Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction

[Henk Elegeert]

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http://www.pipa.org/articles/WMDstudy_full.pdf

Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction[PDF 1MB]

  Susan D. Moeller

Philip Merrill College of Journalism, University of
Maryland, College Park


"
FOREWORD

The American political system is in the early stages of
contending with an unwelcome but ultimately unavoidable
problem. The United States government initiated war against
Iraq on the basis of an inaccurate representation of the
scope and immediacy of the threat posed, and it did so
without international authority. That has prejudiced the
legitimacy of the occupation, thereby undermining the single
most important ingredient of successful reconstruction. The
consequences are likely to be seriously troublesome over an
extended period of time. Reconstructing Iraq and restoring
international support for nonproliferation policy will
require admission of the original error and correction of
the processes that generated it — a very difficult feat for
any government.

So far, debate about this problem has focused largely on the
Executive Branch, but Congress, the media, independent
security analysts, and indeed the entire US political system
are all implicated. An action of this magnitude and
consequence cannot be exclusively ascribed to the President
and his advisors or to the intelligence community that
provided the information on which their judgments were
based. If we are the democracy we claim to be — and need to
be — then all of our institutions and all individual
citizens bear some responsibility and are obliged to conduct
some self-examination.

Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction is intended to
contribute to this process of reflection and correction.
This study reviews the content of American news media
coverage during three periods of time when issues relating
to what have been ubiquitously termed “weapons of mass
destruction” (WMD) were being featured: May 2003, in the
immediate aftermath of the Iraq war; October 2002, when both
Iraq and North Korea were featured in the news; and May
1998, during the South Asian nuclear tests. It also compares
the US coverage to comparable discussion in the British
media. By analyzing coverage across time and between
countries, it puts current concerns about news reporting on
the war in Iraq into a larger context.


The study makes three important observations.

   First, it documents that virtually all of the news
coverage accepted without serious question the political
formulation “weapons of mass destruction” as a single
category of threat. The very extensive objective differences
in destructive potential among the various agents included
in that category were barely noted if at all.

   Second, the paper analyzes the media’s habit of
associating mass destruction agents with the phenomenon
of terrorism. That is undoubtedly an accurate reflection of
common fears, but it is not an accurate representation of
established fact. No terrorist organization has yet
demonstrated the capacity to perform an act of mass
destruction under a strict definition of that term. There is
an important difference between common fears, however
prudent they might seem, and actionable threat. It is
extremely important that those who wield American military
power understand the difference. Media coverage did not
acknowledge that distinction during the periods examined,
and that is an evident defect.

   Third, the paper notes that established operating
principles of the American media make it easier for the
incumbent President, whoever that might be, to dominate news
coverage by setting the terms of public discussion.
Journalistic standards that are meant to ensure objectivity
and guard against political bias had the effect of
insulating the president from informed critical scrutiny.
That effect was compounded during the latter periods under
review by the media’s inclination to amplify what was
considered to be patriotic sentiment. As a result, the
American media did not play the role of checking and
balancing the exercise of power that the standard theory of
democracy requires.


It is important to note an important substantive omission in
media coverage during the second and third time periods
examined. It would have been especially irresponsible for
the United States military to have initiated military action
against Iraq believing that the country might be able to
improvise massively destructive retaliation but not knowing
where the relevant assets were located. It seems evident in
retrospect, however, that American military commanders were
in fact confident in Fall 2002 and Spring 2003 that Iraq did
not have any truly serious capacity to harm the United
States or any country in the region. That judgment, which
would have undermined the justification for war, was not
recorded in the news reports reviewed.

Recognizing the limited scope of the paper and the magnitude
of the issues in question, we are circulating this study in
hope that it will stimulate productive discussion, further
research, and ultimately greater wisdom.

John Steinbruner
Director Center for International and Security Studies at
Maryland
"

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