Is the Israel Lobby getting weaker?

[Cees Binkhorst]

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

Naar mijn mening verdient Obama veel lof voor zijn gebalanceerde manier
van werken om 'de boel op orde te brengen' in het Midden-Oosten. Hij doet
het met heel veel finesse.
Maar hij is er ook van overtuigd dat hij de steun heeft van de meerderheid
van de mensen van Joodse afkomst in de USA en ver daarbuiten.
Waarschijnlijk had Premier Rabin soortgelijke gedachten, toen hij bezig
was met de Oslo-akkoorden!
Naar mijn mening verdient Obama veel lof voor zijn gebalanceerde manier
van werken om 'de boel op orde te brengen' in het Midden-Oosten. Hij doet
het met heel veel finesse.
Maar hij is er ook van overtuigd dat hij de steun heeft van de meerderheid
van de mensen van Joodse afkomst in de USA en ver daarbuiten.
Waarschijnlijk had Premier Rabin soortgelijke gedachten, toen hij bezig
was met de Oslo-akkoorden!

Volgens mij zijn er (naast de geloofsfanaten) genoeg mensen, die geen weet
willen hebben van een twee staten-oplossing. Enerzijds omdat in Israel de
Arabische bevolking sneller groeit dan de Joodse bevolking, anderzijds
omdat Israel dan ook de concurrentie aan zal moeten gaan met Soennitische
en Shiïtische buren en de technologisch wapenvoorsprong dan langzaam
minder zal worden. De technische ontwikkelingen in Iran b.v. hebben niet
stilgestaan. En zodra er een klimaat is dat uitwisseling van kennis tot
stand komt zal deze ontwikkeling in een versnelling komen.

Groet / Cees

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/03/is_the_israel_lobby_getting_weaker
Is the Israel Lobby getting weaker?
Wed, 06/03/2009 - 12:40pm

Several people have recently asked me if the Obama administration's tough
line towards Israel's settlements and its insistence on a two-state
solution invalidates the arguments that John Mearsheimer and I made about
the political influence of the "Israel lobby." Not surprisingly, a few
critics
(http://www.aish.com/jewishissues/middleeast/The_Israel_Lobby_Missing_in_Action.asp)
have made similar points in print. For what it's worth, I think Obama's
approach is largely consistent with the views we set forth in the book,
and certainly with our overall aim in writing it.

To review: in our book we argued that U.S. Middle East policy in recent
decades has been strongly influenced by a loose coalition of individuals
and groups which we termed the "Israel lobby." We pointed out that the
lobby did not "control" U.S. Middle East policy (though it was a powerful
influence), and we emphasized that the various groups that made up this
loose coalition didn't agree on everything (such as the merits of a
two-state solution). All of them have sought to encourage a "special
relationship" between the U.S. and Israel, however, and all to maintain
nearly-unconditional U.S. support. Absent their influence, we argued, U.S.
policy in the region would be substantially (though not entirely)
different.

Like plenty of other interest groups in the United States, the Israel
lobby worked in legitimate ways within the American political system and
successfully acted to shape public discourse about Israel in ways they
believed would reinforce the special relationship. As a result, the entire
subject had become something of a taboo issue, especially for anyone
seeking a prominent career in American politics or in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.

Finally, we saw this situation as increasingly harmful to U.S. and Israeli
interests alike, and argued that a more normal relationship would be
better for both countries. In particular, we hoped that a more open
discussion of these issues would lead to a revision in U.S. policy, and
that more moderate and sensible groups within the "pro-Israel" community
would become more influential. We even expressed the hope that the more
hardline groups might reconsider their policy positions. In short, our
main concern was not the existence of a powerful pro-Israel lobby; it was
the fact that the most influential groups within that "loose coalition"
were advocating policies that were harmful to the U.S. and Israel alike.

