[Aktielijst] [redskin] Spying the modern way in Holland

Sun Apr 23 15:27:33 CEST 2000

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

>X-Authentication-Warning: inform.antenna.dk: majordom set sender to
owner-aktielijst at majordomo.antenna.nl using -f
>X-Sender: crass at pop.dds.nl
>Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2000 20:54:24 +0200
>To: aktielijst at antenna.nl
>From: Rudeboy <crass at dds.nl>
>Subject: [Aktielijst] [redskin] Spying the modern way in Holland
>Sender: owner-aktielijst at majordomo.antenna.nl
>Reply-To: Rudeboy <crass at dds.nl>
>
>>From: Nizkor English Service <nzkspain at teleline.es>
>>
>>Nizkor Int. Human Rights Team
>>Derechos Human Rights
>>Serpaj Europe
>>Information
>>18abr00
>>
>>DUTCH INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEEKS AUTHORIZATION TO INTERCEPT AND SCAN
>>SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH ITS OWN PARALLEL HARD SYSTEM, WHICH ALLOWS
>>THE UTILIZATION OF SOFTWARE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTROL PATTERNS.
>>
>>The Dutch Intelligence Agency BVD is getting new powers. Among other
>>things, the powers to intercept communications will be extended. The
>>agency is authorized, if the government gets its way, to intercept
>>satellite communications at random and search the intercepted traffic by
>>keywords. Also, the BVD gets a new intelligence task: the gathering of
>>economical information. Holland goes Echelon, it seems.
>>
>>The new 'Act on the intelligence and security agencies' (WIV), which is
>>currently debated by Dutch parliament, gives the powers of the BVD a new
>>legal basis. Actually, it means mainly the extension of investigative
>>powers. In each amendment on the original proposal, new powers are
>>given. For instance, in the first draft of the new Act, the BVD got the
>>power to intercept, record and listen into telecommunications. In the
>>latest amendment, from the beginning of this year, the power to
>>'receive' telecommunications was added. This means the BVD is authorized
>>to directly pluck telecommunications, for instance GSM-traffic, out of
>>the air. In this way, the BVD is no longer dependent on the willingness
>>of telcom operators to intercept traffic, but can create for instance
>>their own parallel network of receivers to intercept all GSM-traffic.
>>Also, this prevents providers from 'leaking' about the fine work the BVD
>>is doing in this area.
>>
>>The biggest extension, however, is the newly added article 25a. In this
>>article, the BVD is authorized to intercept at random all international
>>telecommunication that is not cable bound and scan the intercepted
>>communication on items of interest (persons, groups, keywords).
>>According to the explanatory note by the draft Act, this kind of random
>>interception is needed to investigate if by any chance interesting
>>messages are part of the international communication.
>>
>>The government says nonchalantly that it can't be prevented that in this
>>manner the BVD gets acquainted with the content of the intercepted
>>communications, although that isn't - still according to the Dutch
>>government - the main purpose of the random interception.
>>
>>"The searching is primarily an instrument for the reconnaisance of the
>>communication, to try to establish the nature of the communication and
>>the identity of the person or organisation that is communicating. That
>>in this way the agency gets acquainted with a part of the content of the
>>communication is inevitable, in order to establish who is communicating
>>and if it's a person or a group that has the interest of the agency. The
>>searching however is not directed to get acquainted with the full
>>content of the communication. In a certain way, this activity is
>>comparable with the listening in on telephone conversations, to check
>>if the connection is allright."
>>
>>This seems like a very creative way of saying that interception isn't
>>really interception, but a mere technical testing of connections. And
>>for that, no legal or governemental warrant is needed...
>>
>>Keywords
>>
>>As important parts of the international telecommunications are
>>transmitted by satellites and beam transmitters, it is clear this
>>article 25a authorises the Dutch BVD to intercept all these
>>communications.  This means an uncontrolled authority to intercept and
>>scan all communication that is not cable bound. This can have a great
>>impact on the Internet traffic. As a message on the Internet chooses the
>>least busy route, and the heart of Internet lays in the United States,
>>there is a big chance that email send within the Netherlands chooses an
>>international route by satellite. In future this can also be the case
>>for telephone conversations. All these messages can be intercepted and
>>randomly searched. Even now, the phone conservations between two big
>>Dutch cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, are being transmitted by beam
>>transmitters.
>>
>>In the first draft of the WIV, the Home secretary had to give permission
