[D66] The US restarts the arms race

[A.O.]

https://mondediplo.com/2018/03/02nuclear-weapons-era

Monday 22 October 2018.

Over the weekend, President Trump threatened to withdraw the US from the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed by Reagan and Gorbachev
in December 1987. Such a move would be in line with the Pentagon’s
strategy. ‘With Democrats in Congress keen to punish Moscow for helping
elect Trump,’ Michael T Klare wrote in March, Pentagon officials ‘see an
opportunity to gain funding for all the new weapons – both nuclear and
conventional – they’ve long been seeking.’


The US restarts the arms race
Welcome to the new nuclear era

Obama tried to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles. Under Trump’s Nuclear
Posture Review, the weapons are back and there will be more of them,
with greater likelihood of use.

by Michael T Klare
Le Monde diplomatique


For a very long time, from Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 to the collapse of
the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991, much of the world dreaded nuclear
annihilation. There were attempts to diminish that peril through
superpower summits and arms control agreements, but the threat of
catastrophe never truly disappeared. Then, with the end of the cold war,
the perceived risk of nuclear war largely evaporated, and few gave much
thought to the mammoth stockpiles of atomic weapons still in place. But
now the threat of nuclear war has returned, as the major powers
undertake plans to modernise those arsenals and contemplate their use.

The principal nuclear powers – the US, Russia and China – are all
engaged in weapons modernisation, but no government has embraced this
new era of atomic rehabilitation with greater fervour than the
administration of President Donald Trump. On 2 February the US defence
department released a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), envisioning the use
of nuclear weapons under a wider range of circumstances than previously
allowed and calling for more atomic munitions to make this possible.

By ‘nuclear posture’ the Pentagon means an assessment of the global
security environment; a formal statement of US policy regarding the use
of atomic weapons; and an inventory of the weapons deemed necessary to
implement it. The new NPR is very clear on all these points. The US, it
says, faces wider threats than ever before, including increased
hostility from, and military assertiveness by, Russia and China. In
response, US nuclear policy must be revised to afford the president
greater leeway in the use of nuclear weapons, and munitions must be
acquired to facilitate such actions, when and if necessary.

One might conclude that the US is at a military disadvantage vis-à-vis
Russia or China, and desperately needs to rebuild its defences. Nothing
could be further from the truth: the US has overwhelming superiority in
conventional military forces and a vast, potent nuclear arsenal. It
maintains substantial combat forces on the periphery of Russia and China
but faces no such peril itself. Despite these realities, the new NPR
claims the US is severely threatened by Russia and China, and so must
acquire more nuclear weapons and be prepared to use them.
Policy reversed

This is a turnaround from the policies inherited by the Trump
administration. Under the previous strategic overhaul by US authorities,
the Nuclear Posture Review of April 2010, it was policy to reduce the
‘salience’ of nuclear weapons in US military doctrine and to pursue, via
negotiations with other nuclear states, significant reductions in
stockpiles of such munitions.

When first describing this approach, President Barack Obama said in
Prague on 5 April 2009: ‘To put an end to cold war thinking, we will
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy,
and urge others to do the same’ (1). Underlying this outlook was a
conviction that relations among the great powers were capable of steady
improvement, that nuclear war was a diminishing prospect, and that in
consequence, nuclear arsenals could be safely shrunk. The Trump
administration’s review rejects those propositions and goes out of its
way to assert the validity of their polar opposites. In this way, the
new NPR is a manifesto for the ‘new nuclear age’.

    Russia and China have made clear they seek to revise the post-cold
war international order and norms of behavior
    2018 Nuclear Posture Review

Just as the Obama NPR, with its call for diminished nuclear arsenals,
was predicated on the belief that relations among the great powers were
moving toward steady improvement, the Trump NPR pictures the opposite,
and contends that the US arsenal must be significantly upgraded as a
result. Since 2010, it claims, ‘we have seen the return of Great Power
competition. To varying degrees, Russia and China have made clear they
seek to substantially revise the post-cold war international order and
norms of behavior.’ Actions by those countries are cited, including
Russia’s seizure of Crimea and China’s building of military facilities
on contested islands in the South China Sea. Both countries are said to
be ‘pursuing asymmetric ways and means to counter US conventional
capabilities, thereby increasing the risk of miscalculation and the
potential for military confrontation with the United States, its allies,
and partners.’ Russia and China are said to be modernising and expanding
their nuclear arsenals to be even greater perils to the US and its
allies (2).

