Export nucleair materiaal bestraft, nu Lubbers nog

[Henk Elegeert]

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

Teletekst za 17 dec
  ***************************************
     Export nucleair materiaal bestraft
  ***************************************
  ALKMAAR Een 61-jarige man heeft 100.000
  euro boete en een jaar cel gekregen
  voor de illegale export van nucleaire
  technologie naar Pakistan.Acht maanden
  van de celstraf zijn voorwaardelijk.

  Twee bedrijven van de man kregen ook
  bijna 100.000 euro boete.Een medewerker
  kreeg 180 uur werkstraf,drie maanden
  voorwaardelijk en 5.000 euro boete.

  Volgens de rechter kunnen met de
  onderdelen massavernietigingswapens
  worden gemaakt.De bedrijven deden zaken
  met een Pakistaans bedrijf dat nauwe
  banden heeft met atoomspion Khan,die in
  1983 is veroordeeld voor diefstal van
  Nederlandse atoomgeheimen.

"


Ha kijk, dat biedt nog eens perspectief.

Hier liet MP (Lubbers) een spion lopen op verzoek van een Amerikaanse
organisatie (CIA), toch? Dat ondanks dat dit land tekende voor (Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty van 1968) om verpreiding tegen te gaan.

En vormt atoomspion Khan niet tevens de basis voor de Iraanse?

Henk Elegeert


http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html
"
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Background

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objectives are to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of
achieving general and complete disarmament. The Treaty establishes a
safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA, which also plays
a central role under the Treaty in areas of technology transfer for
peaceful purposes.

For additional information, see document INFCIRC/140 [pdf].
(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf)

Also see the report on the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference
(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull373/priest.html);
and the 2000 NTP Review Conference
(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Npt/npt2000.shtml).
"


http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/npt_chrono.html
1960 - 1969
"
16 September 1968: The IAEA revises its safeguards system with further
additional provisions for safeguarded nuclear material in conversion
plants and fabrication plants.

1 July 1968: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(also known as the "Non-Proliferation Treaty", or the "NPT") is opened
for signature in London, Moscow and Washington—the United Kingdom, the
USSR and the United States having been designated the depositary
Governments.

19 June 1968: The UN Security Council adopts resolution 255 (1968) on
security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

12 June 1968: After further revision—concerning mainly the preamble and
articles IV and V—the General Assembly commends the draft text of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is annexed to
Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII).

January - March 1968: The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
examines further revisions of the draft treaty texts submitted by the
USSR and the United States, which incorporate some of the suggestions of
the non-nuclearweapon States, and submits another revision to the
General Assembly at its resumed twenty-second session.

1 January 1968: The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) enters into force.

19 December 1967: The General Assembly adopts resolution 2346 A (XXII),
in which it requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to
present it with a full report on the negotiations on a non-proliferation
treaty on or before 15 March 1968.

August 1967: The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament considers two
separate but identical draft texts of a non-proliferation treaty,
submitted by the USSR and the United States, as well as a number of
amendments submitted by other members.

14 February 1967: The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) is opened for
signature in Mexico City. The Treaty establishes the first
nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region, and creates the
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (OPANAL) to oversee its implementation.

27 January 1967: The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) is opened for signature
(A/RES/2222 (XI), annex). The Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear
weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in outer space,
stipulating that that environment shall be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes.

November 1966: The General Assembly adopts two resolutions on
nonproliferation: resolution 2149 (XXI), by which it appeals to all
States, pending conclusion of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, to
renounce actions that might hamper agreement on such a treaty, and
resolution 2153 A (XXI), in which it calls upon the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament to give priority to the question of
non-proliferation and also to consider the question of assurances to
non-nuclear-weapon States.

1965: The IAEA revises its safeguards system.

19 November 1965: On the initiative of eight non-aligned States, the
General Assembly adopts resolution 2028 (XX), which contains five
principles on which negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty is to be based.

24 September 1965: The USSR submits to the General Assembly a draft
treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

17 August 1965: The United States submits to the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons.

16 October 1964: China tested its first nuclear bomb.

5 August 1963: The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (the Partial Test-Ban Treaty)
is signed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.
On 8 August, it is opened for signature in Moscow, London and Washington.

4 December 1961: On the initiative of Sweden, the General Assembly
adopts resolution 1664 (XVI), by which it requests the Secretary-General
to inquire under what conditions States not possessing nuclear weapons
would be willing to undertake not to acquire them.

