Oorlog tegen Irak voor Israel? (of om China voor te zijn?)

[Cees Binkhorst]

REPLY TO: D66 at nic.surfnet.nl

"Mark Giebels" <mark at giebels.org> schreef:
> Beste lijsters,
>
> In een opiniestuk vandaag in de San Francisco Chronicle beweert George
> Bisharat, professor aan de Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco,
> dat de oorlog tegen Irak voornamelijk gepushed is door een klein groepje
> pro-israel extremisten in zowel de CIA en de Bush administration.
> Anti-Israelische propaganda of waarheid? Van allebei een beetje denk ik.
> Groeten,
> Mark
>
[knip]

Een ander klein beetje van de waarheid is de mogelijkheid dat de VS
gewoon China voor wil zijn in het 'bezetten' van 'inkoopmarkten.'
Per slot van rekening zijn het 1,3 miljard mensen die ook wel eens
een kachel willen stoken zonder takken te verzamelen, of even met de
auto naar familie of het strand (:) willen.

THE NEW GREAT GAME By Thomas Woodrow
http://china.jamestown.org/pubs/view/cwe_003_003_001.htm

The former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Azerbaijan sit astride some of the world's most valuable oil and
gas reserves or the routes to those reserves. Access to Central Asian
energy resources, which are just now beginning to be exploited to
their full potential, will be critical to fill the world's ever-
voracious appetite for oil. This is especially true for China, which
has the most rapidly growing economy, and thus the greatest need for
future oil imports, in the world. The gathering political, economic
and military competition amongst China, Russia and the United States
to control Central Asia's energy resources is in effect a new Great
Game, the victor of which will emerge as the major power of the 21st
century.

A net exporter of oil before 1995, China is today one of the world's
largest importers and the third-largest consumer after the United
States and Japan. Largely dependent on Persian Gulf oil to fulfill
its accelerating need for energy resources, Beijing increasingly sees
access to Central Asian reserves through pipelines stretching across
its vast western desert as crucial for national energy security. In
November 2002, China released its oil strategy for the 21st century,
which includes the preparation of strategic oil reserves in
northwestern China. What was left unsaid was growing Chinese unease
at U.S. influence in Central Asian areas that China itself has had
long historical ties to and claims over.
[knip]

Chinese interest in Central Asia has increased markedly in recent
years:
-- In 1997, Beijing won the bidding for the Uzen oilfield against
competition from U.S. companies, including Amoco, Texaco and Unocal.
The Uzen oilfield is Kazakhstan's second-largest oil reserve after
the huge Tengiz fields managed by a U.S.-Russian-European consortium.
China also won the competition to develop Kazakhstan's Aktyubinsk
oilfield and has acquired an interest in the Kursangi and Karabagli
oil fields in Azerbaijan.
-- Beijing has reached an agreement with Kazakhstan to build a
pipeline that will extend 3,000 kilometers from the Chinese-
controlled Kazakh oilfields to northwestern China. In addition to
supplying Chinese needs, Beijing hopes that this pipeline will also
be used to supply Korea and Japan, bypassing the sea routes
controlled by the U.S. and Indian navies. Kazakhstan is currently
transferring 95,000 barrels a day to the Chinese border by rail
through a state-of-the-art Chinese-built rail transfer facility.
-- China has joined a consortium to build a pipeline from the Caspian
to Iranian oil refineries to carry out oil swaps in which Kazakh oil
is shipped to northern Iran while equal amounts of Iranian crude are
shipped from Iran's ports on the Persian Gulf to China. Some analysts
believe China's involvement in the swaps and pipelines suggests that
Beijing may be attempting to exert control over Kazakhstan's exports
both to the east and to the south.

China has also attempted to gain some measure of control over Russian
oil and gas reserves in Siberia. The two sides, however, remain in
disagreement on gas and oil development and on plans for a 2,400-
kilometer pipeline from Siberia to China's main oil/pipeline centre
at Daqing. China wanted outright control over oil and gas, but
offered to pay Russia only as much as Moscow sells gas for
domestically. Beijing also wanted the right to bring in tens of
thousands of Chinese workers to build the pipeline. Moscow,
understandably upset at Chinese attempts to cheap-Charlie the
contract, was probably more concerned at the prospect of a Chinese re-
colonization of parts of Siberia that once belonged to the Chinese
emperor.
[knip]

Groet,

Cees

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