At no point does the NPR acknowledge any role of the US or its partners
in propelling the alleged deterioration of great power relations. No
mention is made of NATO’s expansion into the territory of the former
Soviet Union or the US’s provocative pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.
That the US continues to have overwhelming superiority in nuclear
weaponry goes unmentioned, as does its massive investment in
conventional and space capabilities. Russia and China are exclusively
blamed for the increase in nuclear tensions.
‘Russia upgrading nuclear arsenal’

Russia is particularly blamed as seeking dominance over all its
neighbours and girding for a war with NATO. In its planning, Russia is
said to place disproportionate reliance on nuclear weapons to intimidate
the West and, if necessary, defeat NATO in battle.

‘Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and
military uses of nuclear weapons,’ the NPR states. To implement this
strategy, Russia is conducting ‘a comprehensive modernisation of its
nuclear arsenal’ which entails ‘multiple upgrades for every leg of the
Russian nuclear triad,’ as well as the introduction of non-strategic
nuclear weapons intended for use on future European battlefields against
NATO’s conventional forces.
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Top secret: Kim Jong-un inspects intercontinental ballistic missile test
fire, July 2017
STF · AFP · Getty

This intense focus on Russia and its purported threat to the US and its
allies is striking, given Donald Trump’s reluctance to criticise
Vladimir Putin for recent international disturbances or to blame Russia
for interference in the 2016 presidential election. Although Trump has
endorsed the modernisation of the US atomic arsenal, he has not spoken
as critically of Russia’s nuclear moves as the Department of Defense, as
reflected in this document. The upper ranks of the US military
establishment are full of career officers who look at the world map and
see Russia, followed by China, North Korea and Iran, as America’s
principal adversaries, and believe US forces must be capable of
overpowering all of them. These officers never embraced the benign world
outlook of President Obama and now, with the White House preoccupied
with internal matters and the Democrats in Congress keen to punish
Moscow for helping elect Trump, see an opportunity to gain funding for
all the new weapons – both nuclear and conventional – they’ve long been
seeking.

It is in this atmosphere of suspicion and animosity that the NPR appears
to have been fashioned. The document points to a revival of great power
rivalry and provocative steps said to have been taken by Russia and
China, and insists the US has no choice but to gird itself for a new
cold war-like era of competition and arms race.
Nuclear arms again to be usable?

Underpinning the entire review is the claim, never actually
substantiated, that Russia and China have increased the perceived
utility of nuclear arms in their defence strategies: ‘While the United
States has continued to reduce the numbers and salience of nuclear
weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite
direction. They have added new types of nuclear capabilities to their
arsenals.’ Here again Russia is said to be the leading culprit, and to
have increased its reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons to deter
attack by superior western forces, or to defeat them in battle if
deterrence failed: ‘Most concerning are Russia’s national security
policies, strategies, and doctrine that include an emphasis on the
threat of limited nuclear escalation.’

The NPR claims Russia has adopted this stance because it has sought to
compensate for its perceived inferiority to western forces on the
European front by turning to the early use of ‘tactical’ or ‘theater’
nuclear weapons. In such a scenario, Russia might employ low-yield
atomic munitions against selected NATO conventional forces to persuade
the West to abandon the fight – a strategy referred to in the US as
‘escalate to de-escalate’. No evidence is provided to support this
claim, and many independent analysts are sceptical that Russian
strategists seriously entertain this notion. Russian military doctrine
does call for the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of an
overwhelming enemy attack on Russian territory, just as NATO doctrine
envisions first use of such munitions in a non-nuclear strategic attack
by Russia on the West.

Nevertheless, it is on this dubious assumption that the Trump NPR calls
for a more flexible weapons-use policy, employing a more diverse range
of weapons systems. The review claims that the Russians may believe that
a US president would hesitate to employ the high-yield nuclear arms
currently in the US arsenal in response to Russian use of a low-yield
weapons, fearing all-out retaliation by Moscow, and insists that the US
must be able to threaten the use of low-yield weapons to close this
supposed gap.
‘Our tailored strategy’

A similar approach is taken toward China. Even though China has
repeatedly declared a no-first-use policy in nuclear weapons, and has a
smaller atomic arsenal than France (3), the NPR states that the US must
be able to threaten it with a wider range of nuclear attacks to deter it
from contemplating first use: ‘Our tailored strategy for China is
designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could
secure an advantage through the limited use of theater nuclear
capabilities.’

