Israel offered to sell nuclear bombs to South Africa in 1975

[Cees Binkhorst]

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http://www.smh.com.au/world/top-secret-israel-offered-to-sell-nuclear-bombs-20100524-w82c.html
CHRIS MCGREAL
May 25, 2010

WASHINGTON: Secret South African documents reveal that Israel offered to
sell nuclear warheads to the apartheid regime, providing the first
official documentary evidence of the state's possession of nuclear weapons.

The top-secret minutes of meetings between officials from the two
countries in 1975 show that South Africa's defence minister, P.W. Botha,
asked for the warheads and Shimon Peres, then Israel's defence minister
and now its president, responded by offering them ''in three sizes''.
The two men also signed an agreement governing military ties between the
two countries that included a clause declaring that ''the very existence
of this agreement'' was to remain secret.

The documents, uncovered by an American academic, Sasha
Polakow-Suransky, in research for a book on the close relationship
between the two countries, provide evidence that Israel has nuclear
weapons despite its policy of ''ambiguity'' in neither confirming nor
denying their existence.

The Israeli authorities tried to stop South Africa's post-apartheid
government declassifying the documents at Polakow-Suransky's request and
the revelations will be an embarrassment, particularly as this week's
nuclear non-proliferation talks in New York focus on the Middle East.

They will also undermine Israel's attempts to suggest that, if it has
nuclear weapons, it is a ''responsible'' power that would not misuse
them, whereas countries like Iran cannot be trusted.

South African documents show that the apartheid-era military wanted the
missiles as a deterrent and for potential strikes against neighbouring
states.

The documents show the two sides met on March 31, 1975, Polakow-Suransky
writes in his book, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Alliance with
Apartheid South Africa, which is published in the US this week. At the
talks Israeli officials ''formally offered to sell South Africa some of
the nuclear-capable Jericho missiles in its arsenal''.

Among those attending the meeting was the South African military chief
of staff, Lieutenant General R. F. Armstrong. He immediately drew up a
memo in which he laid out the benefits of South Africa obtaining the
Jericho missiles but only if they were fitted with nuclear weapons.

The memo, marked ''top secret'' and dated the same day as the meeting
with the Israelis, has previously been revealed but its context was not
fully understood because it was not known to be directly linked to the
Israeli offer on the same day and that it was the basis for a direct
request to Israel.

In it, General Armstrong writes: ''In considering the merits of a weapon
system such as the one being offered, certain assumptions have been
made: a) That the missiles will be armed with nuclear warheads
manufactured in RSA [Republic of South Africa] or acquired elsewhere.''

But South Africa was years away from being able to build atomic weapons.
A little more than two months later, on June 4, Mr Peres and Mr Botha
met in Zurich. By then the Jericho project had the codename Chalet.

The top-secret minutes of the meeting record that ''Minister Botha
expressed interest in a limited number of units of Chalet subject to the
correct payload being available.'' The document then records: ''Minister
Peres said the correct payload was available in three sizes. Minister
Botha expressed his appreciation and said that he would ask for advice.''

The ''three sizes'' are believed to refer to conventional, chemical and
nuclear weapons.

The use of a euphemism, the ''correct payload'', reflects Israeli
sensitivity over the nuclear issue and would not have been used had it
been referring to conventional weapons. It can also only have meant
nuclear warheads as General Armstrong's memorandum makes clear South
Africa was interested in the Jericho missiles solely as a means of
delivering nuclear weapons.

Mr Botha did not go ahead with the deal in part because of the cost. In
addition, any deal would have had to have the final approval by Israel's
prime minister and it is uncertain it would have been forthcoming.

South Africa eventually built its own nuclear bombs, possibly with
Israeli assistance. But the collaboration on military technology only
grew over the following years. South Africa also provided much of the
yellowcake uranium that Israel required to develop its weapons.

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