Upon the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly adopts, without a
vote, resolution 1665 (XVI), by which it calls upon the nuclear-weapon
States in particular to endeavour to conclude an international agreement
on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and upon all States to cooperate
for this purpose.

1961: The IAEA establishes its first safeguards system.

20 December 1960: On the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly
adopts resolution 1576 (XV), by which it calls upon both nuclear- and
non-nuclear-weapon States, pending agreement on the prevention of wider
dissemination of nuclear weapons, to refrain, as a temporary and
voluntary measure, from acts that would lead to further proliferation.

13 February 1960: France tested its first nuclear bomb.
"

http://www.iaea.org/PrinterFriendly/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2005/derspiegel21022005.html
Der Spiegel Interview, 21 February 2005
"
"Al-Qaida also Wants the Bomb"
DER SPIEGEL Interview with Mohamed ElBaradei
21 February 2005

See DER SPIEGEL.
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,343030,00.html)

United Nations chief weapons inspector Mohamed ElBaradei discusses the
risks posed by potential new nuclear powers like North Korea and Iran,
the chances of reining in a nuclear black market for terrorist
organizations and the controversy surrounding his re-election.

SPIEGEL: Mr. ElBaradei, North Korea announced two weeks ago that it is
now a nuclear power. Does Pyongyang really have the bomb? And if so, how
great is the risk that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il will use it?

MOHAMED ELBARADEI, DIRECTOR GENERAL, IAEA: I am extremely concerned
about the development in North Korea, even though I cannot say with
absolute certainty that Pyongyang already has a usable nuclear weapon.
They certainly have the know-how and enough plutonium for at least six
to eight bombs. A little more than two years ago, we had to shut down
our last on-site monitoring activities and were thrown out of the
country. This gave the North Koreans time to continue developing a
military nuclear program. But they could also be exaggerating. The
regime apparently sees the nuclear bomb as its only trump card for
negotiations.

SPIEGEL: How will the world find out whether Kim is bluffing? And if he
isn't, how can we defuse his bomb?

ELBARADEI: There is only one solution. North Korea´s nuclear facilities
must be returned to the supervision of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Pyongyang apparently feels internationally isolated,
threatened militarily and in an economically desperate situation.

SPIEGEL: Through its own fault.

ELBARADEI: Be that as it may. The regime could only be convinced to give
up its nuclear weapons with a comprehensive package solution arrived at
through negotiation, a solution that addresses these fears and also
offers economic incentives.

SPIEGEL: You assume that Kim Jong Il is not a hot-headed, unscrupulous
adventurer, or even a lunatic, but rather a coolly calculating politician.

ELBARADEI: I must assume that he is interested in improving the quality
of life in his country. After all, a collapse would put the survival of
his regime in serious jeopardy. I urge him to allow the IAEA to return
to North Korea. And if a special gesture is needed, I would be happy to
go there myself.

SPIEGEL: The Bush administration seems more concerned about Tehran´s
nuclear program than that of North Korea. The Iranian government claims
it is only interested in nuclear energy for civilian uses. However,
former CIA director James Woolsey says that there is "not a shadow of a
doubt" that Iran´s leadership is trying to build its own nuclear
weapons. Who is correct?

ELBARADEI: We at the IAEA lack conclusive evidence. We have yet to see a
smoking gun that would convict Tehran. I can make assumptions about
intentions, but I cannot verify intentions, just facts.

SPIEGEL: But Iran repeatedly lied to and deceived your agency. For
example, the world only found out about the nuclear enrichment facility
in Natans through information provided by Iranian dissidents. Hardliners
in the Bush administration have accused you of being inexplicably soft
on the Iranians.

ELBARADEI: It´s not a matter of dispute as to whether Iran lied and
deceived in the past. We made that very clear in our reports. In the
meantime, however, Iran has improved its cooperation, which, as a
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is obligated
to provide. In response to our pressure, Tehran also signed the
supplementary protocol last year, which allows us to perform more
comprehensive inspections on short notice. I am certainly proud of what
we have accomplished in Iran. Eighteen months ago, the country was more
of a black hole for us...

SPIEGEL: ...which goes to show how completely the IAEA inspections had
failed...

ELBARADEI: ...but now we have a rather clear picture of what is
happening there.

SPIEGEL: Really? Or has the game of hide-and-seek just taken on a new,
more refined form? Hardly any European expert is willing to believe the
claims coming out of Tehran. After all, Iran has enough oil and
especially natural gas that it could do without nuclear power.

