Literatuur voor Henk Vreekamp

[Ad Huikeshoven]

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

Henk Vreekamp,

Literatuuroverzichtjes stemsystemen aan het eind van deze mail. Zoek op
Yahoo met zoekterm "Approval Voting", je komt dan alle (oudere) systemen
ook tegen.

Eerst een citaat uit een Scientific American artikel:
(http://www.sciam.com/askexpert/math/math2.html )

Lawrence Ford, the chair of the mathematics <http://math.isu.edu/>
department at Idaho State University, notes that the goal of fairness is
more elusive than it may appear:
"There has been lots of activity over the past 30 to 40 years on
mathematical applications in political science. One problem that has
been studied extensively seems similar to the problem you describe:
Given a set of candidates (at least 3) and a number of voters, select
the 'fairest' winner.
"Many solutions have been proposed, but all were shown to exhibit flaws
in some cases. Then, in the early 1960s, Kenneth Arrow
<http://www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/faculty/arrow.html>  proved his
famous Impossibility
<http://cisr.anu.edu.au/arp/guy/appendixarrowsimpossib_431.html>
Theorem, which essentially states that no system can exist without these
flaws, that is, no perfect voting system exists. So 'fairer' is a
subjective measure; any voting system can be made to look 'unfair' under
the right set of circumstances.
Voting systems such as the one you describe are probably very
susceptible to 'strategic voting,' wherein participants can influence
the outcome by insincere voting. A similar system that is not
susceptible to strategic voting and that is gaining a good reputation as
a relatively fair system is 'approval voting.' In it, a voter votes for
all candidates he or she approves of. The candidate with the most votes
wins. In it, the candidate with the broadest approval base wins
(centrists, not extremists, get elected--which is often not the case in
a one person/one vote election). One big flaw here is that most voters
are fairly positive of their favorites and fairly positive of those they
hate, but wishy-washy in the middle. If they choose randomly for or
against approval in that middle range, the whole election can become
random."
Een overzichtspagina op internet is bijvoorbeeld:
http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/ over de wiskunde van stemmen.

Met citaat:
(http://bcn.boulder.co.us/government/approvalvote/center.html )
It seems clear that approval voting is the best system for single-winner
elections. But it seems only fair to refer to information on other
reasonable alternatives: a Condorcet method
<http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/politics/condorcet.html> , and Hare (STV)
<http://homepage.mac.com/cgrapski/representation.html> . These and
others are compared in the Voting
<http://dmoz.org/Society/Politics/Campaigns_and_Elections/Voting_Systems
/>  Systems section of the Open Directory Project <http://dmoz.org/> ,
at the Election <http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124/>
Methods Resource page and Election <http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em/>
Methods Mailing List.
When there is more than one winner the situation is more complicated.
See the Center for Voting <http://www.igc.apc.org/cvd/>  and Democracy.
No matter what voting system is used, it is important for you to learn
about the candidates and issues (yahoo
<http://www.yahoo.com/Government/Politics/Elections/>  |
<http://www.npr.org/> NPR) and vote!


Met vriendelijke groeten,

Ad Huikeshoven
Vondelstraat 33
2513 EN  's-Gravenhage
telefoon/fax +31(070)3608510

**********
Dit bericht is verzonden via de informele D66 discussielijst (D66 at nic.surfnet.nl).
Aanmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SUBSCRIBE D66
Afmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SIGNOFF D66
Het on-line archief is te vinden op: http://listserv.surfnet.nl/archives/d66.html
**********