitor and assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its
chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PART 3: IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN
Introduction
1. The Republic of Iraq is bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudia
Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the Persian Gulf. Its population of around 23
million is ethnically and religiously diverse. Approximately 77% are
Arabs. Sunni Muslims form around 17% of the Arab population and dominate
the government. About 60% of Iraqis are Shias and 20% are Kurds. The
remaining 3% of the population consists of Assyrians, Turkomans,
Armenians, Christians and Yazidis.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saddam Hussein's rise to power
Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 in the Tikrit district, north of Baghdad.
In 1957 he joined the Ba'ath Party. After taking part in a failed attempt
to assassinate the Iraqi President, Abdul Karim Qasim, Saddam escaped,
first to Syria and then to Egypt. In his absence he was sentenced to 15
years imprisonment.
Saddam returned to Baghdad in 1963 when the Ba'ath Party came to power.
He went into hiding after the Ba'ath fell from power later that year. He
was captured and imprisoned, but in 1967 escaped and took over
responsibility for Ba'ath security. Saddam set about imposing his will on
the Party and establishing himself at the centre of power.
The Ba'ath Party returned to power in 1968. In 1969 Saddam became Vice
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Deputy to the President,
and Deputy Secretary-General of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath. In
1970 he joined the Party's National Command and in 1977 was elected
Assistant Secretary General. In July 1979, he took over the Presidency of
Iraq. Within days, five fellow members of the Revolutionary Command
Council were accused of involvement in a coup attempt. They and 17 others
were summarily executed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Public life in Iraq is nominally dominated by the Ba'ath Party. But
all real authority rests with Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle.
Saddam's family, tribe and a small number of associates remain his most
loyal supporters. He uses them to convey his orders, including to members
of the government.
3. Saddam Hussein uses patronage and violence to motivate his supporters
and to control or eliminate opposition. Potential rewards include social
status, money and better access to goods. Saddam's extensive security
apparatus and Ba'ath Party network provides oversight of Iraqi society,
with informants in social, government and military organisations. Saddam
practises torture, execution and other forms of coercion against his
enemies, real or suspected. His targets are not only those who have
offended him, but also their families, friends or colleagues.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Iraqi Ba'ath Party
The Ba'ath Party is the only legal political party in Iraq. It pervades
all aspects of Iraqi life. Membership, around 700,000, is necessary for
self advancement and confers benefits from the regime.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Saddam acts to ensure that there are no other centres of power in
Iraq. He has crushed parties and ethnic groups which might try to assert
themselves, such as the communists and the Kurds. Members of the
opposition abroad have been the targets of assassination attempts
conducted by Iraqi security services.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saddam Hussein's security apparatus
Saddam relies on a long list of security organisations with overlapping
responsibilities. The main ones are:
* The Special Security Organisation oversees Saddam's security and
monitors the loyalty of other security services. Its recruits are
predominantly from Tikrit.
* The Special Republican Guard is equipped with the best available
military equipment. Its members are selected on the basis of loyalty
to the regime.
* The Directorate of General Security is primarily responsible for
countering threats from the civilian population.
* The Directorate of General Intelligence monitors and suppresses
dissident activities at home and abroad.
* The Directorate of Military Intelligence's role includes the
investigation of military personnel.
* The Saddam Fidayeen, under the control of Udayy Hussein, has been
used to deal with civil disturbances.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Army officers are an important part of the government's network of
informers. Suspicion that officers have ambitions other than the service
of the President leads to immediate execution. It is routine for Saddam
to take pre-emptive action against those who he believes might conspire
against him.
Internal Repression - the Kurds and the Shias
6. Saddam has pursued a long-term programme of persecution of the Iraqi
Kurds, including the use of chemical weapons. During the Iran/Iraq war,
Saddam appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, as his deputy in the
north. In 1987-88, al-Majid led the "Anfal" campaign of attacks on
Kurdish villages. Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000
Kurds were killed or disappeared during this period.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repression and control: some examples
* A campaign of mass arrests and killing of Shia activists led to the
execution of the Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and his sister in April
1980.
* In 1983, 80 members of another leading Shia family were arrested. Six
of them, all religious leaders, were executed.
* A massive chemical weapons attack on Kurds in Halabja town in March
1988, killing 5000 and injuring 10,000 more.
* A large number of officers from the Jabbur tribe were executed in the
early 1990s for the alleged disloyalty of a few of them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. After the Gulf War in 1991 Kurds in the north of Iraq rose up against
Baghdad's rule. In response the Iraqi regime killed or imprisoned
thousands, prompting a humanitarian crisis. Over a million Kurds fled
into the mountains and tried to escape Iraq.
8. Persecution of Iraq's Kurds continues, although the protection
provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has helped to curb the worst
excesses. But outside this zone, the Baghdad regime has continued a
policy of persecution and intimidation.
9. The regime has used chemical weapons against the Kurds, most notably
in an attack on the town of Halabja in 1988. The implicit threat of the
use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and others is an important part
of Saddam's attempt to keep the civilian population under control.