ELBARADEI: There is a technical justification for everything. And I´m
not saying that the rulers in Iran are not interested in acquiring
nuclear weapons. If they have decided to operate a secret nuclear
weapons program - for which we, as I mentioned, have not found any
evidence to date -- they are likely to have a bomb in two to three
years. They certainly have the know-how and the industrial infrastructure.

SPIEGEL: The Americans and the Israelis will hardly permit that to
happen. That leaves only the military option, which US President Bush
has expressly declined to rule out. But is it really possible to destroy
Iran's nuclear facilities with missiles? Aren´t they too widely
dispersed and in some cases underground?

ELBARADEI: Aside from the problems you mention, I do not believe that
military strikes can solve this problem. They can delay development at
best. Following an attack, the Iranians would most certainly go
underground to produce a weapon as quickly and deliberately as possible.

SPIEGEL: What is the best way to deter them from acquiring nuclear weapons?

ELBARADEI: We need the IAEA inspections. But we also need diplomatic
initiatives, such as those initiated by London, Paris and Berlin, which
I strongly welcome. However, in my opinion they can only be successful
if the United States joins in and throws its weight behind Europe. We
need a united front.

SPIEGEL: That seems unlikely. On the one hand, Tehran is making things
difficult for the Europeans, because it´s playing for time during
negotiations and isn´t making any verifiable concessions. On the other
hand, the US government refuses to use carrots with the Iranians, only
sticks.

ELBARADEI: The Iranians are clearly interested in greater military
security, economic relief and technology transfer. It would be difficult
to imagine it achieving any advances in these areas without Washington.
Tehran wants to join the World Trade Organization, but that depends on
the United States, which already imposed a trade embargo on Iran years ago.

SPIEGEL: Despite the Americans´ failings, we certainly can´t have a
situation in which countries such as North Korea and Iran are actually
rewarded for violating international commitments. Or do you share the
view, held by many Third World countries, that the 1968 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty is unfair because it sanctioned the then five
nuclear powers and excluded the "have-nots" from acquiring nuclear weapons?

ELBARADEI: The NPT only legitimized the arsenal of the then nuclear
powers because those powers also agreed to disarm and to pass on their
knowledge about civil uses of nuclear power. There were some encouraging
steps in the direction of disarmament in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
but they've almost come to a standstill. Tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons still exist today - far too many. The current American
discussion surrounding "mini-nukes" also contradicts the spirit of the
treaty. In this respect, I can understand the criticism coming from the
Third World. On the other hand, of course, we cannot constantly have new
kids showing up and trying to blackmail everyone else with nuclear
weapons, be they real or virtual. Or that they believe this is the only
way to guarantee their own security.

SPIEGEL: The new kids are probably saying to themselves that the world
accepted, without much objection, the fact that India, Pakistan and
Israel became nuclear powers.

ELBARADEI: In each individual case, we must try to understand what
motivates a country to take this step, what national humiliation, what
security concerns. And we must try to dispel these fears. Otherwise,
given the pace of technological advances, we will have 20 new nuclear
powers in 20 years. Everyone wants to play with the big boys, and the
only way to become one of the big boys is to have nuclear toys.

SPIEGEL: You sound like a teacher looking for a compromise, a man who
has to forbid his charges from doing something without being able to
offer much more than a few sweets.

ELBARADEI: I´ve already drawn the same comparison in discussions with my
wife. She teaches at a kindergarten, and we agree that we sometimes use
similar approaches.

SPIEGEL: You have been familiar with the nuclear issue for decades. Has
the risk that a nuclear weapon could in fact be used ever been as great
as it is today?

ELBARADEI: Never. We will come closer to nuclear war if we do not
consider a new international control system. Three phenomena have
radically changed the world in recent years. First we have the tenacious
efforts on the part of a few countries to master the technology to
produce weapons grade fissile material, second, the development of an
international black market for nuclear material and, finally, the
declared intention of terrorists to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

SPIEGEL: Do you truly believe that a terrorist organization could build
nuclear weapons?

ELBARADEI: Al-Qaida also wants the bomb. According to documents found in
Afghanistan, the organization was looking into ways to acquire such
weapons. There are no indications that they have succeeded. There is
also no evidence that terrorists, in the confusion following the breakup
of the Soviet Union, managed to get their hands on a significant amount
of nuclear material. But it cannot be ruled out. Terrorists would be
likely to detonate the bomb. It's part of the nature of their ideology
that they could not be deterred from doing so. I keep my fingers crossed
that this scenario will never happen.