>>to the keywords the intelligence agency is using to scan the intercepted
>>traffic. In the latest amendment, the Home secretary only gets once a
>>year notification of the list of keywords, whereas the BVD is authorized
>>to add new keywords to its own discretion.
>>
>>Besides that, the BVD is authorized to store all intercepted
>>communication. Where the first proposal of the Act stipulated that
>>the BVD has to destroy immediately all intercepted communication that
>>isn't of interest for them, the new amendment gives the BVD the right to
>>store all intercepted communication for a year.
>>
>>In this way, the Dutch government is creating its own mini-Echelon. The
>>BVD uses for its interception tasks the facilities of the Technical
>>information processing centre (TIVC) of the Navy intelligence. This
>>centre, located at the Navy complex Kattenburg in Amsterdam, decodes
>>satellite traffic that is being intercepted by different ground stations.
>>The TIVC is working the same way as its big brother NSA, as showed by
>>the publication of internal documents in the Dutch daily De Haagse
>>Courant in 1985. Satellite conversations were intercepted, recorded and
>>selected by keywords for further analysis. The intelligence the TIVC
>>gathered was sent to the Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB), till this
>>unit was closed down in 1994 after a series of scandals. Since then, all
>>signal intelligence is in the hands of Navy intelligence.
>>
>>According to a study of two Dutch Intelligence experts (Bob de Graaff
>>and Cees Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze, 1998), the TIVC is part of a broader
>>international network and works closely with other Western agencies. For
>>instance in 1972, the TIVC reported to the Mossad that Egypt and Libya
>>had developed a telephone- and telex-connection under sea. Israeli
>>special forces destroyed this connection, so Egypt and Libya had to
>>communicate again by satellites, which were an easy target for
>>interception. According to the authors, the American CIA protested in
>>1992 firmly against the immanent dissolution of the IDB, because they
>>were afraid Dutch signal intelligence capacity would diminish.
>>
>>Vital economic interests
>>
>>The new power to intercept satellite communications at random will
>>undoubtfully be used for economic espionage. In the past, the signal
>>intelligence capacity already served economic purposes. In the above
>>mentioned study of the intelligence experts, examples of this are
>>mentioned. The authors speak of an "incestious relation" between the
>>intelligence services and Dutch industry. Leading persons of big dutch
>>companies, with establishments abroad, worked for the IDB. In exchange,
>>they got economic intelligence gathered by the TIVC. The Dutch
>>multinational Philips has, according to the study, close relations with
>>Dutch intelligence. The company installed interception devices in
>>telephone centres it sold to foreign companies and governments, the
>>report says.
>>
>>In the proposed new 'Act on the intelligence and security services', the
>>BVD gets officially the task of economic intelligence gathering. The BVD
>>has to "protect vital economic interests", which is seen as a part of
>>the national security.
>>
>>"The Dutch economy is highly dependent of economic developments in the
>>world; these developments are characterised by increasing
>>internationalisation and globalisation. Decisions taken elsewhere, can
>>have a sincere impact on the Dutch economy. It is possible to gather
>>intelligence on these developments in different ways, for instance by
>>cooperation with intelligence agencies of other countries. These
>>agencies however, wil take in account their own interests. In order not
>>to be dependent of information of third parties, the government thinks
>>it is necessary to build up its own information position and enforce
>>it."
>>
>>What excactly 'vital economic interests' are, is however wrapped in a
>>cloud of mystery.
>>
>>"To end with, we remark that with the explicitation of 'vital economic
>>interests of the Netherlands' in the terms of reference of the BVD, also
>>the possibility is created - if it seems appropriate - to conduct
>>investigations in this area, where national security as such isn't in
>>danger or is difficult to argue for."
>>
>>Encryption
>>
>>The new powers of the BVD are also interesting because some articles are
>>related to cryptography and information technology. The BVD is
>>authorized to break into homes and offices to bug keyboards. Besides
>>that, the BVD is authorized to break into computers and steal, alter or
>>delete information that is stored in computers. In other words, the BVD
>>is allowed to hack. In this way, the intelligence agency can steal data
>>from computers, manipulate software, corrupt passwords or install a
>>Trojan Horse, so access is secured and cryptography can be bypassed.
>>
>>Cryptography is a topic of special interest for the BVD. In the draft
>>Act, the power to undo encryption is being extended. In the first
>>proposal the BVD got the authority to decrypt encrypted communication