10. The regime has tried to displace the traditional Kurdish and Turkoman
populations of the areas under its control, primarily in order to weaken
Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the northern city of Kirkuk.
Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly ejected to the three northern
Iraqi governorates - Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah - which are under de
facto Kurdish control. According to the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq, 94,000 individuals have
been expelled since 1991. Agricultural land owned by Kurds has been
confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq
have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area.
11. After the 1979 revolution that ousted the Shah in Iran, Saddam
intensified a campaign against the Shia Muslim majority of Iraq, fearing
that they might be encouraged by the new Shia regime in Iran.
12.In the wake of the Gulf War, riots broke out in the southern city of
Basra on 1 March 1991, spreading quickly to other cities in
Shia-dominated southern Iraq. The regime responded by killing thousands.
Many Shia tried to escape to Iran and Saudi Arabia.
13. Some of the Shia hostile to the regime sought refuge in the
marshland of southern Iraq. In order to subjugate the area, Saddam
embarked on a large-scale programme to drain the marshes to allow Iraqi
ground forces to eliminate all opposition there. The rural population of
the area fled or were forced to move to southern cities or across the
border into Iran.
Saddam Hussein's Wars
14. As well as ensuring his absolute control inside Iraq, Saddam has
tried to make Iraq the dominant power of the region. In pursuit of these
objectives he has led Iraq into two wars of aggression against
neighbours, the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait.
15. With the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, relations between Iran
and Iraq deteriorated sharply. In September 1980 Saddam renounced a
border treaty he had agreed with Iran in 1975 ceding half of the Shatt
al-Arab waterway to Iran. Shortly thereafter, Saddam launched a
large-scale invasion of Iran. He believed that he could take advantage of
the state of weakness, isolation and disorganisation he perceived in
post-revolutionary Iran. He aimed to seize territory, including that
ceded to Iran a few years earlier, and to assert Iraq's position as a
leader of the Arab world. Saddam expected it to be a short, sharp
campaign. But the conflict lasted for eight years. Iraq fired over 500
ballistic missiles at Iranian targets, including major cities.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opposition to Saddam during the Iran/Iraq war
During the war Saddam's security apparatus ensured any internal dissent
or opposition was quickly eliminated. In 1982 he quickly purged a group
within Iraq's ruling clique which suggested that the war might be brought
to an end more quickly if Saddam stood down.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. It is estimated that the Iran/Iraq war cost the two sides a million
casualties. Iraq used chemical weapons extensively from 1984. Some twenty
thousand Iranians were killed by mustard gas, and the nerve agents tabun
and sarin, all of which Iraq still possesses. The UN Security Council
considered the report prepared by a team of three specialists appointed
by the UN Secretary General in March 1986, following which the President
made a statement condemning Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This marked
the first time a country had been named for violating the 1925 Geneva
Convention banning the use of chemical weapons.
17. The cost of the war ran into hundreds of billions of dollars for
both sides. Iraq gained nothing. After the war ended, Saddam resumed his
previous pursuit of primacy in the Gulf. His policies involved spending
huge sums of money on new military equipment. But Iraq was burdened by
debt incurred during the war and the price of oil, Iraq's only major
export, was low.
18. By 1990 Iraq's financial problems were severe. Saddam looked at ways
to press the oil-producing states of the Gulf to force up the price of
crude oil by limiting production and waive the $40 billion that they had
loaned Iraq during its war with Iran. Kuwait had made some concessions
over production ceilings. But Saddam blamed Kuwait for over production.
When his threats and blandishments failed, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2
August 1990. He believed that occupying Kuwait could prove profitable.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abuses by Iraqi forces in Kuwait
* Robbery and rape of Kuwaitis and expatriates.
* Summary executions.
* People dragged from their homes and held in improvised detention
centres.
* Amnesty International has listed 38 methods of torture used by the
Iraqi occupiers. These included beatings, breaking of limbs,
extracting finger and toenails, inserting bottle necks into the
rectum, and subjecting detainees to mock executions.
* Kuwaiti civilians arrested for "crimes" such as wearing beards.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Saddam also sought to justify the conquest of Kuwait on other
grounds. Like other Iraqi leaders before him, he claimed that, as
Kuwait's rulers had come under the jurisdiction of the governors of Basra
in the time of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait should belong to Iraq.
20. During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq denied access to the Red
Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to
civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty
was imposed for relatively minor "crimes" such as looting and hoarding
food.
21. In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the
Iraqi regime took hostage several hundred foreign nationals (including
children) in Iraq and Kuwait, and prevented thousands more from leaving,
in direct contravention of international humanitarian law. Hostages were
held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian
sites.
22. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire
to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells, with serious environmental consequences.
23. More than 600 Kuwaiti and other prisoners of war and missing persons
are still unaccounted for. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation
to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to
close only three case-files.
Abuse of human rights
24. This section draws on reports of human rights abuses from
authoritative international organisations, including Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch.
25. Human rights abuses continue within Iraq. People continue to be
arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities,
or often because they are related to members of the opposition.
Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are
often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic
practice. Thousands of prisoners have been executed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human rights: abuses under Saddam
* 4000 prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib Prison in 1984.
* 3000 prisoners were executed at the Mahjar Prison between 1993 and
1998.
* About 2500 prisoners were executed between 1997 and 1999 in a "prison
cleansing" campaign.
* 122 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in February/
March 2000. A further 23 political prisoners were executed there in
October 2001.
* In October 2000, dozens of women accused of prostitution were
beheaded without any judicial process. Some were accused for
political reasons.
* Women prisoners at Mahjar are routinely raped by their guards.
* Methods of torture used in Iraqi jails include using electric drills
to mutilate hands, pulling out fingernails, knife cuts, sexual
attacks and 'official rape'.
* Prisoners at the Qurtiyya Prison in Baghdad and elsewhere are kept in
metal boxes the size of tea chests. If they do not confess they are
left to die.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties
for criminal offences. These include amputation, branding, cutting off
ears, and other forms of mutilation. Anyone found guilty of slandering
the President has their tongue removed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Rights - mistreatment in Abu Ghraib Prison
Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect was
imprisoned for four years at Abu Ghraib in the 1980s. On the second day
of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between two rows of five
guards each to receive their containers of food. While walking to get the
food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They
had to return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get
breakfast resulted in twenty lashes. According to Abdallah, "It wasn't
that bad going to get the food, but coming back the food was spilled when
we were beaten." The same procedure was used when the men went to the
bathroom. On the third day, the torture continued. "We were removed from
our cells and beaten with plastic pipes. This surprised us, because we
were asked no question. Possibly it was being done to break our morale",
Abdallah speculated. The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The
treatment was organised and systematic. Abdallah was held alone in a
3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor. "We were allowed to go to the
toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for
only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash",
Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the
hunger that accompanied his detention: "I taught myself to drink a
minimum amount of water because there was no placed to urinate. They used
wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a
piece of a stick, covered with blood, and managed to bring it back to my
room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry can eat anything.
Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin
was so dry that it began to fall off. I ate pieces of my own body. "No
one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what happened to us. It is
impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was
totally naked the entire time. Half of the original groups [of about
thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and
psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one
of us, and he would be beaten to death". (Source: Human Rights Watch)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saddam Hussein's family
27. Saddam's son Udayy maintained a private torture chamber known as the
Red Room in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an
electricity installation. He ordered the Iraq football team to be caned
on the soles of the feet for losing a World Cup match. He created a
militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their
own homes. He has personally executed dissidents, for instance in the
Shia uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War.
28. Members of Saddam's family are also subject to persecution. A
cousin of Saddam called Ala Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid fled to Jordan from
Iraq, citing disagreements with the regime over business matters. He
returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly
that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir
Habbush, Head of the Directorate of General Intelligence (the
Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid. At the
farm 'Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate
family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him.
29. Some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, have
been killed. His sons-in-law Hussein Kamel and Saddam had defected in
1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the government had announced
amnesties for them. They were executed in February 1996.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Rights - individual testimony
In December 1996, a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad was arrested outside
his house by plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know
his whereabouts and went from one police station to another inquiring
about him. Then they found out that he was being held in the headquarters
of the General Security Directorate in Baghdad. The family was not
allowed to visit him. Eleven months later the family was told by the
authorities that he had been executed and that they should go and collect
his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged
out and the empty eye sockets filled with paper. His right wrist and left
leg were broken. The family was not given any reason for his arrest and
subsequent execution. However, they suspected that he was executed
because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with
the Iraqi opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before
his arrest and also executed. (Source: Amnesty International)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Rights - individual testimony
"...I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He
was handcuffed and a piece of wood was placed between his elbows and his
knees. Two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh
Nasser was being suspended like a chicken. This method of torture is
known as al-Khaygania (a reference to a former security director known as
al-Khaygani). An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis
and another one attached to one of his toes. He was asked if he could
identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya". They took me to
another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my
clothes and a security officer said "the person you saw has confessed
against you". He said to me "You followers of [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have
carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been
distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad". He asked if
I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has
been signing these statements. I said "I do not have any contacts with
him"... I was then left suspended in the same manner as al-Shaikh
al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward. They attached an electric wire on
my penis and the other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor.
One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were
applied every few minutes and were increased. I must have been suspended
for more than an hour. I lost consciousness. They took me to another room
and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating... They
repeated this method a few times." (Source: Amnesty International,
testimony from an Iraqi theology student from Saddam City)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------
Firther copies are available on the Internet from:
No10 (www.pm.goc.uk)
FCO (www.fco.gov.uk)
MOD (www.mod.uk)
The Stationary Office (www.official-documents.co.uk)
**********
Dit bericht is verzonden via de informele D66 discussielijst (D66 at nic.surfnet.nl).
Aanmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SUBSCRIBE D66
Afmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SIGNOFF D66
Het on-line archief is te vinden op: http://listserv.surfnet.nl/archives/d66.html
**********
More information about the D66
mailing list