This basic portrait of the lobby's activities and influence fit the
historical record up through the 2008 Presidential election. What has
happened since? After pandering to the lobby during the campaign (just as
all major candidates do) and remaining studiously silent during the Chas.
Freeman debacle, President Obama has taken several recent steps that
signal a different approach. He has appointed a Middle East envoy (George
Mitchell) with a reputation for evenhandedness. Obama wasn't available to
meet with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu during the AIPAC policy
conference, so Netanyahu had to delay his trip. Obama has already spoken
in one Muslim country (Turkey) and is about to give a major address to the
Muslim world from Cairo, after first stopping off in Saudi Arabia, and
isn't touching down in Israel on this tour.

Most importantly, he and other administration officials -- including
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and White House Chief of Staff Rahm
Emanuel -- have forcefully reiterated the Administration’s commitment to a
genuine two-state solution and its opposition to Israel's settlements
policy, including the fig leaf of "natural growth." That position was
recently echoed (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1088993.html) by
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, which suggests that
Obama's team has been quietly lining up EU support for their position.
Special envoy Mitchell reportedly drove that point home
(http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1089723.html) in his recent meeting
with Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak, and there’s no question that
Israeli leaders are feeling
(http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/28/netanyahu_what_the_hell_do_they_want_with_me)
the heat.  And Obama himself has emphasized that "part of being a good
friend is being honest
(http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104798978),"
suggesting that he understands the pitfalls of unconditional U.S. support.

Do all these steps mean the lobby has lost all its power, and that our
book was all wrong? Not hardly.

Let's start by recognizing that all Obama has done so far is lay down some
rhetorical markers. That's not a trivial step, especially since he and his
aides have used unusually direct language and haven’t waffled in the face
of initial Israeli protests. If nothing else, these declarations make it
harder for Obama to backtrack later on and mark a clear departure from
Bush’s (failed) approach. But Obama has yet to put any real pressure on
Israel, and he certainly hasn’t tried to make U.S. support (still over $3
billion/year) conditional on Israeli compliance. And the main bone of
contention right now is simply whether Israel is willing to stop expanding
(http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2009/06/02/7071/)
settlements; we haven't even gotten to all the steps that will be
necessary to make a viable Palestinian state possible.

Furthermore, we pointed out in our book that the lobby exerted more
influence in Congress than on the Executive Branch, and we noted that
several past Presidents (e.g., Jimmy Carter and George H. W. Bush) had
been able to put limited pressure on Israel in recent decades. So mild
Presidential pressure on Israel is hardly unprecedented. In the meantime,
the situation on the Hill hasn't changed very much: a recent
AIPAC-sponsored "Dear Colleague" letter telling Obama to privately
coordinate his Mideast diplomacy with Israel (and proposing various
conditions on the Palestinians) garnered 76 signatures in the Senate and
329 in the House.  And there are signs that Israel's supporters on the
Hill are beginning to mobilize
(http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23207.html) in more direct
ways.

Nonetheless, there are also signs that AIPAC's control on the Hill may be
diminishing too, Richard Silverstein has pointed out
(http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2009/05/29/frank-and-filner-refuse-to-sign-aipac-letter/)
that two prominent progressive Democrats -- Barney Frank (D-MA) and Robert
Filner (D-CA)--did not sign the AIPAC letter, and recent meetings between
Netanyahu and several congressmen (including John Kerry of Massachusetts,
who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations committee) included sharp
exchanges over Israel’s settlements policy.  Most of the signatures on
those two AIPAC letters were probably pro forma anyway, and they don’t
seem to have had the chilling effect that AIPAC-sponsored missives had in
previous eras. Thus far, Congressional pressure on Obama seems intended to
moderate the Administration’s positions, but not derail its efforts
entirely.

So where does this leave our arguments about the lobby's profound influence?

First, our main goal in writing our book was to encourage a more open
discussion of this issue. We were describing the situation as it existed
up through 2007 (when we finished the book), but we believed that if the
taboo were challenged and a more open discourse emerged, more and more
Americans would realize that the "status quo" lobby (e.g, AIPAC, the
Christian Zionists, the neoconservatives, and groups like the Zionist
Organization of America) were advocating policies that were bad for the
United States and also bad for Israel itself. The good news is that a more
open discussion has emerged in recent years, as illustrated by Jimmy
Carter’s book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, by numerous commentators in
the blogosphere like Ezra Klein, Phil Weiss, Andrew Sullivan, Richard
Silverstein, Matt Yglesias, and others, and by clear-eyed columnists such
as Roger Cohen. Jon Stewart's Daily Show has done its part too, with some
pointed commentary on Gaza
(http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=213380) and at
least one wickedly satirical look at AIPAC
(http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=171492&title=indecision-5768)
itself.