>>and data "by technical means".  In the latest amendment this is extended
>>to decryption "by all possible means".  According to the explanatory
>>note, "practice has shown there are other ways than just technical means
>>to decrypt encrypted communications."
>>
>>This cryptic description seems to be directed at infiltrators who diddle
>>out passwords, or look over the shoulder when messages are encrypted, or
>>intelligence teams breaking into homes and offices in search of the
>>little piece of paper the password is written on.
>>
>>The articles on the interception of telecommunication also contain
>>remarks on cryptography. Encrypted messages may be kept in storage as
>>long as is necessary for the BVD to decrypt them. The explanatory note
>>says:
>>
>>"Where telecommunication is concerned, of which the encryption is not
>>undone, and where the mere fact that cryptography has been used makes
>>this communication interesting for the agency, it is desirable to save
>>this communication to the moment the capacity exists or is being
>>developed to decrypt the communication."
>>
>>So the use of a perfectly normal technique to protect ones privacy,
>>trade secrets or sensitive political information, is in the eyes of the
>>Dutch government a highly suspected act.
>>
>>The draft Act also introduces the obligation for "every one" the
>>authorities believes has acces to the keys, to cooperate with the
>>intelligence agency in decrypting the encryption. Refusal is punishable
>>with a sentence of two years. The Dutch parliament has asked the
>>government if this means that suspects also are obliged to hand over
>>the keys.
>>
>>The answer is not available yet. But if the governement confirms this
>>obligation also applies to suspects, this will be a clear violation of
>>the fundamental human rights, as stated for instance in the Treaty on
>>the protection of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It means
>>an obligation to cooperate on your own condemniation and the reversal
>>of the burden of proof.
>>
>>[Source: Jelle van Buuren. Verlag Heinz Heise, Hannover. 11abr00]
>>------------------------------------------------------------------
>>USEFUL LINKS:
>>
>>- International campaign against Echelon Global System: EchelonWatch
>>http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/index.html
>>
>>- Global Internet Liberty Campaign - GILC (Main issues: free speech,
>>  privacy, cryptography, access)
>>http://www.gilc.org/
>>
>>- Report on International Status of Privacy: "Privacy and Human Rights
1999".
>>Electronic Privacy Information Center Washington, DC, USA.Privacy
>>International London, UK
>>http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/
>>
>>- "Cryptography and Liberty 1999: An international Survey of Encryption
>>Policy". Electronic Privacy Information Center Washington, DC
>>http://www2.epic.org/reports/crypto1999.html#_Toc450793110
>>
>>- "An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control". Scientific and
>>Technological Options Assessment - STOA. 06jan98.
>>http://cryptome.org/stoa-atpc.htm
>>
>>- Echelon:  Development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of
>>economic information - STOA reports - PDF Files - 10/1999 - European
>>Parliament [ENG/ING]
>>
>>http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/stoa/en/publi/default.htm
>>
>
>Rudeboy
>Skins 'n' Punks (united) Against Racism
>
>-Anger, Hate, Aggro, Rage-
>
>http://welcome.to/skanarchy
>or
>http://huizen.dds.nl/~crass (banner free)
>
>Violence on bikes: join BikeWars.
>hardcore distruction derby in amsterdam:
>http://huizen.dds.nl/~bikewars
>http://come.to/bikewars
>
>Terra-ist action all over the land, to stop the lunacy the rich they have
>planned.
>
>
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
>De Aktielijst:  |  Abonnement opzeggen? Stuur een E-mail aan
>voor nieuws en  |  majordomo at antenna.nl en schrijf in het tekstdeel:
>aankondigingen  |  unsubscribe aktielijst
>-------------------------------------------------------------------
>Meer info op het web: http://www.ddh.nl/datacom/mailinglist/machine
>
>
BetterSystems,
Prof.Dr.A.Dirkzwager,
Educational Instrumentation Technology,
Computers in Education.
Huizerweg 62,
1402 AE Bussum,
The Netherlands.
voice: x31-35-6981676
E-mail: mailto:aried at xs4all.nl

{========================================================================}
When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the
apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person
could have written them."  T. S. Kuhn,  The Essential Tension (1977).
 ===========================================================================
Accept that some days you are the statue, and some days you are the bird.

**********
Dit bericht is verzonden via de informele D66 discussielijst (D66 at nic.surfnet.nl).
Aanmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SUBSCRIBE D66
Afmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SIGNOFF D66
Het on-line archief is te vinden op: http://listserv.surfnet.nl/archives/d66.html
**********