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<h1 class="entry-title">Why Russia backs Assad: a view from Russia’s
anti-imperialist left</h1>
<div class="entry-meta"> <span class="author vcard"><a class="url
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class="entry-date" datetime="2015-09-18T16:30:59+00:00">September
18, 2015</time></a></span><span class="separator">/</span><span
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<p><em>The editors of the Russian socialist website </em><a
href="http://openleft.ru/?p=6854"><strong><em>openleft.ru</em></strong></a><em>
analyse why Russia is now openly moving troops into Syria to
support the Assad regime.</em></p>
<p>A whole <a
href="http://syriadirect.org/news/russia%E2%80%99s-visible-presence-in-latakia/">range</a>
of <a
href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/14/this-satellite-image-leaves-no-doubt-that-russia-is-throwing-troops-and-aircraft-into-syria-latakia-airport-construction/?utm_content=buffereb4a6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=bufferhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/14/this-satellite-image-leaves-no-doubt-that-russia-is-throwing-troops-and-aircraft-into-syria-latakia-airport-construction/?utm_content=buffereb4a6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">evidence</a> [also <a
href="http://mashable.com/2015/09/08/russian-selfie-soldiers-in-syria/#QpDtKjDT25kT">here</a>]
indicates that Russia is activating its military aid for the
Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad up to the point of direct
involvement of Russian troops in the Syrian conflict. Why now in
particular, and what lies behind this?</p>
<p>Taken individually, neither military and political ties, nor
economic ties between Russia and the Syrian regime are sufficient
to explain the stubborn support for Assad from the Russian
Federation, which had become the source of a serious conflict with
the West even before the events in Ukraine. Of course, Assad’s
regime is now the only reliable ally of Russia in the region, the
loss of which would make it unable to continue playing an
important role in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Supposedly, another factor was the [former] control of Syria over
the transit of Iraqi and Arabian oil – of fundamental importance
for Russia as one of the world’s largest oil exporters. In turn,
the desire to seize this control played a major role in defining
the anti-Assad position of Turkey, Israel and the monarchies of
the Persian Gulf. However, it is telling that Saudi Arabia
received a decisive rejection when it completely <a
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-is-said-to-use-oil-to-lure-russia-away-from-syrias-assad.html?_r=0">openly
suggested</a> to Russia that it cut off its support for Assad in
return for a lowering of the tempo of its oil production – which
could have then put the break on tumbling global oil prices.</p>
<p>Concern about the rise of radical Islamism in the region, and
beyond to the North Caucasus, is also not a sufficient
explanation. <a
href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2013.767403">Many
analysts</a> see Russia’s support of the Syrian regime as having
a significance that goes well beyond the Syrian conflict itself:
by opposing the attempts to depose Assad, the Kremlin is opposing
the very possibility of a “regime change” sanctioned by
international institutions, as it considers that the next target
of such a “regime change” could be itself.</p>
<p>The Russian government’s position on Syria, radically different
from that of western governments, has on occasion brought benefits
for its reputation abroad: such as when Putin’s column was
published in the <a
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html"><em>New
York Times</em></a>, making a plea against military
intervention in Syria, and criticising notions of American
exceptionalism. However, on the whole, Russia has been more on the
defensive.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the situation in the Middle East changed, and the rise
of ISIS enabled things that had formerly seemed impossible, such
as the partial normalisation of US relations with Iran. So the
Assad regime also stopped being less unacceptable to the US. In
this context, Putin appears to have decided to go on the offensive
– perhaps not in the literal sense of sending troops into Syria,
but at the very least in the sense of backstairs talks with
Washington, using the new Russian airbase in Syria’s Latakia as an
excuse.</p>
<p>According to <a
href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-10/russia-s-syrian-air-base-has-u-s-scrambling-for-a-plan">Bloomberg</a>,
this new tactic may well bear fruit – at least some of those
working at the White House believe the priority should be widening
the alliance against ISIS; they accept the activation of Russian
help for Assad as an already established fact and are even
prepared to work with Russia in an aerial campaign against the
Islamic State. By the looks of it, this is exactly what Putin and
[foreign minister] Lavrov are hoping for.</p>
<p>On the whole the Kremlin’s tactical course can be seen as a
continuation of its struggle for a “fairer multipolar world”, in
which international relations are not regulated by normative
principles of liberalism and Human Rights, but through the mutual
recognition of interests and cooperation on concrete questions. It
is precisely on these conditions that, through a pragmatic
coalition in Syria, Russia is attempting to reintegrate itself
into the world order, simultaneously changing the rules of the
game.</p>
<p>So the real consequences of Russian foreign policy, despite
Russia’s constant criticisms of the “hypocrisy of humanitarian
interventions”, are no better than the same humanitarian
interventions. The victims of the Syrian regime are <a
href="http://www.businessinsider.com/assads-government-still-kills-way-more-civilians-than-isis-2015-2">far
greater</a> than those of ISIS. Support for Assad is support for
a dictator who has turned the military apparatus of his country
into an effective machine for the obliteration of its own
population. However much Lavrov and [Putin’s press secretary]
Peskov make passive-aggressive criticisms of “western hypocrisy”,
Russia is at least as responsible for what is happening in Syria
as western states.</p>
<p>And the Kremlin’s demonstrative refusal to take any part in
solving the refugee crisis is truly hypocritical. By suggesting
that the countries of the EU deal with the consequences of a
crisis which it has done so much to create in Syria, Putin’s
Russia feels it has the “last laugh”. The drama of 100,000s of
people losing their homes is presented in Peskov’s announcements
as an elegant lesson, subordinated to the Kremlin’s foreign policy
towards its “western partners”.</p>
<p><em>Translated by Nick Evans.</em></p>
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