Second, partly because of this more open discourse, more and more people
-- including Americans who care strongly about Israel's well-being -- have
begun to realize that failure to achieve a two-state solution is
jeopardizing Israel’s long-term future.  As we wrote in our book and as
I’ve blogged
(http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/28/the_treason_of_the_hawks)
about before, the only alternatives to a two-state solution are the ethnic
cleansing of millions of Palestinians, the creation of a binational
democracy, or some form of apartheid. That is why Ehud Olmert eventually
came around to the two-state solution, and people who used to reject the
idea of pressure have begun to see the light. Even Martin Indyk
(http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/ambassador-indyk-tells-all-pretty-amazing-interview)
is starting to sound a little bit like us. In other words, what it means
to be "pro-Israel" is being redefined
(http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/05/its_time_to_redefine_pro_israel),
thereby creating space for Obama to move toward a more sensible U.S.
policy.

Third, events in the region have reinforced this growing sense that a
different course of action is needed. The 2006 war in Lebanon and the
recent carnage in Gaza have underscored the futility of trying to solve
these problems by force alone and cast doubt in Israel's efforts to
portray itself as the eternal victim. More and more people are aware of
the long-term demographic trends, and they also know that the Arab League
has offered to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel once the
Palestinians have a viable state of their own. Some people also realize
that settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would remove an arrow from
Iran’s quiver and make it easier to mobilize a united front against Iran
should that become necessary. Of course, the election of the most
right-wing government in Israel's history (and the appointment of Avigdor
Lieberman as Foreign Minister) hasn’t made it any easier for defenders of
the status quo either.

Fourth, the behavior of some of Israel’s most fervent defenders may have
helped open eyes and ears as well. In particular, the reflexive tendency
to smear and marginalize critics of the "special relationship" by accusing
them of being either anti-semites or "self-hating" Jews has become a
self-discrediting enterprise, because the charge keeps getting directed at
people for whom it is so obviously false. Condemning neo-Nazis and
Holocaust deniers is a worthy enterprise, but smearing respected
individuals such as Carter, Desmond Tutu, Tony Kushner, Tony Judt, or
others is transparently bogus and intended solely to stifle intelligent
discourse on a vital subject. And when defenders of any cause have to
stoop to such tactics, it reveals that they are defending an increasingly
weak case.

Finally, we argued in the conclusion of our book, part of the solution
here was the emergence of a different sort of pro-Israel lobby, one that
might be equally influential but in the service of smarter policies. There
are encouraging signs on this front, and the increased prominence of
groups such as J Street, the Israel Policy Forum, or Brit Tzedek v'Shalom
are encouraging developments. There is no reason why groups like AIPAC
cannot evolve too, and begin to use their considerable political acumen in
the service of a more far-sighted approach.

People who think that the Israel lobby is some sort of secret Jewish
conspiracy probably also believe that its influence could never be
countered and that the groups within it are irredeemable. That is the
essence of conspiracy theories -- and especially anti-Semitic ones--they
impute dark and magical powers to some secret organization or cabal and
portray it as evil, all-powerful, unchanging, and unstoppable. By
contrast, those of us who see the lobby as a typical interest group
engaged in the normal rough-and-tumble of democratic politics have
recognized that its considerable influence (which no one seriously denies)
could be mitigated or modified over time, especially once it became clear
that the policies promoted by its most powerful components were in fact
harmful to U.S. and Israeli interests alike. We wrote our book to
contribute to that process, and while realists should probably never be
too optimistic -- and especially about the Middle East -- it's hard for me
not to see the recent turn in U.S. policy as encouraging. Now let's see
what Obama says in Cairo.

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