Other countries, including North Korea, could become targets for US
nuclear weapons in the future. Noting that North Korea relies on
underground facilities to protect its vital military systems, the NPR
states that ‘the United States will continue to field a range of
conventional and nuclear capabilities to hold such targets at risk.’
Because other major threats could emerge – including cyber and space –
the review incorporates a hedge strategy intended to ensure that the US
will always have wide nuclear response options.
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Operation Inherent Resolve: F/A-18E Super Hornet on the supercarrier USS
Dwight D Eisenhower in the Mediterranean, July 2016
Alberto Pizzoli · AFP · Getty

The review affirms that for all this to be credible, the existing US
arsenal must be completely rebuilt and new types of munitions added; the
arsenal was largely constructed decades ago and is nearing or has
exceeded its intended life. Each leg of the nuclear triad –
ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers carrying
gravity bombs and air-launched-cruise missiles (ALCMs) – must be
replaced with new, more capable systems.

Obama, in attempting to gain Congressional support for seeking deep cuts
in strategic nuclear weapons via arms control agreements with Russia,
agreed to begin initial design work on the replacement systems. These
were to include: a new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) to
replace existing Minuteman ICBMs; a new class of missile submarines, the
Columbia class; a new bomber, the B-21 Raider, and a new ALCM, the
long-range standoff (LRSO) missile. However, he deferred to his
successor the decision of whether to proceed with the procurement of
these weapons – possibly believing that a President Hillary Clinton
might decide to forego one or more. This was probably wishful thinking
on his part, as Clinton, as senator, was generally hawkish on defence
issues and, as secretary of state and afterwards, conspicuously hostile
toward Moscow.
‘Tailored’ and ‘flexible’

The development and production of these new systems is likely to take
many years and will cost a minimum of $1.2 trillion (4). In accordance
with the NPR, the Trump administration has requested funding in the
budget it submitted to Congress on 12 February. According to the
Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request, $2.3bn will be sought for
development of the B-21 bomber, $3.7bn for the Columbia-class submarine,
$600m for the LRSO missile, and $300m for the GBSD, a total $6.9bn down
payment on the new arsenal.

    To implement the deterrent strategy, the Pentagon also plans to
acquire additional, low-yield munitions for potential use against Russia
and China in battlefield scenarios

To implement the tailored and flexible deterrent strategy, the Pentagon
also plans to acquire additional, low-yield munitions intended for
potential use against Russia and China in battlefield scenarios. These
‘supplements … will enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries
any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a
useful advantage over the United States and its allies.’

The procurement is needed, the NPR states, because Russia may believe
that the US lacks a capacity to counter an enemy’s use of low-yield
nuclear munitions without resorting to high-yield weapons. But this is
untrue, and the Russians know it. As part of its commitment to NATO, the
US stations dual-capable aircraft (DCA), specifically F-15 fighters, in
Europe that could drop B61 low-yield nuclear bombs on Russian forces in
a major European conflagration. New low-yield SLBM warheads and a
nuclear-armed SLCM are not needed to deter Russian first use of tactical
nuclear weapons, but this satisfies a desire to expand the diversity of
the US nuclear arsenal.

Congress still has to appropriate money for all these programmes, and
many will not reach completion for many years. It is possible that some
of the technical dimensions of the NPR will not be fully achieved. Far
more significant is the change in policy and mood, discarding Obama’s
anti-nuclear views: the Trump administration is fully committed to
expanding the perceived utility of atomic weapons in US military
strategy. The anti-Russia climate enveloping the US political class
silences all opposition to the enhancement of US nuclear capabilities;
there has been an almost unanimous adoption of a huge increase in
military spending by both parties’ parliamentarians. This can only
inspire the leaders of Russia and China – and other countries – to adopt
a similar stance, and seek the expansion of their own arsenals. Welcome
to the new nuclear era.

Michael T Klare
Michael T Klare is professor of peace and world security studies at
Hampshire College in Amherst (Massachusetts) and the author of The Race
For What’s Left: the Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources,
Picador/Metropolitan Books, New York, 2012.
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(1) White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama in Prague as delivered’,
April 5, 2009, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/.

(2) US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018. All
subsequent quotations are from this document.

(3) China is thought to have approximately 260 nuclear warheads, France
about 300. See ‘Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance’, Arms Control
Today, March 2017.

(4) See Aaron Mehta, ‘America’s nuclear weapons will cost $1.2 trillion
over the next 30 years’, Defense News, October 31, 2017.