SPIEGEL: Can you do more than keep your fingers crossed?

ELBARADEI: We are working hard on exposing the black market and its many
facets. I would love to be able to say that we have figured out exactly
what happened where and when, and, perhaps, what is still happening.
It's a market that involves a tremendous amount of cleverness and huge
sums of money. The players are business-savvy scientists, unscrupulous
companies, possibly even government organizations - a true nuclear
supermarket.

SPIEGEL: The network that developed around Pakistan´s "father of the
nuclear bomb" has been destroyed for the most part. Abdul Qadir Khan has
confessed to having delivered technology and construction plans to
Libya, and is currently under house arrest in Islamabad. His most
important source, Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir, is in a Malaysian prison. Do
you have access to these two men?

ELBARADEI: IAEA experts were able to have an extended conversation with
Tahir. We would like to talk to Khan, but the Pakistani government
hasn´t allowed us to do so yet. But we are permitted to submit written
questions, which are then answered. The investigation is underway, and
the results are secret. But everything that I hear sounds promising.

SPIEGEL: Nuclear smuggler Khan visited North Korea more than a dozen
times. One of the greatest fears now is that Pyongyang could become the
center of the international black market.

ELBARADEI: A regime that is isolated, suffers from a dramatic shortage
of funds and feels driven into a corner could certainly hit upon such
export ideas.

SPIEGEL: Don´t you have to admit to yourself, to your organization and
to the entire world that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has failed?

ELBARADEI: The NPT has given us some successes in recent years, but it
is correct to say that things cannot continue this way. It´s absolutely
essential that we amend the treaty. This May, we will have a unique
opportunity to make the world a safer place. The world's most important
heads of state will meet in New York for the NPT Review Conference,
which takes place once every five years.

SPIEGEL: What will you propose?

ELBARADEI: To intensify security inspections by making inspections, now
based on the supplementary protocol, the norm. To automatically impose
sanctions by the UN Security Council for violations against the NPT,
especially withdrawal from the treaty. To bring weapons-grade material,
such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium, under multinational
control. Everyone will have to give up something, because we are
standing with our backs against a wall. The construction of new plants
for producing fissile material must be suspended for at least five
years. Nuclear powers must guarantee the have-nots the delivery of
nuclear fuel for civilian use in return for the non-nuclear powers
agreeing to do without the technology, and must also disarm more quickly
and comprehensively.

SPIEGEL: That´s an ambitious program that requires a radical shift in
thinking. What makes you optimistic that all the key players won´t just
play for time once again?

ELBARADEI: Everyone must understand that time happens not to be on our
side this time. That political tensions in some regions, such as the
Middle East and the Korean peninsula, will fuel the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons. That we cannot get the genie of
nuclear weapons back into the bottle.

SPIEGEL: The conference in May could also be one of your last official
appearances. Hardliners in the Bush administration are trying to force
you out. Do Washington´s hawks hate you because you were so on the money
in your assessment of Iraq´s supposed nuclear weapons potential?

ELBARADEI: I don´t know. The official reason US politicians cite in
opposing my third term is that, in their opinion, two terms are enough.
I will campaign for re-election. I haven´t heard anything about an
opposing candidate yet, and I believe that many countries support me.
Most of them probably wouldn´t stake their lives on me, but they seem to
be able to get along with me rather well.

SPIEGEL: Does it bother you that, according to press reports that have
not been denied, US intelligence apparently bugged your telephone? And
should we assume that someone is also eavesdropping on this interview?

ELBARADEI: I have nothing to hide professionally. But it becomes
unpleasant when you apparently cannot even have a private phone
conversation with your wife or your daughter. There is also a concerted
smear campaign against me. For example, they say things like: An
Egyptian can´t be impartial toward Islamic states, and will tell them
all our secrets. I refuse to comment on people at this low level.

SPIEGEL: And despite all that you would like to continue?

ELBARADEI: I won´t lose any sleep over it if it doesn´t work out. But I
would like to launch the reform of the NPT and move the situation in
North Korea and Iran in a positive direction - from my standpoint of
strict neutrality. After all, I know exactly what the consequences would
be of a major collapse in the mechanisms that control nuclear weapons:
The world, as we know it, would not survive such a tsunami brought about
by human activity.

SPIEGEL: Mr. Baradei, thank you for speaking with us.

Translated from German by Christopher Sultan
"

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