Is Saving Karzai Worth U.S. Lives?

[Cees Binkhorst]

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

Moeilijk als je weet dat de broer er een vermogen aan verdient.
Nog moeilijker als je weet dat je industrie er een vermogen aan
verdient.
Het wordt pas echt moeilijk als je dat ook nog eens aan je kiezers moet
verkopen?
Zij eindigen immers met de gevolgen van de trauma's waardoor ze zo
schietgraag worden.

Groet / Cees

PS. 1 op de 6 van de soldaten (let wel het voetvolk, niet de generaals)
eindigt dit soort expedities met een trauma, voor de behandeling van die
trauma's is echter géén aandacht (=geld).

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-11-12/is-saving-karzai-worth-us-lives/
Is Saving Karzai Worth U.S. Lives?

As the U.S. envoy casts doubt on an Afghan troop surge, America takes a
skeptical new look at its dodgy partner. Reihan Salam on why we have to
hold our nose and make it work.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s relationship with the Obama White House
is badly broken, and it's hard to see how it can be fixed. Ambassador
Karl Eikenberry's explosive call to rethink a troop increase in
Afghanistan has renewed doubts within the Obama administration and the
larger Democratic foreign-policy community about whether Karzai's
government, in its current incarnation, is worth fighting and dying for.
And though the president seems to be inching towards a substantial troop
increase, these nagging doubts have led to a call for a narrower, more
defined commitment to Afghanistan. The fear is that the U.S. mission has
become "too big to fail," and that Karzai, like a profligate Wall Street
tycoon, is taking the American taxpayer for a ride without making the
painful sacrifices necessary to create a viable nation-state.

For years, American officials have been profoundly concerned by Karzai's
erratic behavior and reports that he tolerates corruption at the highest
levels of his government. As Rajiv Chandrasekaran of the Washington Post
reported in May, the president's advisors had decided "to maintain an
arm's-length relationship" with Karzai, and to channel resources to
local officials rather than through the Karzai-controlled central
government. To that end, President Obama abandoned President Bush's
practice of talking to the Afghan president at least twice a month, and
he rebuffed all efforts to strike up a closer working relationship.
Because Bush had grown so close to Karzai, some critics believed that he
—the cowboy president—had grown too deferential. The idea was that by
giving Karzai the cold shoulder, Obama would have an easier time
demanding results.

But while Bush's partnership with Karzai was problematic, it might
nevertheless have been the best approach. Once seen as staunchly
pro-American, he has grown increasingly critical of the United States,
particularly over heavy civilian casualties that have sparked outrage
among Afghans. One interpretation of Karzai's egregious ballot-stuffing
during the first and only round of Afghanistan's national elections is
that Obama's decision to create some distance deepened Karzai's already
deep paranoia. If Karzai were a clingy ex, Obama could then change his
phone number or, in the worst-case scenario, file a restraining order.
Instead, Karzai is essential to achieving Obama's strategic objectives
in South Asia.

For some in Obama's inner circle, the fraudulent election simply
confirmed long-held suspicions about Karzai's trustworthiness. Yet that
ignores the extent to which he feels as though he has been let down by
the United States, under President Obama but also under President Bush.
Though one can hardly characterize Iraq as a stunning success, Iraqi
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki consolidated his hold on power only after
the United States seized the initiative from the insurgency. Had Maliki
been left to his own devices, it is easy to imagine him flailing and
eventually being overthrown by a Shia politician willing to take a
harder line.

Those who believe that the war in Afghanistan can be salvaged maintain
that a successful U.S.-led counterinsurgency effort could give Karzai
the breathing room he needs to strengthen the Afghan state, or it will
allow others in a national unity government to do the same. Now,
however, the Taliban are very much on the rise, and Karzai finds himself
forced to make grubby compromises to maintain his grip on power. He has
thus stacked his cabinet with a number of unsavory characters, including
some notorious human-rights violators like General Abdul Rashid Dostum,
further alienating him from his American allies. Karzai's harshest
critics believe that he hasn't done enough to take on corruption and
warlordism and the poppy trade. This begs the question: how can we
expect the Afghan president to wage war on corruption and crime when
he’s barely keeping his head above water?

Rather than rethink the arm's-length approach, the Obama White House
seems prepared to double down on it. Earlier talk of doing an end-run
around Karzai's central government was mostly talk, but that seems to be
changing. Supporting promising local leaders instead of Kabul sounds
like a decent option. Looked at it another way, however, and it
certainly sounds as though the United States is looking to cultivate
warlords of its own—a step that won't exactly improve the relationship.
Of all the miserably bad options facing the president and his cabinet,
the view reportedly backed by Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, and Admiral
Mike Mullen has the best chance of success: commit to a large troop
increase—in the neighborhood of 30,000 or more—in an effort to secure
the Afghan population and give the country's civilian leadership,
including the paranoid and problematic Karzai, the time and the tools
the need to eventually do the job on their own.

**********
Dit bericht is verzonden via de informele D66 discussielijst (D66 at nic.surfnet.nl).
Aanmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SUBSCRIBE D66 uwvoornaam uwachternaam
Afmelden: stuur een email naar LISTSERV at nic.surfnet.nl met in het tekstveld alleen: SIGNOFF D66
Het on-line archief is te vinden op: http://listserv.surfnet.nl/archives/d66.html
**********